filed the following dissenting opinion.
Trained and accustomed to expect a particular result from a given set of circumstances, many State appellate judges have been traumatically frustrated on Monday after Monday in recent years as decision after decision of the Supreme Court, in its- inexorable march towards complete federalization of the criminal law in this country, has overturned established law and made, what not long ago would have been thought almost fantastic, new law.
As a result, State appellate courts have tended to become conditioned to anticipate that each new decision of the Supreme Court in the criminal field is a forerunner of decisions even more startling and far-reaching, from their point of view, and so, in a sort of hypnotic desperation, to fashion their own opinions and holdings to reflect not only what already actually has been held (as in duty and good conscience they must and should) but what they imagine or suspect soon will be held.
The result in the present case in this Court can be explained, it seems to me, only on this theory and, as I see it, there is not only no necessity to reverse a sound and fairly obtained conviction of guilt in a brutal and senseless murder but an affirmance is called for by the present holdings of the Supreme Court (including Ker v. California 374 U. S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, which, unlike the Supreme Court cases supposed by the majority to control, has quite analogous facts) and many other courts in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice from the point of view of society.
The majority of the five judges of this Court who heard the appeal said: “ [w] e think that our decision is controlled by the Stoner [Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483, 11 L. Ed. 2d 856] and Preston [Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364, L. Ed. 2d 777] cases.” Neither of these cases purported to or did make new law. In Stoner the holding was that a hotel clerk cannot give consent for the absent lessee of a hotel room to the search of that room. The police learned two days after a robbery in Monrovia, California, that a suspect had been living in a hotel in Pomona. They went to the hotel, without either a search or arrest warrant, told the clerk they had come to ap*447prehend a man “who had possibily committed a robbery in the City of Monrovia and were informed that the suspected individual had been occupying room 404 but that he was out and that the clerk knew he was out. Then the police were admitted to room 404 by the clerk who said to them “be my guest” and made a thorough search of the room and its contents, finding a pair of glasses, a gray jacket and a .45 caliber automatic pistol in the bottom of a bureau drawer. The suspect was arrested two days after the search in Las Vegas, Nevada, and returned to stand trial in California. At his trial the articles seized in his room were admitted against him.
The Supreme Court noted that although the District Court of Appeal had reasoned and held that the search was justified as an incident of a lawful arrest, and said that in brief and argument before it California had abandoned and renounced this contention and relied only on the point that the consent of the hotel clerk to the search of Stoner’s room amounted to consent by Stoner. The Court said (pp. 487-488):
“In this Court the respondent has recognized that the reasoning of the California District Court of Appeal cannot be reconciled with our decision in Agnello, nor, indeed, with the most recent California decisions. Accordingly, the respondent has made no argument that the search can be justified as an incident to the petitioner’s arrest. Instead, the argument is made that the search of the hotel room, although conducted without the petitioner’s consent, was lawful because it was conducted with the consent of the hotel clerk. We find this argument unpersuasive.”
The Supreme Court went on to point out that the implied consent theory was not the law of California. In its obiter discussion of the “incident to arrest” theory, the Court said this (pp. 486-487) :
“The District Court of Appeal thought the search was justified as an incident to a lawful arrest. But a search can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially *448contemporaneous with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20. Whatever room for leeway there may be in these concepts, it is clear that the search of the petitioner’s hotel room in Pomona, California, on October 27 was not incident to his arrest in Las Vegas, Nevada, on October 29. The search was completely unrelated to the arrest, both as to time and as to- place. See Preston v. United States, [376 U. S. 364].” (Italics supplied.)
