concurring:
The difficulty presented by this appeal is the absence of a statement of reasons by the trial court for denying appellant’s motion because it is not possible to conclude that the trial judge had only one option to choose without abusing her discretion. Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C.1979). Appellant argued in the trial court that his motion to dismiss should be granted because all of the events transpired in Texas, involving an official of the appellee bank in Texas and a Texas contractor, and hence all of the relevant records and witnesses were in Texas. He asserted that the witnesses, the bank official and the contractor (also identified by name), were critical to his defense of fraud. Because the witnesses were not amenable to being served with process to appear in the District of Columbia, the filing of the lawsuit in the District prevented appellant from presenting his only defense to appel-lee’s claim, and he argued, therefore, his motion to dismiss should be granted. I write principally to make clear that, on the record before this court, it is hardly clear that the motion to dismiss was properly denied.
The complaint confirms that there were financial transactions between appellant and appellee bank, that appellee bank took a security interest in Texas land owned by appellant, and that appellee bank’s principal place of business and state of incorporation are outside of the District of Columbia. The documentation offered by the parties indicates that there were such financial transactions, and an exhibit to appellant’s motion to dismiss outlines the nature of his defense of fraud by a bank official and a contractor.1 Our decisions have required, in order for a defendant to succeed on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, for a defendant to be able to prove, as a result of out-of-state investigative discovery, that the defense to the underlying action will succeed. The documentation in the record, combined with appellant’s contentions were adequate, in my view, to show that he could raise his claimed defense in an alternative forum.2 The representations by counsel are those of an officer of the court. In re Gates, 248 A.2d 671, 677 (D.C.1968).
The witnesses whom appellant has identified are a bank official and a contractor. These are persons with established professional connections, not merely vague presences or transient workers. Their connections are in Texas, where appellee bank also is. Hence there can be no suggestion that appellant is seeking a dismissal in order to defeat appellee’s ability to pursue its lawsuit. Rather, he claimed that while the bank could prove its prima facie case through admissions by appellant relating to the loan documents, he could only defend with testimony from the witnesses about their roles in the financial transactions.3
*207There was nothing before the trial court to suggest that the witnesses would not be available in Texas, nor that they would be unable to support appellant’s defense of fraud much less that appellant would be prevented from presenting his defense in Texas. While various forms, entitled “Loan Authorization — Application,” instruct loan proceeds to be deposited into account number 75-1410-7 (i.e., the contractor’s account), there is no signature by appellant on these forms. Also, the color designations for copies at the bottom of these forms do not even show that appellant (i.e., the customer) was to receive a copy.
Any suggestion that the witnesses would assert their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is pure speculation. See concurring opinion of Associate Judge Terry at 209-210. There is nothing to indicate that the witnesses are subject to criminal prosecutions or that, if they were, their claims to a blanket privilege against self-incrimination would be sustained, much less that immunity would not be granted to them. Although appellant’s counsel stated that the witnesses would deny the fraud, it also appears from the record that appellant’s claim of fraud rested in part on non-incriminating testimony of the witnesses. For example, the bank official and the contractor could affirm or deny that the loan proceeds were placed in the contractor’s account and the bank official could also affirm or deny the procedures by which appellant obtained a second loan. See note 2, supra. On the other hand, the trial court could not properly grant appellee’s motion to dismiss on the ground that appellant’s witnesses would be subject to criminal prosecution for the very fraud that appellant seeks to assert, and claims is impossible to prove at a trial in the District of Columbia, as a defense to appellee’s claim.
Insofar as private interests are concerned, access to proof and availability of process weigh in appellant’s favor. Although appellee would be burdened by having to file a new lawsuit in the District of Columbia to enforce any judgment it obtained against appellant in Texas, and to that extent this factor weighs in appellee’s favor, this would not defeat appellee’s ability to recover whereas suit in the District would defeat appellant’s ability to defend. There was no evidence appellee filed here to vex or harass appellant. This court acknowledged in Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. v. Rose, 583 A.2d 156 (D.C.1990), that “substantially less deference is accorded to plaintiff’s choice of forum when the plaintiff resides in another jurisdiction, for it is much less reasonable to assume under such circumstances that the District of Columbia was selected because it is a convenient forum.” 583 A.2d at 158 (citing Dunkwu v. Neville, 575 A.2d 293 (D.C.1990)). Appellee bank claimed that it filed suit in the District of Columbia “solely for the convenience of [appellant] who presently resides in the District of Columbia” and not in Texas, “the more convenient forum for [appellee bank].... ” Thus, appellant and appellee are in agreement that Texas would be the more convenient forum! The fact that appellant, the defendant, resides here does not preclude dismissal of the case on the ground of forum non conveniens. Carr v. Bio-Medical Applications of Wash., Inc., 366 A.2d 1089 (D.C.1976).4
The public interest appears also to weigh in appellant’s favor. The District of Columbia courts are burdened with litigation and can hardly welcome the opportunity to embark upon a study of Texas law. At *208this stage of the proceedings it would appear optimistic to conclude that the litigation involves simple legal principles. See note 2, supra. Inability to present one’s only defense to a claim is a demonstration of “a seriously inconvenient forum.” Cresta v. Neurology Center, 557 A.2d 156, 161 (D.C.1989); cf. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. v. Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 160 (by assuming jurisdiction, trial court would prevent defendant from asserting Virginia’s liability cap).
Accordingly, I concur in the remand of the case to the trial court.5
.Exhibit 15 to appellant’s brief is a verified letter from appellant to the Clerk of the Superi- or Court and is designated in the record as appellant’s answer to appellee’s complaint. Appellant’s counsel also incorporated the factual assertions contained in the exhibit in appellant's motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Those factual assertions are that appellant denies he owes the amount claimed by appellee, explaining that this is because of several errors by the bank and fraud by one of its officers. The alleged errors involved the placement of the proceeds of a loan granted to appellant by the bank into the wrong account. Appellant claims that the bank admitted its mistake, but indicated that it would nonetheless hold appellant responsible because the other account was that of appellant’s contractor. In addition, appellant claims that the bank thereafter gave him another loan but in so doing its officer misled appellant into signing for a loan to cover the amount that had been misplaced in the contractor’s account at the bank. The factual assertions are accompanied by documents showing loan applications at the Texas bank and statements of accounts.
. See note 5, infra.
. In his memorandum in support of his motion, appellant claimed that appellee bank’s complaint involved two loans that represented a consolidation of three previous loans. In his reply to appellee bank's opposition to the mo*207tion to dismiss, appellant maintained, referencing his affidavit, see note 1, supra, that some of the loan transactions "were an attempt by an employee of the plaintiff bank to cover up his act of depositing the total proceeds of one loan to [the contractor’s] account, who later used the funds for his own purposes.”
. Daquila v. Schlosberg, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 366, 367, 253 F.2d 888, 889 (1958), is inapposite because that opinion does not address the situation claimed by appellant, namely, that trial in the District of Columbia would make it impossible for him to present his only defense to appel-lee bank's claim. Nor is there anything in that opinion to suggest that had the court been presented with such a situation, there was only one option available to the trial court in ruling on the motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.
. Although the statute of limitations has run in Texas, this court has heretofore conditioned dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens on the defendant's agreement to waive that defense. See Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc. v. Rose, supra, 583 A.2d at 160 (citing Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 8, 15-16 (D.C.1986)).