People v. Stanton

R. M. Maher, J.

(dissenting). I am unable to agree with the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s holding that the statute under which defendant was charged violates the constitution of our state.

In 1909, the Michigan Legislature enacted Pub-*501lie Act 17, which was designed to keep weapons, liquor and narcotics out of the state prison system. The act was entitled as follows:

"An Act to prohibit the bringing into prisons of all weapons, or other implements which may be used to injure any convict or person or in assisting any convict to escape from punishment, or the selling or furnishing of same to convicts; to prohibit the bringing into prisons of all spirituous or fermented liquors, drugs, medicines, poisons, opium, morphine or any kind or character of narcotics, or the giving, selling or furnishing of spirituous or fermented liquors, drugs, medicines, poisons, opium, morphine or any other kind or character of narcotics to convicts or paroled prisoners and providing a penalty for the violation hereof.” 1909 PA 17. (Emphasis supplied.)

The 1909 PA 17 contains five sections. It is § 3 of this act (MCLA 800.283; MSA 28.1623) which is at issue today.

As written in 1909, § 3 of PA 17 prohibited the following conduct:

"No weapon or other implement which may be used to injure any convict or person, or in assisting any convict to escape from imprisonment, shall be sold,given away or furnished to any convict in any prison, or any building appurtenant thereto, or on the land granted to or owned or leased by the State for the use and benefit of the prisoners; nor shall any weapon or other implement which may be used to injure any convict or person, or in assisting any convict to escape from imprisonment, be brought into any prison or any building appurtenant thereto, or onto the land granted to or owned or leased by the State for the use and benefit of the prisoners; nor shall any weapon or other implement, which may be used to injure any convict or person, or in assisting any convict to escape from imprisonment, be sold, given away, or furnished, either directly or indirectly, to any convict either in or any*502where outside of the prison, or be disposed of in such a manner, or in such a place that it may be secured by any convict in the prison.” (Emphasis supplied.)

In 1972, the Legislature added one sentence to § 3:

"A convict without authorization, shall not have on his person or under his control or in his possession any weapon or other implement which may be used to injure any convict or other person, or to assist any convict to escape from imprisonment.”

The 1972 amendment did not provide for any equivalent amending of the act’s title. For this reason, the statute as it now reads violates art 4, § 24 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution:

"No law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. ” Const 1963, art 4, § 24. (Emphasis supplied.)

The majority correctly points out the twin purposes that this constitutional provision serves. The majority also correctly states the standard which it traditionally has imposed upon legislative draftsmen:

"The purpose of an act must be indicated by its title, and the body of the act must not be inconsistent with the title. The title must indicate its purpose, and the purpose of the statute cannot be changed by an amendatory act. Vernor v Secretary of State, 179 Mich 157 [146 NW 338] (Ann Cas 1915 D, 128) [1914], An amendment to a statute including matter foreign to the title is invalid. Stewart v Father Matthew Society, 41 Mich 67 [1 NW 931 (1879)].” People v Stanley, 344 Mich 530, 541; 75 NW2d 39 (1956). (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, a close reading of 1909 PA 17 reveals that the intent of the Legislature was to *503prevent any person from supplying liquor, narcotics or weapons to prison inmates. MCLA 800.281; MSA 28.1621 (§1 of 1909 PA 17) and MCLA 800.283; MSA 28.1623 (§ 3 of 1909 PA 17) prohibited the selling, giving, furnishing or bringing into a prison of the designated contraband. By using this language, the Legislature indicated that the focus of the act was on those people who "sold, gave, furnished or brought” contraband into prisons, rather than on those inmates who ultimately received the goods. The title of 1909 PA 17 accurately reflected this focus.

The 1972 amendment to 1909 PA 17 was aimed at the ultimate recipient of the contraband:

"A convict without authorization, shall not have on his person or under his control or in his possession any weapon or other implement which may be used to injure any convict or other person, or to assist any convict to escape from imprisonment.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the amendment focused on a different class of people than did the original enactment. It enlarged the scope of people subject to prosecution under the act, and thereby enlarged the purpose of the act. The amendment of the title, to indicate that the purpose of the act had been expanded to prohibit not only the introduction of weapons into prisons but also the possession or control of weapons by inmates, would have been a simple task. Yet, the title of the act does not reflect the purpose of the amendment. This is fatal. Consequently, I cannot agree that the 1972 amendment is constitutional.

I find support for my position here in earlier decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court. In People v Smith, 246 Mich 393; 224 NW 402 (1929), the *504Court faced a similar issue. Defendant was charged with receiving the earnings of a prostitute. 1925 PA 330 outlawed "pandering”. The title of that act noted its purpose as prohibiting pandering. 1927 PA 37, an amendment to the 1925 act, added offenses other than pandering to the list or proscribed actions. The title of the original act was not amended. Our Supreme Court struck down the amendment because the title did not accurately reflect the subject matter of the amendment. See also, People v Carey, supra, and People v Morton, 384 Mich 38; 179 NW2d 379 (1970).

People v Milton, 393 Mich 234; 224 NW2d 266 (1974), does not warrant this Court to blithely dismiss even substantial title-body questions. Appreciative of the difficult situation presented in Milton, I am not inclined to reject defendant’s challenge to the statute under which he was charged on the basis of language found in Milton. Since the subject matter added by the 1972 amendment is not adequately reflected in the title of 1909 PA 17,1 would affirm the trial court.