delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this search and seizure case, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, defendant pled guilty to possession of drugs based on evidence seized after a warrantless arrest. As in State v. Moore, also decided today, 181 N.J. 40, 853 A.2d 903, 2004 WL 1713632 (2004), we review whether the State had reason*18able suspicion to make an investigatory stop and whether the State had probable cause to search defendant. The trial court and the Appellate Division both answered that question in the affirmative. We disagree in part. We conclude that although there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant and investigate, the totality of the circumstances failed to support a finding of probable cause to search defendant without a warrant.
I.
Wildwood Police Officer Elias Aboud was the sole witness at the suppression hearing. On December 8, 2000, around 6:15 p.m., he was on routine patrol in the area of Roberts and Pacific Avenues in Wildwood, New Jersey. Aboud characterized this area as a high drug, high crime area. While in his patrol vehicle Aboud observed defendant Jose R. Pineiro and codefendant Jorge Rodriguez standing on the corner of Roberts and Pacific Avenues. There was a bicycle nearby.
Aboud recognized both individuals. He previously had encountered defendant “while clearing the corners” in that same area, and he had received intelligence reports indicating defendant was a suspected drug dealer. Aboud knew Rodriguez, having arrested him for child support and possibly for possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS). He also was aware that Rodriguez was a drug user.
The overhead lights in the area allowed Aboud to observe defendant give Rodriguez a pack of cigarettes. Aboud was aware that a cigarette pack sometimes is used to transport drugs. Neither man was smoking at the time. Immediately after the transfer, the two men noticed Aboud. They looked at him with shock and surprise and turned to leave the area. Defendant walked down Pacific Avenue while Rodriguez mounted the bicycle and pedaled westbound on Roberts Avenue. Aboud called for assistance to detain defendant while he pursued Rodriguez. He overtook Rodriguez and detained him. Aboud informed Rodriguez that he believed he had just purchased drugs. Rodriguez *19began to cry and denied any drug involvement. Aboud asked Rodriguez for the cigarette pack, and upon receipt of it, looked inside and found a baggie containing three smaller light blue baggies of suspected heroin.
Concurrently, other Wildwood police officers stopped and arrested defendant. The record does not reveal that any evidence was seized from defendant.
The trial court found there was probable cause to arrest Rodriguez and defendant for their involvement in a drug transaction. The Appellate Division agreed, finding that Aboud’s specialized knowledge that cigarette packs are used to conceal drugs, his knowledge of Rodriguez’s drug involvement, the officer’s prior observation of defendant in that same high crime area, and the men’s reaction upon seeing the officer established probable cause. We granted defendant’s petition for certification, 177 N.J. 489, 828 A.2d 917 (2003), and now reverse.
II.
Warrantless seizures and searches are presumptively invalid as contrary to the United States and the New Jersey Constitutions. State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7, 414 A.2d 1327, 1330 (1980). Both constitutional standards require that such seizures or searches be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. There is a constitutional preference for a judicial determination of whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant. State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 381, 590 A.2d 1179, 1183 (1991). This preference accounts for the difference in result in a “marginal ease [where] a search with a warrant may be sustainable [and] where a search without a warrant would fail.” Ibid.
When no warrant is sought, the State has the burden to demonstrate that “ ‘[the search] falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.’” State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 482, 771 A.2d 1220, 1227 (2001) (altera*20tion in original) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973)). Thus, we evaluate the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in light of the trial court’s findings of fact to determine whether the State met its burden. “[T]he State must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that there was no constitutional violation.” State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 13, 833 A.2d 1087, 1090 (2003).
We recently reviewed the constitutionally permissible forms of police encounters with citizens. State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 816 A.2d 153 (2003). A “field inquiry” is the least intrusive encounter, and occurs when a police officer approaches an individual and asks “if [the person] is willing to answer some questions.” Id. at 510, 816 A.2d at 158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A field inquiry is permissible so long as the questions “[are] not harassing, overbearing, or accusatory in nature.” Ibid. “The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.” Maryland, supra, 167 N.J. at 483, 771 A.2d at 1227 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236 (1983)). Cf. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., — U.S.-, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004) (upholding state “stop and identify” statute requiring detainee to disclose his name to officer under suspicious circumstances).
