concurring and dissenting.
While I concur with the majority’s view that the testimony of appraisers formerly employed by Piper should not be permitted in Columbia’s case in chief, and -with its conclusion regarding the testimony of Reichart and King, I disagree as to the majority’s conclusion that Columbia should not be permitted to use the appraisal reports initially obtained by Piper to impeach Piper’s credibility.
I, thus, believe the jury was entitled to know that Piper had obtained and rejected the appraisals, and how much the appraisals were for, as well as the reasons for his rejection. Since Piper introduced testimony of what underlying factors he had relied upon, it would have been proper cross-examination to ask him what information he had possessed and discarded. The jury was entitled to hear that evidence.
*419Further, with regard to cross-examination, I disagree with the majority that there is a hearsay problem. The damage estimates were not being admitted to establish the truth of those figures but merely to impeach Piper’s credibility.1 This situation is not analogous to the rule espoused in Commonwealth v. Seville, 266 Pa.Superior Ct. 587, 405 A.2d 1262 (1979), as the majority suggests, because that case, and those it in turn relies upon concern situations where the medical opinion was offered not to impeach, but to prove the truth of the medical opinion.
For this reason, I dissent on this issue.