dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. This is another case in which trial was delayed by the appellant, who then attempted to use that delay, successfully it now appears, to obtain a dismissal of criminal charges against him.
In Commonwealth v. Brightwell, 486 Pa. 401, 406 A.2d 503 (1979), Justice Nix, writing in support of affirmance by an equally divided court, articulated the common sense rule which ought to be applied in this and in similar cases. “[W]e know of no case,” he wrote, “wherein the right to a speedy trial has been violated when the cause for the delay has been properly attributable to the defendant. To the contrary, where the defendant has deliberately caused the delay, he has been prevented from taking advantage of his own wrong.” (486 Pa. at page 405, 406 A.2d at page 505).
The instant case was scheduled for trial in Adams County during the week of July 25, 1977, and the Commonwealth was prepared to proceed at that time. A continuance was requested by appellant’s counsel, however, and joined by appellant himself, for the stated reason that counsel would be unavailable. Knowing that his application for continuance faced possible opposition by the District Attorney and a doubtful reception by the trial judge, both of whom were aware that 180 days would expire before the next scheduled session of jury trials in September, appellant’s counsel took *7steps to eliminate the reasons for such opposition. Thus, he assured the District Attorney in a written letter that “the Defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived the requirement of Rule 1100 as it applies to this continuance.” In the application to the court, moreover, appellant conceded: “I am aware and have been advised of the implications and consequences of the above application and do not have objection to the continuance. I am further aware of my right to a speedy trial and that a continuance shall cause a delay in having said criminal charges disposed of by the Court.” The District Attorney did not oppose and the court, therefore, granted the defense application for a continuance. The case was then scheduled for trial during the week of September 26, 1977, which was the next scheduled session of jury trials in Adams County. Prior to the start of trial, however, appellant filed an application to dismiss the charges under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100(f).
Under these circumstances, I would hold that appellant knowingly agreed to a trial in September. Because such a trial followed the expiration of more than 180 days from the signing of the complaint against him, appellant thereby waived the time requirements of Rule 1100.
There can be no doubt that appellant and his counsel desired and made application for a continuance of the trial scheduled in July, 1977. It also is clear that in Adams County the next session of criminal jury trials was scheduled to commence on Monday, September 26, 1977 and that appellant’s counsel was chargeable with knowledge of that fact. Finally, it seems clear that appellant’s counsel represented to the District Attorney that the requirements of Rule 1100 were being waived knowingly and voluntarily in order to obtain consent from the District Attorney and favorable action by the court on the application for continuance. Because counsel’s knowledge of the court calendar in Adams County must be imputed to his client, I would hold that appellant’s joinder in the request for a general continuance constituted consent to be tried at the next term of court to be held during the week of September 26,1977. Cf. *8Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 373 A.2d 1355 (1977). Under such circumstances, it seems clear that appellant intended to waive and did waive a violation of Rule 1100 which was inherent in the granting of his request for a continuance. See: Commonwealth v. Hickson, 235 Pa.Super. 496, 344 A.2d 617 (1975). See also: Commonwealth v. Waldman, 484 Pa. 217, 398 A.2d 1022 (1979).
It is correct, as appellant argues, that the problem could have been avoided if, as suggested in Commonwealth v. Coleman, 477 Pa. 400, 405-406, 383 A.2d 1268, 1271 (1978), the continuance had been granted for a specified period of time. In July, 1977, however, the teachings of the Supreme Court in Coleman were not available to the trial court.1 It is also correct that the language in the application for continuance was alone inadequate to constitute a waiver of Rule 1100. See: Commonwealth v. Coleman, supra. Certainly, however, it is a fact to be considered. Appellant and his counsel wanted a continuance, knew that a continuance would result in a September trial and agreed to that result. The language of the application, the letter by appellant’s counsel to the District Attorney, and the information available to appellant and his attorney make this clear.
Thus, when all the legalese is stripped away, the one fact that clearly remains is that appellant and his counsel were responsible for the continuance in July and thereby achieved a delay of the trial until September. Now they seek to avoid their agreement and use the very delay which they caused to avoid a trial on the merits. By permitting such a result, we encourage the games which are being played with Rule 1100 in the trial courts. Perhaps even more regrettably, we contribute to the disillusionment of a public which cannot comprehend a criminal justice system which allows a defendant to cause delay and then take advantage of his own delay to obtain a dismissal of serious criminal charges against him.
*9Because I believe such a result is undesirable and not required by Rule 1100, I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
. Coleman was decided on March 23, 1978.