dissenting.
I agree with the majority that on this pre-trial appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, dismissing the preliminary objections of appellant (S & H) to the Commonwealth’s “petition in escheat,” the Commonwealth Court improperly exceeded its limited scope of appellate review under the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, § 1, formerly 12 P.S. § 672 (1953). Review under the Act of 1925 is limited to whether the court of common pleas has “power to enter upon the inquiry.” Studio Theaters, Inc. v. City of Washington, 418 Pa. 73, 77, 209 A.2d 802, 804 (1965). Review under the Act is not to extend to the merits of the controversy. Here, as in McFarland v. Weiland Packing Co., 416 Pa. 277, 206 A.2d 18 (1965), S & H has raised issues beyond the permissible scope of review under the Act and has
“in fact [appealed] from the lower court’s refusal to sustain defendant’s preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer to the complaint. This goes to the right of the plaintiff to recover and not to his right to have the cause heard and determined. An order overruling such an objection is not within the scope of appeals allowed under the Act of 1925, and is not an appealable order.”
McFarland, 416 Pa. at 279-80, 206 A.2d at 19. Thus, the Commonwealth Court improperly expressed a view on the Commonwealth’s power to obtain a judgment against S & H.
I agree, however, with the view expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice NIX that this Court should now consider the merits. I believe also that it is not sufficient merely to label the Commonwealth Court’s expression of opinion as “dictum.” This lawsuit, commenced eleven years ago in 1969, still has not proceeded beyond the pleadings. Indeed, since commencement of this action the Supreme Court of the United States has decided a case relevant to *348this litigation and our Legislature has revised the very laws pursuant to which the Commonwealth brings its present petition. The extraordinary delay of this important lawsuit presents an issue of manifest public concern. The merits have been sufficiently briefed and argued by the parties and the present record more than amply permits resolution of the merits. There is no reason, therefore, for this Court further to countenance any additional delay. Pursuant to its statutory discretion under 42 Pa.C.S. § 726, “notwithstanding any other provisions of law,” to assume plenary jurisdiction “on its own motion” in any matter involving an issue of “immediate public importance” and enter a “final order or otherwise cause right and justice to be done,” this Court now should review the merits. See Wilson v. Blake, 475 Pa. 627, 381 A.2d 450 (1977); see also Hilton v. State Employees Retirement Board, 470 Pa. 301, 368 A.2d 640 (1977); Wieskerger Appeal, 447 Pa. 418, 290 A.2d 108 (1972).
After careful review of the pleadings and briefs in light of relevant statutory and case law, I am convinced that the Commonwealth’s present petition improperly seeks to divest funds from a corporation doing business in Pennsylvania but domiciled elsewhere in a manner not contemplated by Pennsylvania substantive law. It is for this reason that I dissent, would vacate the order of the Commonwealth Court, and would direct the court of common pleas to dismiss the Commonwealth’s petition. My disagreement with the majority, however, goes well beyond its unwillingness now to dispose of the merits. I also believe the majority incorrectly analyzes one of the questions of judicial jurisdiction presented. The majority does so because, in my view, it misapprehends the relief the Commonwealth presently seeks.
I
At the outset, there can be no doubt that the court of common pleas can exercise judicial jurisdiction under federal principles of “fair play and substantial justice” embodied in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (in personam), and extended in *349Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (in rem). Were this a case where a Pennsylvania court assumes jurisdiction to decide the Commonwealth’s claim against a non-resident whose only affiliation with Pennsylvania is the assumption that the “situs” of the funds in controversy is Pennsylvania, there would be serious constitutional concern. For the Supreme Court has made it clear that a fictional situs alone cannot provide the basis for fair assumption of jurisdiction. Shaffer v. Heitner, supra; see Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 100 S.Ct. 571, 62 L.Ed.2d 516 (1980); see also Schreiber v. Republic Intermodal Corp., 473 Pa. 614, 375 A.2d 1285 (1977). Here, however, no mere fictional “situs” rule is involved. Instead, before the Pennsylvania courts is a corporation which does business in Pennsylvania and which has subjected itself to suit here by registration with the Secretary of the Commonwealth. Further, because the fund which the Commonwealth seeks to claim is the value of unredeemed trading stamps, distributed through retail merchants making sales in Pennsylvania, “the activities of the corporation [here] . . . give rise to the liabilities sued upon.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. at 159. In distributing these stamps through retailers, S & H enjoys “the benefits and protection of the laws of [this] state.” Id., 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S.Ct. at 160. There is a direct connection both between Pennsylvania and S & H as well as Pennsylvania and the fund in question. Thus, it is fundamentally fair under International Shoe to adjudicate in a Pennsylvania court the right of S & H to the fund.