The holding of Preston was that after three occupants of a car had been arrested for vagrancy, searched for weapons and taken to police headquarters, the car which had not been searched at the time of the arrest was driven first to a police station and then towed to a garage. Sometime later it was searched and various items intended to be used to rob a bank named by the men were found and seized. In the trial of the men in a federal court for conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank, the articles taken from the car were admitted into evidence over objection. The Supreme Court held this to have been prejudicial error. The Court said:
“Unquestionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the police have the right, without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the crime. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). This right to search and seize without a search warrant extends to things under the accused’s immediate control, Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S., at 158, [the Court had earlier said of Carroll: “Our cases make it clear that searches of motor cars must meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment before evidence obtained as a result of such searches is admissible.”] and, to an extent depending on the circum*449stances of the case, to the place where he is arrested, Agnello v. United States, supra, 269 U.S., at 30; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927) ; United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1950). * * * Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest. Agnello v. United States, supra, 269 U. S., at 31. Here, we may assume, as the Government urges, that, either because the arrests were valid or because the police had probable cause to think the car stolen, the police had the right to search the car when they first came on the scene. But this does not decide the question of the reasonableness of a search at a later time and at another place. * * * We think that the search was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental to the arrest and conclude, therefore, that the search of the car without a warrant failed to meet the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the search inadmissible.” (pp. 367-368)
The majority of the Court in the present case refer to the rule that the police after a lawful arrest may, without a warrant, search the arrested person and the place where he was arrested, but they feel impelled by Stoner and Preston — erroneously I think the analyses of the cases have shown — to find it inapplicable. Even if the majority were right in this, a corollary of the rule is directly apposite here.
The facts of the instant case fit like a glove that recognized and well established corollary which the majority reject and say “no case” supports. This corollary has two aspects. First, if a peace officer is justified in making an arrest, the fact that the search and seizure precedes rather than follows the arrest is immaterial and, second, the privilege to make an arrest for a criminal offense carries with it the privilege to enter a dwelling place (forcibly if necessary) for the purpose of making the arrest if the person sought is therein, or if the arrestor reason*450ably believes him to be there (Restatement, Torts, Secs. 204, 205, 206; Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 Md. L. Rev. 125, 167) and in such case the officer is not a trespasser, and after such a bona fide entry may make a search and effect a seizure, after a valid arrest or even if there is no arrest (usually because the person sought turns out not to be in the dwelling place).
Judge Traynor said for the Supreme Court of California in People v. Simon, 290 P. 2d 531, 533, in speaking of a justified entry by police: “the security of * * * [one’s] person, house, papers, or effects suffers no more from a search preceding his arrest than it would from the same search following it.” See also Wilson v. Superior Court (Cal.), 294 P. 2d 36, 38; People v. Vice (Cal. App.), 305 P. 2d 270 (Peace officers having cause to do so went to make an arrest of a suspect at his hotel and, thinking he was in his room, caused the clerk to let them in. The suspect was not in his room but narcotics were found there. The police arrested the suspect, a half hour later at another location. The search and seizure were held reasonable and valid.); People v. Dillard (Cal. App.), 335 P. 2d 702; State v. Chinn (Ore.), 373 P. 2d 392 (Officers, in an honest belief that a man they were entitled to arrest was in an apartment, entered and, finding him absent, made a search which revealed incriminating articles. The officers waited in the apartment for several hours and when their quarry returned arrested him. The search and seizure were held reasonable and valid because made in an area in which the officers had a right to be; they were in the apartment in a bona fide attempt to make an arrest [and were not making an exploratory search under the guise of a search incident to arrest] and the search was an incident of the attempt and as reasonable under the circumstances as if it followed a lawful arrest.); People v. Roberts (Cal.), 303 P. 2d 721; State v. Peterson (Ida.), 340 P. 2d 444; Martin v. United States (C. A. 4), 183 F. 2d 436, cert. den. 340 U. S. 904 (Judge Soper, for the Court, held that an officer having probable cause to make an arrest of a probationer for a current violation of law had the authority to enter the probationer’s premises without any warrant, to make an arrest and, therefore, had *451authority to make a search and seizure without making any arrest — the probationer was told to come to Court the next day —because the test is not the lack of a warrant or the failure to procure one but reasonableness of the search under all the circumstances which, in that case, said Judge Soper, “cannot be distinguished, on any reasonable basis, from the search of the premises of an accused as an incident to the lawful arrest of his person.” [p. 439]); United States v. Joines (C. A. 3), 258 F. 2d 471, cert. den. 358 U. S. 880 (The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s holding that a still, mash and “nontax-paid” liquor found by officers in a house, entered by virtue of a warrant of arrest, during a quest for the suspect named in the warrant, which was unsuccessful because he was not then in the house, were admissible into evidence. [See 246 F. 2d 278.] The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of affirmance and remanded the case for further consideration in the light of Jones v. United States, 357 U. S. 493, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1514. [Jones held that probable cause to believe that a house contained contraband did not justify a search of the house without a warrant.] On remand, the Court of Appeals gave “the most careful consideration” to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jones and again affirmed the trial court. Judge Maris, for the Court, said at p. 472:
“In the case before us, however, the facts as found by the trial judge, with which finding we agree, are that the officers searched the defendant’s dwelling house in a bona fide attempt to find and arrest him and that they did not know of, or even suspect, the existence of the still, mash and liquor in the dwelling house until they came upon it in the course of their search for the defendant. This, then, is the case which the Supreme Court took pains to point out that the Jones case was not, and it falls within the exception to the rule requiring a search warrant which the court in that case expressly pointed out, namely, a ‘search incident to a valid arrest.’