The next type of encounter, an investigatory stop, sometimes referred to as a Terry1 stop, is valid “if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 510-11, 816 A.2d at 158 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The suspicion need not rise to the “probable cause necessary to justify an arrest.” Id. at 511, 816 A.2d at 158. We have explained:
*21The standards by which the reasonableness of police conduct involving an investigatory stop of a person or an automobile [are evaluated] originate with Terry v. Ohio ____ In Terry, the United States Supreme Court ... stated that the reasonableness of the police conduct in conducting an investigatory stop in light of the Fourth Amendment could be generally assessed by “ ‘balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.’ ” The facts used in that balancing test are to be judged objectively: “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” When determining if the officer's actions were reasonable, consideration must be given “to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Neither “inarticulate hunches” nor an arresting officer’s subjective good faith can justify an infringement of a citizen’s constitutionally guaranteed rights. Rather, the officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”
[State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 7-8, 691 A.2d 808, 811 (1997) (citations omitted) (second alteration in original).]
The last type of encounter is that occasioned by the probable cause standard. Probable cause is not easily defined. In Moore, supra, we stated:
[T]he probable cause standard “ ‘is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being committed.’” [Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 515, 816 A.2d at 161] (quoting State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211, 777 A.2d 60, 64 (2001)). “Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within ... [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Schneider v. Simonini, 163 N.J. 336, 361, 749 A.2d 336, 349 (2000) (first and second alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1146, 121 S.Ct. 1083, 148 L.Ed.2d 959 (2001). “The substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003); accord State v. Dangerfield, 171 N.J. 446, 456, 795 A.2d 250, 255 (2002).
[181 N.J. at 45-46, 853 A.2d at 906-07 (first and second alterations added).]
III.
Turning to the case at hand, the State seeks to justify the initial stop of defendant as an investigatory stop. Defendant argues to the contrary.
As noted, there must be a showing of reasonable and articulable suspicion for courts to sanction a brief investigatory *22stop. In State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 788 A.2d 746 (2002), the Court reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court definition of reasonable suspicion as “ ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 356, 788 A.2d at 752 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 918 (1996) (internal citation omitted)). There must be “some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981).
A determination of reasonable suspicion is fact-sensitive. Nishina, supra, 175 N.J. at 511, 816 A.2d at 159. The totality of the circumstances must be considered in evaluating whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory stop. State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504, 517 A.2d 859, 867 (1986). An officer’s experience and knowledge are factors courts should consider in applying the totality of the circumstances test. Ibid.
A.
A review of several prior cases is helpful to our determination. In Arthur, supra, the police observed a woman in a high drug traffic area get into the defendant’s ear, remain with the defendant for about five minutes, leave with a brown paper bag under her arm, and look around in a suspicious manner. 149 N.J. at 4, 691 A.2d at 809. Based on the woman’s conduct and their knowledge that paper bags were often used to transport drugs, the police stopped the woman, seized the bag, looked inside, and discovered between 100 and 200 glass vials containing a white residue. Id. at 5, 691 A.2d at 809. The police stopped the defendant’s car, and when he was ordered to exit the car he blurted out that he had “bottles” (slang for cocaine). Ibid. The Court held that the stop of the woman was lawful, but that the officers’ observations did not justify a search of her bag in the absence of any belief that she was armed or dangerous. Id. at 14-*2315, 691 A.2d at 814. The Court determined that the search of the woman was merely an attempt to look for evidence of drugs. Id. at 15, 691 A.2d at 814-15. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the investigatory stop of the defendant’s car because the totality of the circumstances supported a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in illegal drug activity, id. at 12, 691 A.2d at 813, and his admission that he had “bottles” gave the police probable cause to search his person, id. at 16, 691 A.2d at 815.
