OPINION
SHARPNACK, Judge.Woodrow Taylor appeals his conviction for criminal trespass as a class A misdemeanor.1 Taylor raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Taylor's conviction. We affirm.
The relevant facts follow. On March 11, 2004, Taylor attended classes at IPS School 26 in Indianapolis, pursuant to his class schedule, from 8:15 to 10:15 a.m. Around noon, Indianapolis Public School Police Officer Thomas MeClendon saw Taylor standing in the hallway by the front entry. Officer McClendon asked Taylor what he was doing, and Taylor told the officer he was waiting for the city bus. Officer McClendon told: Taylor it was fine as long as he waited in the hallway by the front entry.
While patrolling the school, Officer McClendon saw Taylor walking around in the building on two separate occasions. After his patrol ended, Officer McClendon waited for Taylor 'at the front entry. When Taylor returned, Officer McClendon told him to leave the building, repeating himself five times in quick succession. Taylor responded, "[ylou must be hard of hearing," and "[I am] not leaving the building." Transeript at 9. Officer McClendon then placed Taylor under arrest.
The State charged Taylor with trespass as a class D felony.2 After a bench trial, the trial court found Taylor guilty but *1026reduced the conviction to a class A misdemeanor pursuant to the alternative misdemeanor sentencing provisions. The trial court sentenced Taylor to serve 180 days on probation. Taylor filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied.
The sole issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Taylor's conviction. When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied. Rather, we look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the con-vietion. Id. We will affirm the conviction if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The offense of criminal trespass is governed by Ind.Code § 85-48-2-2, which provides, in pertinent part: "A person who ... not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly or intentionally refuses to leave the real property of another person after having been asked to leave by the other person or that person's agent . commits criminal trespass, a Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Class D felony if it is committed ... on school property." Thus, to conviet Taylor of criminal trespass as a class D felony, the State needed to prove that Taylor: (1) did not have a contractual interest in the property; (2) knowingly or intentionally refused to leave the real property of another person; (3) after having been asked to leave by the other person's agent; and (4) the offense is committed on school property.
Taylor argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction because he had a contractual interest in remaining on the school property. A "contractual interest," as it is used in the criminal trespass statute, refers to the right to be present on another's property, arising out of an agreement between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (relying on Woods v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1115, 1117 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)). The State is not required to disprove every conceivable contractual interest the defendant might have had in the property. Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind.1987).
At trial, the State presented the following evidence regarding the lack of a contractual interest. The following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and Officer MeClendon:
Q. Okay. Did Mr. Taylor pay rent to the school or did he have any contractual interest in that property that you know of?
A. Not that I know of,.
[Defendant's Attorney]: as to... Objection
A. No, sir.
Q. Okay.
[Defendant's that? Attorney]: Strike
THE COURT: Objection stricken.
Q. Is part of your job to make sure that people aren't hanging around the school that aren't supposed to be there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is Mr. Taylor one of those people that was hanging around where he wasn't supposed to be?
A. Yes, sir.
Transcript at 9-10. Further, the record shows that Taylor was scheduled to attend class only from 8:15 to 10:15 a.m., and he was still at school around noon. At the close of trial, the trial court stated:
*1027Provisionally I agree with the Defense contention that [Taylor] had a contractual interest at IPS School 26. However, that contractual interest ended at 10:15 on March l1ith, 2004, when his classes ended. The Defendant was on school property two (2) hours after the conclusion of his classes. The indications in the report filed by Officer McClendon and testimony is provided, this is somewhere around 12:00, 12:15, about two (2) hours after classes let out. Notwithstanding any subjective belief regarding his right to be on the property, Mr. Taylor was instructed by an IPS officer to stay at one location, and Mr. Taylor refused that order .... But Mr. Taylor was given an opportunity to remain in the building to wait for his bus when Officer McClendon first encountered him. Mr. Taylor disregarded that instruction and when confronted and told to leave the building, the evidence is that he responded with attitude. That is my characterization based on the testimony that I have received. Given that, I find that the State has proven its case.
Id. at 22-28.
Taylor argues that the trial court improperly based its verdiet "on the notion that a student's right to remain at his or her school ends when classes are finished." Appellant's Brief at 5. Taylor argues that the trial court improperly found that he did not have a contractual interest in remaining on the school property because his classes had ended at 10:15 a.m. During trial, on his motion to reconsider, and on appeal Taylor relies on to support his belief that he had a contractual interest in remaining on the school's property.
