DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SIMPSON.Although I like the result reached in the well-written majority opinion, I reluctantly dissent, because the analysis overlooks an important principle of statutory construction.
The Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 954, amended Section 1103 of the Domestic Relations Code as follows: “No common law marriage contracted after January 1, 2005, shall be valid. Nothing in this part shall be deemed or taken to render any common-law marriage otherwise lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005, invalid.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the act did not expressly take action with respect to common-law marriages contracted before January 1, 2005.
On September 17, 2003, this Court ruled in an en banc decision in PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) that the doctrine of common-law marriage was prospectively abolished. That was the state of common-law marriages on November 26, 2003, when the marriage in this case was celebrated. Pursuant to the holding in PNC Bank Corp., Claimant’s common-law marriage was not lawful or valid.
I respectfully disagree that the General Assembly intended to implicitly change the state of common-law marrjages before 2005, resulting in the retroactive validation of Claimant’s marriage. Indeed, the opposite presumption is warranted, because statutes are never presumed to make any innovation in existing common law beyond that expressly declared in their provisions. In re Holton’s Estate, 399 Pa. 241, 159 A.2d 883 (1960); Pennsylvania Bankers Ass’n v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Banking and Trumark Financial Credit Union, 893 A.2d 864 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006) (en banc); Inkpen v. Roberts, 862 A.2d 700 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004); Borough of Pitcairn v. Westwood, 848 A.2d 158 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004).
There is no doubt that the General Assembly could have expressly changed the common law on this topic at any time it chose to do so. It chose January 1, 2005, to act. It is error to construe some earlier effective date. Therefore, I would affirm the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board’s order which permitted dependent benefits for the son, but denied them for the Claimant.
Judge LEADBETTER joins in this dissent.