Majority: CLIFFORD, DANA, ALEXANDER, CALKINS, and SILVER, JJ.
Dissent: LEVY, J.
ALEXANDER, J.[¶ 1] Christina C. Cardan appeals from a judgment entered in District Court (Lewiston, LáVerdiere, J.), determining child support obligations between her and David A. Bell. She asserts that the court erred by imputing to her, for purposes of calculating annual gross income: (1) the difference between the rent her parents charge her and the rent they charged the previous tenant; (2) an amount equal to her employer’s cost of health insurance; and (3) income for eight hours of pay Cardan could be earning if she had a forty-hour work week.1 Because the court *947erred in imputing, as income, its estimate of the additional economic value of Caro-lan’s rent and the wages she might earn if she worked additional hours, not available at her regular job, we vacate and remand.
I. CASE HISTORY
[¶ 2] Carolan and Bell are the parents of a son, now seven years old. Carolan has no other children. Bell has a thirteen-year-old daughter from a previous relationship. In 2004, Carolan fried a parental rights action seeking child support for their son. After issuing a preliminary child support order, the court bifurcated the parental rights issue and the support issue for separate consideration.
[¶ 3] The court (Cote, J.) entered its order on the nonfinancial parental rights issues on December 23, 2005. The court ordered shared parental rights and responsibilities. In essence, the order gave custody of the child to Bell from 6:00 P.M. on Sunday until the end of school on Thursday. Carolan would pick up the child at school on Thursday and keep him until Sunday at 6:00 P.M. The parties do not dispute this shared parental rights arrangement.2
[¶ 4] In April 2006, the court (LaVerdi-ere, J.) held a hearing on the child support issue. The testimony revealed the following facts relevant to this appeal. Carolan has a high school diploma and a technical school degree for work in a dental laboratory. In the past she has worked for various dental laboratories and has worked in the service industry. At the time of hearing, Carolan was working as a dental assistant and earning $13.50 per hour.3 Carolan’s employer’s office is closed on Fridays; therefore she works approximately thirty-three to thirty-five hours per week, Monday through Thursday. She then takes her son to school on Friday, a twenty-eight-mile trip, and typically volunteers at the school that day.
[¶ 5] Carolan testified that her employer covers her health insurance costs, but because the health insurance premiums have risen, she has not received a pay raise in two years. She was unaware of how much her employer actually pays to maintain her health insurance.
[¶ 6] Carolan rents a small single-family home that is owned by her parents. She pays $1000 per month in rent and pays for all of the utilities. Her oil bill for the 2005-2006 season was over $1000. Caro-lan hopes to eventually purchase this home from her parents. Her parents previously rented the home for $1300 per month.
[¶ 7] Testimony indicated that Bell fives rent-free in a home owned by his employer, Bell Farms, which is his family’s corporation. A real estate broker testified that the fair rental value of the property was $900 to $1000 per month, although Bell claimed that it is much less. The corporation owns several vehicles that Bell uses for personal purposes. The corporation also pays most of his expenses, including his utility bills and insurance. Bell’s employer also pays for his children’s health insurance. Bell presented exhibits indicating that Bell’s employer would pay $214.85 per month for a single person insurance plan and $386.73 per month for a parent and child(ren)’s plan.
*948[¶ 8] In lieu of closing arguments, the court instructed counsel to submit memo-randa and proposed worksheets in support of their positions. Carolan argued that her gross income should be her income that is reported on her W-2 and that the court should not impute any additional income to her. Bell argued that the court should impute additional income to Caro-lan for: (1) the difference between her rent and the rent charged the prior tenant; (2) the value of the health insurance that Cardan’s employer pays for her;4 and (3) voluntary underemployment. The court adopted Bell’s suggestions for imputing income in its findings and order addressing child support.