Of equal concern, though, is whether, consistent with Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 82 S.Ct. 199, 7 L.Ed.2d 139 (1961), the court of common pleas can render a judgment protecting S & H from multiple liability. In Western Union, a Pennsylvania court allowed Pennsylvania absolutely to escheat intangible property of a New York corporation doing business in Pennsylvania. It did so despite New York’s “aggressive, . . . actual, active and persistent” claims on the subject fund. The *350Supreme Court of the United States held that, in light of the evident conflict between New York and Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania proceedings, which could not resolve the states’ conflicting claims, gave the corporation no assurance against multiple liability and thus, consistent with due process, could not stand.
The majority seeks to distinguish Western Union on the ground that, because a Pennsylvania court has not yet rendered judgment, the concern of multiple liability is not present. This distinction reflects the majority’s misunderstanding of the Commonwealth’s claim. Here, of paramount importance is that, unlike in Western Union, the Commonwealth does not seek to obtain its own favorable judgment without regard for the possibility that another state will render judgment against S & H affecting the same funds and subjecting S & H to multiple liability. Rather, the Commonwealth, in harmony with Western Union's concern for multiple liability, acknowledges and guarantees that, by way of express state law, S & H will be required to pay only once. See Disposition of Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Act, Act of August 9,1971, P.L. 286, § 15, 27 P.S. §§ 1-15 (Supp.1979).1 In light of the Commonwealth’s assurance, *351even if the Commonwealth could proceed and judgment against S & H were imposed, S & H would not be deprived due process under Western Union. See State of New Jersey v. American Can Co., 42 N.J. 32, 41, 198 A.2d 753, 758, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 826, 85 S.Ct 53, 13 L.Ed.2d 36 (1964). Accordingly, I agree with the majority that the court of common pleas has jurisdiction to entertain the Commonwealth’s petition.
II
This is not to say, however, that the Commonwealth can now prevail on its petition, for the question of the power of a Pennsylvania court to hear this controversy does not determine the question of the Commonwealth’s power here to obtain a judgment against S & H. In evaluating this latter, distinct question of the Commonwealth’s power to obtain a judgment, first it must be pointed out that the Commonwealth does not now seek to assert any absolute right to the value of the unredeemed green stamps. Rather, the Commonwealth concedes that it cannot assert an absolute right because it is unable to satisfy the rule of Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 85 S.Ct. 626, 13 L.Ed.2d 596 (1965). Responding to the circumstances where states assert competing claims on intangible property under state escheat laws, the Supreme Court in Texas fashioned a federal common law rule of priority under which the state of the creditor’s last known address is entitled to the property owed. Texas added, however, that if the creditor’s address does not appear on the holder’s books or is in a state that does not provide for escheat of intangibles, the state of the holder’s incorporation may take custody of the funds “until some other State comes forward with proof that it has a superior right to escheat.” Texas, 379 U.S. at 682, 85 S.Ct. at 631. Here, despite the fact that the transactions occurred in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth admits that the anonymity of the transactions precludes it from making any showing that Pennsylvania is the state of the creditors’ last known address. So too, the Commonwealth admits that *352under Texas New Jersey, the state of S & H’s domicile, has a superior right to the funds.