“The fact that the defendant could not be found in his dwelling house did not render the presence of the *452officers there unlawful since they entered armed with a warrant which they were endeavoring- in good faith to execute. And being lawfully in the house they were entitled to seize the illicit articles which met their eyes. Accordingly, the fact that no arrest actually then took place is immaterial. Indeed, if that were the decisive factor there would have been no purpose in remanding the case to us for further consideration. On the contrary, the Supreme Court, had it thought this undeniable fact controlling, would certainly have reversed the defendant’s conviction.”
After the second affirmance of the trial court by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.); cf. Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610, 5 L. Ed. 2d 828,. where a search of a rented house in the absence of the tenant with the landlord’s consent — access having been gained through a window — was held to be an unreasonable search; Bushy v. United States (C. A. 9), 296 F. 2d 328, 332, cert. den. 369 U. S. 876; Ellison v. United States (C. A. D. C.), 206 F. 2d 476. See also Annotation, Lawfulness of Nonconsensual Search and Seizure without Warrant, Prior to Arrest, 89 A. L. R. 2d 715.
The authorities make it plain that a search prior to arrest is reasonable and constitutional if it is incident to an entry into premises for the bona fide purpose of making a justified immediate arrest therein, and that a search prior to arrest is unreasonable and unconstitutional if it is for the real purpose of making an exploratory search, even if that search is sought falsely to be justified as incident to a legal arrest.
In the instant case the evidence can leave no real doubt that the officers had entered the appellant’s hotel room with the real, express and justified purpose of arresting her, honestly believing her to be in the room and to be contemplating flight. After gaining entry, for this purpose, they searched the room and bathroom to see if Maxine Gross was there and found she was not. In the course of the search of her quarters, the police-observed blood spots on the sheets on the bed, and in the bathtub, about a third full of “pinkish” water, a blond wig (which the police then knew the suspect often wore), and a white dress.
*453The officers did not then disturb these articles. On the bed was a contract of employment at a nightclub, bearing the name of the suspect, and on a desk in plain view was a letter written in red ink which told of how a crime like that which the occupant of the room was thought to have committed could be committed, and how its commission could be concealed.
The police certainly were justified, after their lawful entry, in observing what was in plain view and taking into possession the incriminating note, which was a part of the means of the crime. Maryland has long adhered to the view that as incident to a lawful arrest any tangible evidence of the crime may be seized — whether classified as “means,” “fruits,” “weapon for escape,” or “contraband.” Matthews v. State, 228 Md. 401; Shorey v. State, 227 Md. 385; Lucich v. State, 194 Md. 511; Griffin v. State, 232 Md. 389, 393. This is not an unusual rule. 4 Wharton’s Criminal Lazv and Procedure (1957 ed.), Secs. 1538, 1569; 47 Am. Jur. Searches and Seizures Sec. 54.