Similarly, in State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 275-76, 712 A.2d 1096, 1097-98 (1998), the Court concluded there was reasonable suspicion to stop and search the defendant after the police officer observed the defendant riding a bicycle off a bridge walkway. The officer recognized the defendant from previous arrests for drug offenses, knew that he lived in the opposite direction from where he was riding, and after making eye contact with the officer the defendant appeared nervous, increased his speed, and jumped off the bicycle and placed it into the back of a pick-up truck. Based on his knowledge that drug traffickers frequently used bicycles to ride into New York and buy drugs, the officer approached the defendant to inquire about his activities. Id. at 276, 712 A.2d at 1098. Without responding, the defendant hastily mounted his bicycle and departed. Ibid. The officer gave chase and stopped the defendant. Ibid. The officer believed the defendant was under the influence of CDS because he was sweating profusely, his eyes were bloodshot, and his pupils were slow to react to light. Ibid. The officer placed him under arrest and a subsequent search of the defendant revealed suspected crack cocaine. Ibid.
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding articulable suspicion to stop, which rose to probable cause to arrest when the officer’s observations reasonably led him to conclude that the defendant was under the influence of drugs. Id. at 277, 712 A.2d at 1098-99. On appeal, a majority of the Appellate Division panel reversed, ibid., holding that the officer *24lacked the requisite level of suspicion needed to support a Terry stop, thus the arrest and search were fruits of that illegality, id. at 278, 712 A.2d at 1099.
This Court reversed, concluding that even though “[the] ‘defendant’s actions might have some speculative innocent explanation,’ ” they also were reasonably consistent with illegal activity to give the officer reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. Id. at 280-81, 712 A.2d at 1100 (citation omitted). The Court noted that the defendant’s flight from the officer merely added weight to the officer’s already existing reasonable and articulable suspicion. Id. at 280, 712 A.2d at 1100. Thus, the Court held that the stop and the ensuing search were valid. Id. at 281, 712 A.2d at 1101.
Likewise in State v. Valentine, 134 N.J. 536, 636 A.2d 505 (1994), this Court upheld the trial court’s finding of specific and articulable facts of criminal activity. A police officer on patrol in a high crime area around midnight saw the defendant duck behind a tree. Id. at 539, 636 A.2d at 506. The officer approached the defendant, who began walking towards the officer with his hands in his pocket. Id. at 540, 636 A.2d at 506. The officer recognized the defendant and was aware that he had a lengthy criminal history. Ibid., 636 A.2d at 507. The defendant’s responses to the officer’s questions, along with his nervousness and failure to make eye contact, made the officer uncomfortable and suggested that the defendant might have a weapon. Ibid. The officer conducted a pat-down search, which led to defendant’s immediate arrest when a hard large object in his pocket proved to be a locked blade knife after removal. Ibid. The trial court denied defendant’s motion to suppress and a divided Appellate Division panel reversed. Id. at 541, 636 A.2d at 507. On review, this Court held that the totality of circumstances (which included the officer’s isolation, the late hour, the high crime area, and the defendant’s furtive movements and prior criminal history) provided a reasonable basis for the officer to conclude that the defendant might be armed and dangerous, and thus the officer was justified in conducting both the Terry *25stop and the subsequent pat-down search. Id. at 553-54, 636 A.2d at 513-14.
B.
Here, Aboud observed defendant give Rodriguez a pack of cigarettes. Based on his experience, Aboud was aware that drugs sometimes are transported in cigarette packs. While the transfer of the cigarette pack may have been purely innocent, Citarella and Arthur support the proposition that the police may rely on behavior that is consistent with innocence as well as guilt in finding reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. “The fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a person’s actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as ‘a reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with guilt.’ ” Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 279-80, 712 A.2d at 1100 (quoting Arthur, supra, 149 N.J. at 11, 691 A.2d at 813).
