dissenting:
This is a case in which, in my judgment, the equities strongly favor the petitioner. As my colleagues in the majority acknowledge, “petitioner’s is not an unsympathetic case.” The substantially more difficult issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) abused his discretion in denying the petitioner’s motion for a new hearing. Although, given our deferential standard of review, the question is a close one as to which reasonable people might (and do) differ, I would answer it in the affirmative.
I.
I begin by setting forth what I take to be the petitioner’s perspective on this dispute. On July 20, 2007, Dion Prime found himself between a rock and a hard place. He learned that morning that the United States Marshal’s office had scheduled the eviction of one of Prime’s tenants in southeast Washington, D.C. for 9:00 A.M. on the following day. The OAH had previously scheduled a hearing in the present matter before an ALJ for 10:30 A.M. on July 30, just If hours after the eviction was to begin. Prime thus faced the likely prospect of having to be in two places at the same time and of facing untoward consequences no matter which location he chose.
What was Prime to do? On the one hand, if he postponed the eviction, it might not be rescheduled for weeks or months, and this would prevent him, for an indefinite period, from securing a paying tenant for the premises. On the other hand, although Prime could theoretically have attempted to obtain a continuance of the proceedings before the OAH by requesting the DPWs consent and filing a written motion, he apprehended (not at all unreasonably) that such a request would be rejected as coming too late. Therefore, if he did not postpone the eviction, the hearing before the OAH might (and in fact did) go on without him.
According to Prime, his dilemma was compounded by the fact that he had previously scheduled meetings for much of July 19. As a non-lawyer1 involved in two sepa*184rate legal proceedings, Prime had a very brief time to reflect upon what action he should take. Moreover, the procedure for drafting and filing a motion for a continuance probably was not a subject in which Prime had much expertise. At the very least, Prime’s situation on July 19 must have been quite unnerving. It is easier today to judge Prime’s actions (and inaction) in hindsight than it is to know what to do in a situation such as the one that suddenly confronted him on July 19, 2007.
Nevertheless, Prime thought that he had a way out- of his quandary. He apparently believed — or, more probably, he persuaded himself to believe, perhaps by resort to a smidgen of wishful thinking — that he and his crew could complete the eviction and that he could still arrive on time for the OAH hearing. As events turned out, this hope did not materialize, but it is quite likely that no other solution would have both protected his interest in future collection of rent and his hope of participating in the hearing at the OAH.
Unfortunately, as my colleagues in the majority point out, Prime, who was representing himself, did not file a written motion for a continuance on July 19, nor did he seek or obtain DPW’s consent to such a continuance. That is supposed to be the principal error or misjudgment that inexorably leads to the failure of Prime’s contentions in this court. When the Deputy Marshal failed to arrive on time, however — a possibility Prime might have anticipated, for written materials that he had received from the United States Marshal’s office revealed that Deputy Marshals’ other duties sometimes result in their being late for evictions — Prime called the OAH, in advance of the start of the hearing, and he explained that he was having difficulty getting to the hearing on time and that he would be late. Although he apparently did not expressly request that the hearing be briefly delayed, that was the obvious purpose of his call.
Nevertheless, at 11:03 A.M., the ALJ commenced the hearing. The ALJ stated on the record that Prime had telephoned and was “having problems getting here today,” and he took note of this fact as establishing that Prime had notice of the hearing. The ALJ declined, however, to wait for Prime any longer. Rather, he decided to proceed in Prime’s absence. The ALJ heard the testimony of the inspector, and he adjourned the hearing at 11:10 A.M. In a subsequent written order, the ALJ found Prime guilty of two counts of improper storage of waste and not guilty of a third similar count. Notwithstanding his acknowledgment at the hearing that Prime had called and indicated that he would be late, the ALJ wrote that Prime “failed to appear for the hearing and has not explained his failure to do so.” The ALJ imposed civil fines of $150 on each of the substantive counts, and although Prime apparently arrived at the hearing site at 11:30 A.M., one hour after the scheduled time, and only twenty minutes after the end of the very brief hearing, and although Prime had called to disclose that he was late but presumably en route, the ALJ imposed the maximum civil fine of $600 — double the amount of the fines for the substantive offenses — for failure to appear.
II.
I turn now to the harder question whether, knowing all that he knew when he denied Prime’s request for a new hearing, the ALJ abused his discretion by doing so. In my opinion, given Prime’s obvious bona fides, his apparent lack of legal training, his genuine dilemma as to how to deal with his suddenly conflicting obligations, and the minimal time available to him to decide what to do, the ALJ’s treat*185ment of the situation was unduly harsh, and the $600 fíne for failure to appear— the statutory maximum — compounded the consequences of the harshness.
My colleagues in the majority place heavy emphasis on Prime’s procedural miscues, some real, some perceived. They assert, for example, that Prime’s July 20 call to the OAH, before the hearing began, did not constitute a request for a continuance, that such a request was required to be in writing, that Prime first had to seek DPW’s consent, and that Prime had not complied with these requirements. Given the circumstances here, however, the July 20 call was obviously designed to be an emergency request not to begin the proceedings until Prime was able to get there, and it was thus an informal oral motion for a brief emergency continuance, in substance if not in name. By the morning of July 20, it was no longer possible to file a written motion or to secure the consent of the adversary.2
The majority also points out, as did the ALJ, that even if the Deputy Marshal had appeared on time at the site of the eviction, Prime’s professed expectation that he could arrive at the OAH hearing on time was unrealistic, and that Prime therefore should have filed a motion for a continuance on July 19. In hindsight, I agree that it would certainly have been preferable for Prime to have done so, although he apprehended, not unreasonably, that it was already too late for that. My colleagues also fault Prime for not proffering a substantive defense in his motion for a new hearing.
