dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that a debtor inflicts a willful and malicious injury on a creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) if she knows with substantial certainty that her actions will result in that injury. I do not agree, however, that when reviewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Debt- or that there are no material issues of fact in dispute so that Blocker is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
I would begin by noting that the analysis of whether a person commits an intentional tort must focus on whether the person was substantially certain that her conduct would result in the injury in question. Valencia v. Reardan-Edwall School Dist. No. 1, 125 Wash.App. 348, 104 P.3d 734, 736 (2005). Thus, because Blocker is seeking to except from discharge Debtor’s obligation to Dillon’s estate in the Wrongful Death Action, Blocker must demonstrate that Debtor was substantially certain that her conduct would result in Dillon’s death.
I would also note that neither § 523(a)(6) nor the case law on intentional torts in general give precise guidance on when a person acts with substantial certainty. It is clear, however, that substantial certainty is more than acting with knowledge that one’s conduct creates a high probability of the injury to another, which is defined as recklessness. In re Boston Reg’l. Med. Cent., 328 F.Supp.2d 130, 164 (D.Mass.2004); See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, cmt. f. I believe that when reviewing Debtor’s deposition testimony in the light most favorable to Debtor, there are material questions of fact as to whether Debtor acted with substantial certainty or recklessness with respect to Dillon’s death.
There is no doubt, as the majority points out, that the autopsy report indicates that Dillon had suffered a number of significant past injuries because of McBride’s abuse of him. There is also no question that Debtor knew that McBride had abused Dillon in the past and took action to hide that abuse from others. It is also uncontroverted that Debtor observed that Dillon was having difficulty breathing and speaking the morning that Dillon died. But the summary judgment record, in my view, does contain sufficient evidence that creates a material question of fact as to whether Debtor was substantially certain that leaving Dillon with McBride and failing to obtain medical help for Dillon would result in Dillon’s death for two reasons.
First, Debtor repeatedly testified that she did not know that McBride’s abuse of Dillon was frequent or severe, or at least severe enough to result in Dillon’s death. The majority takes the position that this portion of Debtor’s deposition testimony cannot create a material issue of fact because the testimony is self-serving and contradicted by the autopsy report. I agree that the autopsy report contains objective evidence that Dillon sustained a number of significant injuries at the hands of McBride. I believe, however, that Debtor’s deposition fails to establish whether or not Debtor was subjectively aware of all of the injuries listed in the autopsy report. Also, assuming that Debt- *462or was aware of those injuries, a material question of fact remains as to whether Debtor was substantially certain, in a subjective sense, that the abuse that would result in these types of injuries would be severe enough to cause Dillon’s death.
Second, Debtor testified that she believed Dillon was not critically injured because he was initially responsive to Debt- or’s questions and Debtor subjectively believed he had suffered a concussion, from which he would eventually recover. Once again, as the majority notes, there is certainly objective evidence in the record that establishes that Dillon was in dire need of medical assistance the morning of his death. I believe, however, that Debtor’s deposition testimony creates a material question of fact as to whether she was substantially certain that Dillon would die absent medical treatment.32
Given that we must view this summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Debtor, I believe there are material questions of fact as to whether Debtor’s conduct in leaving Dillon with McBride and failing to obtain medical assistance for Dillon constitutes substantial certainty or recklessness with respect to Dillon’s death. Accordingly, I would reverse the bankruptcy court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Blocker and remand the ease to the bankruptcy court for a trial.
. I note that because we must focus on Debt- or’s subjective belief in analyzing whether Debtor was substantially certain that her conduct would result in Dillon's death, the reasonableness of her belief is not at issue. See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 579 Pa. 333, 855 A.2d 854, 871 (2004).