Aboud was familiar with defendant from having “cleared him off the corners” in the same area. Furthermore, Aboud had received intelligence reports that identified defendant as a suspected drug dealer. Regarding Rodriguez, Aboud was aware that he had been involved with illicit drugs and that Aboud previously had arrested him. Additionally, both defendant and Rodriguez immediately departed the area upon seeing Aboud. Based on his knowledge that drugs were sometimes carried in cigarette packs, that he had not observed either of the men smoking, and his familiarity with both men, Aboud decided to stop Rodriguez and defendant. We are satisfied that, even though standing alone each factor may not have been sufficient, the totality of the circumstances, as viewed by a reasonable officer with Aboud’s knowledge and experience, established a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying an investigatory stop.
The trial court did not emphasize flight as a factor, nor do we. However, we note the following. Although both men departed the scene on seeing Aboud, there was no evidence that they ran *26from the scene or refused to stop when the police directed them to do so. Aboud previously had cleared defendant from the same corner, so the men may have departed in anticipation of Aboud “clearing the corner” again. Today, we reaffirm that flight alone does not create reasonable suspicion for a stop, Dangerfield, supra, 171 N.J. at 457, 795 A.2d at 256, although in combination with other circumstances it may support reasonable and articulable suspicion, Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 281, 712 A.2d at 1100— 01. Thus, even if we were to consider the departure from the scene by defendant and Rodriguez as flight, that flight would only add “weight to the already existing, reasonable articulable suspicion.” Citarella, supra, 154 N.J. at 281, 712 A.2d at 1100-01; see also State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169, 642 A.2d 401, 407 (1994).
Our concurring colleague urges that the police should not consider an area’s reputation for or history of crime, or even the transfer of a cigarette pack, to aid in the determination of reasonable and articulable suspicion. In support of his view, our concurring colleague references a few decisions from other jurisdictions, but he fails to account for either our jurisprudence, or that of other jurisdictions, that considers the reputation or history of an area and an officer’s experience with and knowledge of the suspected transfer of narcotics as relevant factors to determine the validity of a Terry stop. See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 830 So.2d 440, 445 (La.App.2002) (holding that officer’s experience, training, and common sense may be considered in determining reasonable inferences for investigatory stop; reputation of area is relevant, articulable fact on which officer can rely in determination of reasonable suspicion for investigatory stop); State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 414 N.E.2d 1044, 1046—47 (1980) (recognizing relevancy of factors such as area’s high crime reputation, officer’s awareness of recent criminal activity in area, and officer’s training and experience in Terry stop analysis); Commonwealth v. E.M., 558 Pa. 16, 735 A.2d 654, 659 (1999) (upholding Terry stop where articulable factors included high-crime area where officer had made many drug arrests, officer saw defendant holding baggie and motioning to others who made exchange of items on officer’s approach, and *27where defendant “began walking away, quickening his pace into a run when the officer ordered him to stop”); State v. Allen, 226 Wis.2d 66, 593 N.W.2d 504, 508 (Ct.App.), review denied, 228 Wis.2d 168, 599 N.W.2d 409 (1999) (observing that officers’ training and experience and area’s reputation are factors in totality of the circumstances equation, thus relevant to determination of reasonable suspicion supporting Terry stop).
Even so, the concurrence recognizes that our decision follows current precedent, although he cautions against the erosion of our Fourth Amendment protections. In our view, we do no more than follow the admonition of Justice Garibaldi when she expressed the Court’s approach to the evaluation of the lawfulness of a given seizure:
We recognize, as did the Supreme Court in Terry and its progeny, the narrow line that must be drawn to protect a citizen’s privacy and freedom of movement and yet allow proper law-enforcement activities. We have always favored strong safeguards against governmental interference with a citizen’s rights of privacy and freedom. Common sense and good judgment nevertheless require that police officers be allowed to engage in some investigative street encounters without probable cause. Such encounters are justified only if the evidence, when interpreted in an objectively reasonable manner, shows that the encounter was preceded by activity that would lead a reasonable police officer to have an articulable suspicion that criminal activity had occurred or would shortly occur. No mathematical formula exists for deciding whether the totality of circumstances provided the officer with an articulable or particularized suspicion that the individual in question was involved in criminal activity. Such a determination can be made only through a sensitive appraisal of the circumstances in each ease. In each case, the reasons for such particularized suspicion will be given careful scrutiny by the Court. A seizure cannot—we emphasize cannot—be justified merely by a police officer’s subjective hunch.
