dissenting.
I dissent. The trial judge erred in declaring a mistrial because a manifest necessity did not exist for the declaration of a mistrial. I would reverse the Superior Court and order the instant action dismissed on the basis that retrial would violate the Double Jeopardy provisions of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
In determining whether retrial after mistrial is permissible, the question is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding that either manifest necessity or the ends of public justice required the declaration of a mistrial. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824); Commonwealth ex. rel. Walton v. Aytch, 466 Pa. 172, 352 A.2d 4 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867, 97 S.Ct. 178, 50 L.Ed.2d 147 (1976). The propriety of the exercise of discretion by the trial court must be free from doubt. Commonwealth v. Bycer, 485 Pa. 224, 401 A.2d 740 (1979); Commonwealth v. Bartolomucci, 468 Pa. 338, 362 A.2d 234 (1976). Therefore, a very low abuse of discretion standard and a very high manifest necessity standard is applied to these cases. This eliminates the wide discretion often accorded judges because of the potential for manipulation of the judicial system. Thus, on review, the trial judge’s decision of mistrial must be scrupulously scrutinized and only where the decision is free from doubt should the decision be upheld. The majority finds, in this case, that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion and that both manifest necessity and the ends of public justice *225required the declaration of a mistrial as there was a possible conflict of interest on the part of the prosecuting attorney.
I believe, and case law demonstrates, that a manifest necessity exists only where it is absolutely obvious from the circumstances that the original tribunal would be unable to complete the trial at all or where it is absolutely certain that a defendant would not receive a fair trial. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Mehmeti 501 Pa. 589, 462 A.2d 657 (1983) (jury hopelessly deadlocked); Commonwealth v. Murry, 498 Pa. 504, 447 A.2d 612 (1982) (jury hopelessly deadlocked); Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 290, 46 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (illness of presiding judge); Commonwealth v. Stewart, 456 Pa. 447, 317 A.2d 616 (1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949, 94 S.Ct. 3078, 41 L.Ed.2d 670 (1974) (victim’s father was tipstaff tending jurors); Commonwealth v. Brown, 451 Pa. 395, 301 A.2d 876 (1973) (jury hopelessly deadlocked). In other words, there must be a compelling reason serious enough to outweigh the interest of the defendant in obtaining a final resolution of the case against him. That is not the case here. By holding that a manifest necessity existed in this case, the majority grossly deviates from established case law.
The basis for the declaration of mistrial in this case was an alleged conflict of interest on the part of the prosecuting attorney. It is not at all clear from the record that an actual or even potential conflict of interest existed. Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a) provides that a conflict of interest exists only where the present proceeding involves “the same or a substantially related matter” as the previous matter (emphasis added). The criminal matter at issue in this case is not even remotely related, let alone substantially related, to the attorney’s prior representation of appellant in the custody matter four years earlier. Even if there were a conflict of interest, there is no evidence that appellant was or would have been prejudiced by the purported conflict of interest on the part of the district attorney. Neither appellant nor the district attorney requested the mistrial. In fact, it was appellant’s express desire to continue with the trial. *226Appellant was willing to consent to any conflict of interest that potentially existed.1 In this case, appellant made a counseled decision to waive any potential conflict and not to seek a mistrial.2 The interests of justice could have only been protected in this case by allowing the defendant to have his trial completed by the tribunal in which it was initiated and to have his fate determined by the jury first impaneled. Since that is now impossible, the only remedy is to bar retrial.
The majority concedes that it is well established that “any doubt relative to the existence of manifest necessity should be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Majority at 691, citing Commonwealth v. Bartolomueci, 468 Pa. 338, 362 A.2d 234 (1976) (emphasis added). In this case, it is beyond any doubt that the sua sponte declaration of a mistrial was not warranted, needed or proper. I would reverse the Superior Court’s order affirming the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy.
. Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(a) expressly permits a client to consent to representation where a conflict of interest exists. As the comment to Rule 1.9 points out, "[disqualification from subsequent representation is for the protection of clients and can be waived by them."
. I agree with Mr. Justice Cappy that a defendant can consent to possible or actual prejudice by placing a waiver on the record. I disagree, however, with his conclusion that the facts of the case sub judice do not give rise to a complete and competent waiver. The defendant's objection to the declaration of a mistrial and his express desire and readiness to proceed with the trial were clearly a sufficient waiver. We have held that waiver has occurred as a matter of law on the basis of much less assertive behavior. See, Commonwealth v. Brown, 497 Pa. 7, 438 A.2d 592 (1981) (defendant’s silence constituted waiver of Rule 1100 rights).