Ker v. California, 374 U. S. 23, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, not only is controlling on the main merits but it makes plain that the Maryland rule is constitutionally permissible. There, eight members of the Supreme Court agreed that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081, did not establish assumption by the Supreme Court “of supervisory authority over state courts * * * and, consequently, it implied no total obliteration of state laws relating to arrests and searches in favor of federal law.” (p. 31) The eight justices also' said:
“We reiterate that the reasonableness of a search is in the first instance a substantive determination to be made by the trial court from the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the ‘fundamental criteria’ laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in opinions of this Court applying that Amendment * * *. The States are not thereby precluded from developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet ‘the practical demands of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement’ in the States, provided that those rules do not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures * * (pp. 33-34)
*454Four members of the Court, including Mr. Justice Black (Justice Harlan concurred in the result), held that police officers who had probable cause to believe that the occupant of an apartment was a felon, and was then in the apartment, did not violate either California law or the federal constitution when they entered the apartment to arrest the occupant by means of a key obtained from the manager of the apartment house (even if such entry be deemed the legal equivalent of a “breaking”) and could lawfully seize marijuana observed in the apartment. They noted also that “the practicability of obtaining a warrant is not the controlling factor when a search is sought to be justified as incident to arrest.” (p. 41)
The appellant contended that the seizure could not be reasonable since it preceded the arrest. The Court said at pages 42-43:
“This contention is of course contrary to George Ker’s testimony, but we reject it in any event. While an arrest may not be used merely as the pretext for a search without warrant, the California court specifically found and the record supports both that the officers entered the apartment for the purpose of arresting George Ker and that they had probable cause to make that arrest prior to the entry. We cannot say that it was unreasonable for Officer Berman, upon seeing Diane Ker emerge from the kitchen, merely to walk to the doorway of that adjacent room'. We thus agree with the California court’s holding that the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view. United States v. Lee, 27A U. S. 559 (1927) ; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S. 452, 465 (1932) ; People v. West, 144 Cal. App. 2d 214, 300 P. 2d 729 (1956). Therefore, while California law does not require that an arrest precede an incidental search as long as probable cause exists at the outset, Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294 P. 2d 36 (1956), the California court did not rely on that rule *455and we need not reach the question of its status under the Federal Constitution.”
I can see no unconstitutional or unreasonable search and seizure of the contract and the note under the facts of the instant case. As the Court said in State v. Chinn, supra (at pp. 397-398 of 373 P. 2d):
“If the police may not look at visible objects or glance around the room until after they have arrested the accused, then law enforcement has been turned into some sort of a game. We think the essential point is whether the police have made an unlawful exploratory search, or incidentally, and reasonably, have observed evidence found while on the premises to make the arrest.”
See Silverstein v. State, 176 Md. 533, and Heyward v. State, 161 Md. 685.
The majority holds that it is unnecessary to decide whether the entry of the police into the room of Miss Gross after they arrested her when she returned to the hotel an hour and a half or so after they first entered the room and their seizure of the blood stained sheets, the wig, and the dress which they had observed on their first entry, was unreasonable. The room of Miss Gross was on the same floor as the lobby where she was arrested and was under her immediate control. This being so, the seizure was justified even without her consent. In summarizing the law it is said in Diamond, Arrest, Search and Seizure (published in 1963 by the Department of Political Science and Administration of the Los Angeles State College) (at p. 65), “[i]n an arrest made in an entry hall or lobby, the defendant’s apartment or room in the same building may be searched.” People v. Aleria, 14 Cal. Rep. 162, cert. den. 374 U. S. 832, 10 L. Ed. 2d 1055, in which the Court, citing many cases in support, held that a search of defendant’s hotel room up one flight of stairs and some twenty to thirty feet down the hall immediately after his lawful arrest in the lobby of a hotel, was not unreasonable. To the same effect see *456United States v. Seltzer (D. C. Mass.), 5 F. 2d 364, 365, in which it was said that after a lawful arrest there may be a search of the accused’s person and property “even to the extent of searching the building in which the crime was committed as far as controlled by the offender.” See also Sayers v. United States (C. C. A. 9), 2 F. 2d 146; United States v. Charles (D. C. Cal.), 8 F. 2d 302; Rucker v. State, 196 Md. 334.
The search could be justified on either the theory that it was incident to a lawful arrest in point of time and place and of a place under the actual control of the accused, or that there was consent to the search, or both.
I would affirm the judgment and sentence.