dissenting.
I respectfully' dissent to the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s order that overruled the Department’s preliminary objections. The majority finds that the one inch resurfacing did not constitute a change of grade and that even if there were a change of grade, the damages are inappropriate because Daw did not establish that the resurfacing caused increased water runoff or damage to her property.
I believe that a one inch thick resurfacing along the main portion of the roadway coupled with the subsequent paving of the *1212berm or shoulder constitutes a change of grade entitling Daw to consequential damages. See Deposition of Andrew Kost, July 28, 1997, at 7; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 57a.
In contrast to the majority, I believe the trial court’s determination that Daw sufficiently established that the resurfacing caused increased water runoff and damage to her property, thus warranting the dismissal of the Department’s preliminary objections is supported by her testimony. Even though the report of her expert, Donald B. Partridge, P.E., is admittedly not as clear or as strong as possible, I believe that a factfinder could conclude, based upon reasonable inferences drawn from the report that Daw suffered damage to her property as a result of increased water damage caused by the change of grade. I find no legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. This controversy deserves to proceed to a board of viewers.