concurring.
[¶ 19] I concur in the Court’s analysis and the result in this matter. I write separately to address the Court’s reference to the de facto parenthood of Henderson and the area of law that is emerging from the intersection of traditional social policies and modern biological testing abilities.
[¶ 20] For centuries, a child born during a marriage was considered the child of the parties to the marriage, regardless of contrary allegations of paternity. See Ventresco v. Bushey, 159 Me. 241, 191 A.2d 104, 106 (1963). As a matter of public policy, this approach was necessary to prevent “bastardization” and to preclude unwarranted intrusions into family peace and harmony. See Atkinson v. Atkinson, 160 Mich.App. 601, 408 N.W.2d 516, 518 (1987). From a practical perspective, evidentiary proof of paternity was also difficult and unreliable.8 See Denbow v. Harris, 583 A.2d 205, 206 (Me.1990) (noting that prior to blood tests, a baby was exhibited to the jury to show family resemblance).9 As blood testing and methods of proof progressed, we repudiated the absolute presumption of paternity in 1963, allowing the rebuttal of the presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ventresco, 191 A.2d at 108-09. That presumption was eventually embodied in the Rules of Evidence. See M.R. Evid. 302; Denbow, 583 A.2d at 206.
[¶ 21] With the recent advances in biotechnology and human genetics, family law is undergoing further evolution. Because testing is now sufficiently accurate, the presumption of paternity, a hurdle once very difficult to overcome, can now be swept aside by a simple test. See 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1561 (1998). As a result, there now exists the real possibility, as this case demonstrates, that one man may become the legally acknowledged biological father of a child, while another, through marriage to the mother, has been the legally acknowledged and factually involved father.
[¶ 22] The status of the father “by marriage,” following an adjudication declaring that another man is the biological father, is not addressed consistently throughout the country. Some states have enacted statutes explicitly recognizing that a man married to a child’s mother at the time of the child’s birth is a legal parent, regardless of *605the legal recognition of a different biological father.10
[¶23] Maine statutes are silent on the issue.11 Maine law does, however, create an avenue for biological fathers to assert a claim of paternity, see 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1553 (1998), even when the child has a father who was previously understood to be the father because he was married to the mother at the time of the child’s birth.12 Thus, although the law recognizes the legal rights and responsibilities of the newly established biological father, it does not directly address the consequences of that legal recognition for the person who-had previously thought himself to be the father.
[¶ 24] Although DNA testing may provide a bright line for determining the biological relationship between a man and a child, it does not and cannot define the human relationship between father and child. When a man has been newly determined to be the biological father of a child, the courts have a responsibility to assure that the child does not, without cause, lose the relationship with the person who has previously been acknowledged to be the father both in the law, through marriage, and in fact, through the development of the parental relationship over time.13
[¶ 25] In this developing area of law, and in the absence of legislative action, many questions remain unanswered.14 However, we have today recognized that Henderson’s previously existing legal and factual relationship to K.M.H. gives the District Court the authority to recognize Henderson as a de facto parent15 and to act in the best interests of K.M.H. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: *606Analysis and Recommendations, § 2.03(l)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 10, 2000).16
[¶ 26] Accordingly, one question has been resolved. When a man has been understood at law to have been the father of a child, through marriage to the child’s mother, and the courts have determined that a different man is the biological father of the child, the District Court has the authority to determine, in the best interests of the child, whether the father by marriage shall continue as a de facto parent and have a continuing relationship with the child.
[¶ 27] Thus, I concur in the opinion of the Court.
. In an "action in bastardy,” created to allow the adjudication of paternity in the absence of marriage, the man was "accused” of paternity and found guilty or not guilty of being a father. If the mother identified the father “at the travail,” signifying the period of time after the pains of labor had commenced but before the birth of the child, it was regarded as competent evidence of paternity. See Beals v. Furbish, 39 Me. 469 (1855).
. This approach was later disapproved. See Overlook v. Hall, 81 Me. 348, 17 A. 169, 170 (1889) (holding that a complainant cannot offer a child into evidence for purposes of showing family resemblance).
. See, e.g., Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 3(B) (West 2000) ("If a child is born during the course of the marriage and is reared by the husband and wife as a member of their family without disputing the child's legitimacy for a period of at least two (2) years, the presumption cannot be disputed by anyone.”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1 — 102(26)(B) (2000) (including in the definition of "legal parent” a man "who is or has been married to the biological mother of the child if the child was bom during the marriage”); W. Va. CODE § 48-4-l(i) (2000) (including in the definition of "legal father" a man "[w]ho is married to [the child’s] mother at the time of conception” or "who is married to [the child’s] mother at the time of birth of the child”); Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854 (La.1989) (“The legal tie of paternity will not be affected by subsequent proof of the child's actual biological tie.”).
. A father of a child bom out of wedlock is liable for the support of the child to the same extent as a father of a child born in wedlock. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1552 (1998).
. As one author has noted, absent guidance from the courts, the results of such a system may be the unintended disruption of a stable family:
This clash between the emotional and psychological value of families and the legal rules governing them has several adverse consequences. One consequence ... is that biological fathers who have had no significant relationship with their children may gain custody of them, even when it means breaking up a child’s relationship with another man who has lived as the child’s father and to whom the child may be very attached.
Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal Fatherhood, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 461, 474 (1996).
. See, e.g., Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 28, 761 A.2d 291, 302 (”[T]he State has demonstrated that it has a compelling interest in providing a forum in which a grandparent, who has acted as a parent to the child ... may seek continuing contact with the child.”).
. For example, historically, the concept of a "maternity test” was rarely discussed because the biological mother was, by definition, present at the birth of the child. Given advances in genetics, that assumption will not always hold.
. One court has defined de facto parent in the following manner:
A de facto parent is one who has no biological relation to the child, but has participated in the child’s life as a member of the child’s family. The de facto parent resides with the child and, with the consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great as the legal parent.
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (1999).
. Section 2.03(l)(c) suggests the following • standards for determining de facto parenthood:
(c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking functions,
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of care-taking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.
American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, § 2.03(i)(c) (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 10, 2000).