[¶ 9] The court calculated Cardan’s gross income based on the following: Employment 32 x $13.50 x 52 = $22,464.00
Imputed wages to full-time_8 x $10,00 x 52 = $ 4,160.00
Value of paid health insurance $ 2,578.00
Value of rent reduction $300.00 x 12 = $ 3,600.00
TOTAL_$32,802.00
The court calculated Bell’s gross income based on the following:
W-2 income (including health insurance) $29,542.00
In-kind income provided by employer
House rental $900.00 x 12 = $10,800.00
Electricity $ 75.00 x 12 = $ 900.00
CeU phone_$ 60.00 x 12 = $ 720.00
Home phone $ 35.00 X 12 = $ 420.00
Heating oil 550 gallons @ $2.25/gallon = $ 1,238.00
Vehicle use/maintenance/registration 10,000 miles @
and fuel $ .445/mile = $ 4,450.00
Insurance on home contents and vehicle $ 446.00
TOTAL_$48,516.00
[¶ 10] Using the calculations on the child support worksheet, the court ordered that Bell pay Carolan $28.46 per week for child support. The court also ordered Bell to maintain health insurance for their son. This appeal followed. Bell did not file a cross-appeal.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
[¶ 11] This case requires us to consider the limits of a court’s discretion to impute income to establish annual gross income for child support calculation purposes pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5) (2006). When calculating gross income for child support purposes, the court may consider income from any “ongoing source.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(A). The law authorizes the court to impute additional income in certain circumstances, such as when a parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed, 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(D), or when the parent, as an employee, receives in-kind payments or services, in lieu of wages, in the course of his or her employment, 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(B).
[¶ 12] We review child support orders for abuse of discretion. Sylvester v. Vitagliano, 2002 ME 141, ¶ 10, 804 A.2d 391, 394. However, we review the District Court’s factual findings to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. Williams v. St. Pierre, 2006 ME 10, ¶ 8, 889 A.2d 1011, 1013. Findings are clearly erroneous if “there is no competent evidence in the record to support [them].” Payne v. Payne, 2006 ME 73, ¶ 7, 899 A.2d 793, 795 (quotation marks omitted).
A. Income Imputed for Value of Rent Reduction
[¶ 13] We have held that income from an “ongoing source” includes money *949received from educational grants for living expenses, see Rich v. Narofsky, 624 A.2d 987, 939 (Me.1993); lump sum severance pay, Walker v. Walker, 2005 ME 21, ¶ 15, 868 A.2d 887, 890; and per diem stipends, Macomber v. Macomber, 2003 ME 1, ¶ 7, 814 A.2d 456, 457-58.5 However, gross income does not include money received as a gift, where the donor has no legal obligation to continue “ongoing” payment. See True v. True, 615 A.2d 252, 253 (Me.1992) (rejecting the argument that the court should have included the value of monthly checks sent by the party’s grandmother in the gross income calculation).
[¶ 14] Here, the difference between the rent Carolan paid and the rent paid by the previous tenant cannot be considered income from an ongoing source pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(A). Although her monthly rent may be $300 less than the previous tenant’s, the $1000 rent is hardly an insubstantial sum. There is no evidence in the record that Carolan’s rent payments are significantly less than prevailing rental rates for similar properties in the area. Even if the record included evidence of a significant variance between actual rent paid and prevailing rates in the area, the court would be engaging in considerable speculation if it were to impute income, or loss of income, based on a finding that a particular rent payment was significantly more, or less, than the prevailing, or “economic,” rental rate that should be assessed for a particular unit. Further, there is no evidence in the record that Carolan’s parents have a legal obligation to continue the $1000 per month rental rate.6 The court erred by imputing the value of the difference between Caro-lan’s rent and the rent of the previous tenant in Carolan’s gross income calculation.
B. Income Imputed for Value of Health Insurance
[¶ 15] Gross income includes “income from an ongoing source, including, but not limited to ... expense reimbursements or in-kind payments received by a party in the course of employment or self-employment or operation of a business if the expense reimbursements or in-kind payments reduce personal living expenses.” 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(A)-(B); see also Knowles v. Knowles, 588 A.2d 315, 318 (Me.1991). In the present case, subsection (5)(B) provided the authority for the court to include the value of Bell’s rent-free housing, use of vehicles, and other payments for his living expenses in calculating his gross income, because the value of these items was received by Bell in lieu of wages in the course of his employment and reduced his personal living expenses. Here, we need not address, as a general matter, whether a court may include the amount an employer contributes to an employee’s health insurance plan when calculating gross income.