In A.E.B., an assistant principal of a middle school informed A.E.B., a suspended student, to stay out of school until she heard from the IPS's downtown office regarding her expulsion. A.E.B., 756 N.E.2d at 538. Despite the assistant principal's instruction, A.E.B. returned to school and was suspended once again. Id. After the second suspension, A.E.B. returned to school and "[olnee at school, A.E.B. went to several classrooms and verbally insulted the teachers." Id. at 589. A police officer told the defendant to leave the school or she would be arrested for trespassing and disorderly conduct, and the defendant refused to leave. Id. The trial court found defendant to be a delinquent child for committing criminal trespass and disorderly conduct. A.E.B. 756 N.E.2d at 538-539. On appeal, she alleged that because she was a student at the school there was insufficient evidence that she did not have a contractual interest in the property. Id. at 540. We held, "elven assuming that [the defendant's] claim is correct, we find that [the defendant] violated whatever contract existed when she interfered with the educational activities at [the school] to the point where she committed the crime of disorderly conduct." Id. We concluded:
[The defendant] did not have a contractual interest to remain on school property in order to disrupt the educational environment and to break the law. By committing the crime of disorderly conduct on school property, [the defendant] abandoned whatever contractual interest she had in the school property. Thus, we find that there was sufficient evidence to show that [the defendant] did not have a contractual interest in the school property when she was asked to leave the premises.
Id. at 541. Generally, A.E.B. holds that if a student has a contractual interest in school property, that interest is not unlimited and can be violated by the student's conduct. An inherent temporal and spatial limitation to a student's contractual interest in school property is present in A.E.B. *1028because AEB. was where she was not supposed to be, in several classrooms, and when she was not supposed to be there because the assistant principal had informed A.FE.B. to stay out of school until she heard from the IPS's downtown office. Even assuming that a student has a contractual interest in school property, based on A.E.B., we conclude that such an interest is limited temporally to when taking classes or engaged in other school activities and limited spatially to areas necessary to the attendance function. See also Olsen v. State, 668 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ind. Ct.App.1996) (holding that defendant's contractual interest in hotel room did not extend to hotel lobby).3
Here, Taylor was finished with class at 10:15 a.m. Around noon, Officer MceClen-don saw Taylor standing in the hallway by the front entry. Accordingly, Taylor had completed his classes almost two hours earlier. Further, Officer McClendon told Taylor he could wait for the city bus as long as he waited in the hallway by the front entry. While patrolling the school, Officer McClendon saw Taylor walking around in the building on two separate occasions. After his patrol ended, Officer McClendon waited for Taylor at the front entry. When Taylor returned, Officer McClendon told him to leave the building and Taylor refused. We find that there was sufficient evidence to show that Taylor did not have a contractual interest in the school property where and when he was asked to leave the premises. See, e.g., A.E.B., 756 N.E.2d at 541.
Taylor also argues that he had a reasonable belief that he had a right to be at school and directs us to his testimony that the principal had given him permission to wait in the hallways. The belief that one has a right to be on the property of another will defeat the mens rea requirement of the criminal trespass statute if it has a fair and reasonable foundation. Olsen, 663 N.E.2d at 1196. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the defendant believed that he had a right to be on the property of another and whether that belief had a fair and reasonable foundation. Myers v. State, 190 Ind. 269, 269, 130 N.E. 116, 117 (1921). Taylor's argument is essentially a request for us to reweigh the evidence, this we cannot do. See, e.g., A.E.B., 756 N.E.2d at 541.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Taylor's conviction for criminal trespass as a class A misdemeanor.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J. concurs. MAY, J. dissents with separate opinion.. Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2 (2004).
. Ind.Code § 35-43-2-2 (2004).
. The dissent cites Woods for the proposition that "if Taylor had a contractual interest in the school property, he could not be guilty of criminal trespass even after Officer McClen-don told him to leave." In Woods, Woods had a membership contract with a health club that granted her "full access to the facilities on unlimited days and unlimited hours." Woods, 703 N.E.2d at 1117. Health club employees asked Woods to leave the health club property based on an erroneous computer record that indicated that her membership contract had expired even though it was still in effect. Id. at 1116. Woods refused to leave and was convicted of criminal trespass. Id. On appeal, we held that Woods's membership granted her a contractual interest in the property occupied by the health club. Id. at 1118. We do not find Woods instructive because Woods's membership contract granted her "full access to the facilities on unlimited days and unlimited hours." Id. at 1117. Here, no evidence was presented that Taylor had a contract that provided him with full access to the school's property for unlimited hours.