But these errors or imperfections should, in my view, be placed in context. According to Prime, he did not learn of the potential conflict between his two obligations until the day before the scheduled hearings — a day he described as filled with meetings. Retaining counsel in a case in which the amount in controversy was so small was not a realistic option, so Prime had to rely, under considerable pressure, on his own best judgment. To preclude Prime from presenting his defense on the merits because he did not instantly recognize on July 19 that he had to drop everything to file a written motion, and because he subsequently did not know that he was supposed to proffer a substantive defense as a part of his motion for a new hearing, constitutes, at least in my view, an overly draconian sanction rather than a balanced and reasonable exercise of discretion. We have repeatedly held, in applying statutory regimens in which litigants ordinarily represent themselves, that a measure of leniency is appropriate with respect to procedural or other similar errors or miscues, that the contentions of the pro se litigants are to be generously construed, and that waivers of substantive claims or defenses are not to be lightly inferred. See, e.g., Butler-Truesdale v. AIMCO Properties, L.L.C., 945 A.2d 1170 (D.C.2008); Rhea v. Designmark Service, Inc., 942 A.2d 651, 655-56 (D.C.2008); Goodman v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm’n, 573 A.2d 1293, 1299 (D.C.1990).
I appreciate that our standard of review of discretionary calls is deferential; that is what makes this case difficult. A forced regime of overlooking lateness on the part of litigants can undermine the authority of *186courts and agencies to conduct and complete proceedings before them in timely fashion. I also acknowledge some abstract merit in the DPW’s contention that if an evidentiary hearing had been granted, the inspector would have been required to appear for a second time, and that this would theoretically have prejudiced the DPW in some modest measure.3 Nevertheless— and here, recognizing that this is a close call, I part company with my colleagues — I conclude that the denial of the motion for a new hearing, after the ALJ had proceeded with the case notwithstanding Mr. Prime’s July 30 telephone call and had imposed the maximum sanction, was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion.
By the time he ruled, the ALJ had been apprised of Prime’s dilemma, and he was aware of Prime’s efforts to attend the hearing while at the same time trying to avoid the risk of losing substantial amounts in rent. The ALJ also knew that Prime was not a man who simply ignored his legal obligations; at worst, Prime had made a flawed decision at a time when news that the eviction would proceed on the following morning had placed him under considerable pressure. The ALJ wrote in his initial order signed on August 31, 2007 that Prime had provided no explanation for his failure to appear. But if this was an accurate assessment on August 31, 2007, notwithstanding Prime’s call on July 20 to the OAH, it was no longer true on November 20, 2007, when the ALJ issued his order denying Prime’s request for a new hearing.
I must of course, acknowledge that the amount of the fíne for failure to appear is within statutory limits, that it has not been explicitly challenged, and that it is not in itself properly subject to judicial review. See In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 434-35 (D.C.1988). But viewing the case as a whole, the record shows that Prime did try to attend the hearing, that he notified the OAH that he was running late, that he arrived twenty minutes after the very brief hearing was over, and that he had a compelling reason not to postpone the eviction. Under these circumstances, the ALJ’s disposition — the denial of an opportunity to defend on the merits, accompanied by a draconian monetary penalty — was severely out of line with the Mikado’s “object all sublime” that “the punishment fit the crime.”
III.
Fundamentally, the ALJ, rightly or wrongly, initially treated the case as one in which Prime had inexcusably failed to show up and that Prime had provided no explanation. The ALJ subsequently learned, however, that at least if Prime’s account was accurate, he had done his concededly imperfect best to carry out his obligations without potentially sacrificing several months of rent. At this point, the ALJ was on notice that the facts were evidently quite different from those that he had assumed in issuing his initial order. In my opinion, the ALJ’s adherence to a harsh disposition based on his original assumptions, even after he had reason to believe that these assumptions were un*187sound, constituted an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. Any reasonable person would recognize that the scheduling of the eviction, on a single day’s notice, for the same morning as the OAH hearing, had placed Prime in a very difficult situation and had undermined the assumptions on which the sanctions initially imposed were based. Notwithstanding this pro se litigant’s procedural miscues, I would not sustain an exercise of discretion which did not take into account the dilemma in which Prime had been placed on July 19 and Prime’s limited opportunity to reflect upon the alternatives available to him.
I respectfully dissent.
. There is no indication in the record that Prime has any legal training.
. I agree, based on the facts known to the ALJ at the time of the hearing, that although he could reasonably have waited a little longer in light of Prime's call, he did not abuse his discretion in proceeding in Prime's absence. The fact that the ALJ was aware of Prime's call, however, is relevant to the question whether a new hearing should have been granted when the ALJ subsequently learned of the unusual circumstances that led to Prime’s failure to arrive on time.
. This prejudice might well have been avoided, however, if the ALJ had waited another twenty minutes or so before ending the proceedings. Moreover, the cost in time and money, to the District and to this court, of the proceedings now before us dwarfs the expense entailed in having the inspector reappear, and the need for review by the appellate court might well have been avoided if the ALJ had either waited a little longer or granted a new hearing. Arguably, "this case demonstrates again that the shortest way around is often the longest way through.” In re C.W., 916 A.2d 158, 169 n. 10 (D.C.2007) (quoting, inter alia, Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 451 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir.1971)).