[¶ 16] Carolan’s testimony that she receives employer-paid health insurance in lieu of a wage increase supports the *950court’s conclusion that the health insurance payments are “in-kind benefits” subject to imputation to gross income pursuant to section 2001(5)(B). This result provides similar treatment for Carolan’s and Bell’s employer-paid health benefits. Thus, the court did not err in its treatment of employer-paid health benefits to impute income to each party pursuant to subsection (5)(B).
[¶ 17] While there was no evidence of the actual amount of Carolan’s employer’s health insurance payments, the court did not err in finding that the value of Carolan’s health insurance benefits was $2578. The court arrived at this amount by multiplying Bell’s employer’s monthly rate for single employees, $214.85, by twelve. Using this amount to infer the value of Carolan’s employer’s payments was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.
C. Income Imputed for Eight Additional Hours of Work
[¶ 18] Pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines, income may be imputed when a person is found to be underemployed, subject to conditions specified in section 2001(5)(D). Paragraph D states in pertinent part: “Gross income may include the difference between the amount a party is earning and that party’s earning capacity when the party voluntarily becomes or remains unemployed or underemployed, if sufficient evidence is introduced concerning a party’s current earning capacity.”
[¶ 19] The determination of whether a party is voluntarily underemployed is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Cf. Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 17, 818 A.2d 1005, 1010. If a parent is voluntarily underemployed, the court’s decision to impute income or apply the parent’s earning capacity, rather than his or her current income, is discretionary. See Koszegi v. Erickson, 2004 ME 113, ¶ 14, 855 A.2d 1168, 1171; Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Frye, 2000 ME 128, ¶ 11, 754 A.2d 1000, 1002-03.
[¶ 20] In this record, there is no dispute that Carolan’s job is what would be considered full-time employment with benefits. Her employment as a dental assistant properly utilizes her education and experience. She works thirty-three to thirty-five hours per week, and works virtually all of the hours that are available from her employer. Her employer’s office is closed on Fridays. Like many other employees in today’s economy, she does not work a full forty-hour week. However, a person who works such a schedule is not thereby “underemployed” as a matter of fact or law for purposes of section 2001(5)(D). A parent who has a full-time job consistent with the parent’s education and experience, but who works less than a forty-hour week, is not, thereby subject to having his or her income recalculated to a forty-hour per week equivalent for child support calculation purposes.
[¶ 21] Carolan’s employment, although a few hours less than a forty-hour week, is consistent with her training and experience, and utilizes all available hours provided by her employer. The finding of voluntary underemployment was a clear error. Therefore, the court abused its discretion by imputing an additional eight hours of income to Carolan when calculating her gross income.7
*951The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded for recalculation of child support consistent with this opinion.
. The annual gross income of each party, defined at 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5) (2006), is *947the essential determination from which child support obligations for each party are calculated pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2006 (2006) and the Child Support Table. See 19-A M.R.S. § 2011 (2006).
. The court (LaVerdiere, J.) amended this order on May 2, 2006.
. In 2004, Cardan's W-2 reflected earnings of just over $24,000. Due to her decrease in hours when her son started kindergarten, Carolan’s W-2 in 2005 reflected earnings of about $22,541.
. Bell asserted that because Carolan did not provide evidence of how much her employer pays for her health insurance, the court should apply $214.85 per month, which is the amount that Bell's employer pays for single employees.
. Pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(A) (2006), income also includes, but is not limited to,
salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust funds, annuities, capital gains, social security benefits, disability insurance benefits, prizes, workers' compensation benefits, spousal support actually received pursuant to a preexisting order from a spouse who is not the parent of the child for whom support is being determined, and education grants, fellowships or subsidies that are available for personal living expenses.
. Also, the value of Carolan's rent could not be considered an "expense reimbursementfs] or in-kind payment[s]” that reduces personal living expenses pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5)(B) because the rental rate was not received in the course of her employment.
. In contrast, a finding that a parent is voluntarily underemployed is appropriate when, for example, the parent chooses a career or education path that does not take into account the interests of the children he or she is required to support, Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 17, 818 A.2d 1005, 1010; when the parent is capable of working at least part-time, Rich v. Narofsky, 624 A.2d 937, 939 (Me.1993); or when the parent, who is still at a young age, chooses to retire despite having no apparent limitation on working capacity, *951Koszegi v. Erickson, 2004 ME 113, ¶ 13-14, 855 A.2d 1168, 1171.