[Davis, supra, 104 N.J. at 504-05, 517 A.2d at 867.]
TV.
We next consider whether the facts supported probable cause to seize and search Rodriguez. Both courts below found probable cause to seize the cigarette pack from Rodriguez and to arrest him. The State contends that once drugs were discovered on Rodriguez, there was probable cause to arrest both him and *28defendant for suspected drug activity. Thus, we must consider whether the cigarette pack was lawfully seized from Rodriguez.
As we noted above, warrantless searches are presumed invalid. State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. 657, 664, 751 A.2d 92, 95-96 (2000). Unless the warrantless search comes within one of the prescribed exceptions, the search is not permissible. Ibid. Similar to its position in Moore, the State argues that based on the information available to Aboud, there was probable cause to arrest Rodriguez for possession of drugs.
Today in Moore we found probable cause based on the law enforcement officers’ observations in a high crime area, which included observing the defendant and a companion walk away from a group of people to the back of a vacant lot, and hand a third man currency in exchange for small unknown objects believed to be drugs. Moore, supra, 181 N.J. at 46-47, 853 A.2d at 907. Here, unlike in Moore, there was no observation of currency or anything else exchanged, rather, there was merely a transfer of a cigarette pack under circumstances that had both innocent and suspected criminal connotations. Moreover, there was no proof of “regularized police experience that objects such as [hard cigarette packs] are the probable containers of drugs.” Demeter, supra, 124 N.J. at 385-86, 590 A.2d at 1185. The sum of the evidence was merely the officer’s prior general narcotics training and experience, and his conclusory testimony that he knew that cigarette packs are used to transport drugs because he had seen that type of activity before. The evidence did not even include the number of times the officer had encountered the use of cigarette packs to exchange drugs or what percentage of observed cigarette packs held drugs.
Although we recognize that this is a close case, in our view the totality of the circumstances here fall short of probable cause.2 *29The activity observed by Aboud was the passing of a cigarette pack in a high crime area between a known felon and a suspected drug dealer. Aboud apprehended Rodriguez and accused him of having been involved in a drug transaction. After Rodriguez began to cry and denied he had any drugs, Aboud asked if he would voluntarily surrender the cigarette pack and Rodriguez did so. We conclude that the observations by Aboud raised a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring, but more is required to support a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the cigarette pack. After all, the passing of the cigarette pack just as easily could have been nothing more than the transfer of a cigarette pack between two adults. Although nervousness and crying by Rodriguez may have raised the officer’s suspicions, we do not find that those factors, even when considered with the other circumstances, reached the level of the elusive concept of probable cause.
Moreover, we need not determine whether a pat-down search would have been reasonable under those circumstances. Aboud never testified that he thought either man might be armed or that he needed to conduct a protective pat-down search. Unlike in Valentine, supra, where the officer was aware that the defendant’s criminal history included armed robberies and weapons offenses, 134 N.J. at 540, 636 A.2d at 506-07, there is no evidence of a similar criminal history in this case to justify a protective search.
In summary, we hold that under a totality of the circumstances analysis, the State failed to meet its burden to show probable cause to seize the cigarette pack and arrest the individuals. Consequently, it was error to deny defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Y.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
The State does not seek to justify the search under the consent exception, recognizing that Aboud did not inform Rodriguez of his right to refuse consent. See State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 288, 576 A.2d 834, 847-48 (1990).