What the Commonwealth does assert is that by decisional law New Jersey is “unable” to make any claim on the funds, see State of New Jersey v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 56 N.J.Super. 589, 153 A.2d 691 (1959), aff’d per curiam, 31 N.J. 358, 157 A.2d 505 (1960), and therefore the Commonwealth, as the state of most “contacts” with the transactions, may assume control. The Commonwealth, however, asserts that “[s]hould the Commonwealth be ultimately successful here, it would hold the property escheated from S & H subject to the claim of a state with a superior claim under Texas or other such authority.” Brief for the Commonwealth at 25.2 And, as already pointed out, the Commonwealth acknowledges that, should it prevail, it will, under mandate of state law, protect S & H from multiple liability.
In view of the Commonwealth’s willingness to protect S & H from multiple liability, one might question S & H’s standing to protest against any departure at all from the federal rule of Texas. That rule of priority was fashioned in a controversy involving the rights of competing states and not, as here, a controversy between a state and the private party holding the funds. As of yet, no other state has asserted an interest in the funds.
And certainly there can be no quarrel with the Commonwealth’s contention that Texas does not foreclose any exceptions to its rule. There is language in the Opinion of the Court that its rule is “fundamentally a question of ease of administration and of equity.” Texas, 379 U.S. at 683, 85 S.Ct. at 631. The Court has not yet considered the applicability of the Texas rule where the domiciliary state is “unable” to assert its priority. And while in Pennsylvania v. New York, 407 U.S. 206, 92 S.Ct. 2075, 32 L.Ed.2d 693 (1972), the Court firmly adhered to the rule of Texas, that decision *353may not have foreclosed the possibility that the last known address rule could be modified where the underlying transaction makes any proof of last known address impossible. See Pennsylvania, 407 U.S. at 214-15, 92 S.Ct. at 2080; see also id., 407 U.S. at 216-22, 92 S.Ct. at 2080-85 (Powell, J., joined by Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
Nonetheless, I am convinced that state law as embodied in applicable statutes of this jurisdiction precludes the Commonwealth from prevailing upon this claim against the intangibles of a non-resident doing business in Pennsylvania. There are two relevant Pennsylvania statutes. The first, the Act of July 29, 1953, P.L. 986, § 1, amending the Act of May 2, 1889, P.L. 66, § 3, formerly 27 P.S. § 333 (1958), was in effect at the time the Commonwealth filed its present petition in escheat. This act provides only that “any real property or personal property within or subject to the control of the Commonwealth” shall escheat to the Commonwealth where the owner’s whereabouts are unknown for seven years, 27 P.S. § 333(b), where the property is unclaimed for seven years, 27 P.S. § 333(c), or where the property is without a rightful owner, 27 P.S. § 333(d).
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, but before any judicial disposition, the Legislature replaced the Act of 1953 with the Disposition of Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Act, Act of August 9, 1971, P.L. 286, § 1 et seq., 27 P.S. § 1-1 et seq. (Supp.1979), to be effective January 1, 1972, § 31.3 Unlike the Act of 1953, the new Act quite clearly draws a distinction for purposes of determining when intangibles are subject to the Commonwealth’s “custody and control” between companies domiciled in Pennsylvania and those domiciled in another jurisdiction. The new Act gives the Commonwealth far greater “custody and control” over intangibles of corporations domiciled in Pennsylvania. Not only does the Commonwealth have “custody and control” over a domiciliary’s intangibles where the last *354known address, as shown by the domiciliary’s records, is in a jurisdiction “which [does] not provide for the escheat or custodial taking.” § 3(2)(ii). The Commonwealth also has “custody and control” whether or not the domiciliary’s records reflect the owner’s last known address. §§ 3(2)(i) & 3(2)(iii).4
By contrast, the intangibles of companies domiciled outside of Pennsylvania are subject to the Commonwealth’s “custody and control” only if the company’s records reflect that the owner’s last known address is in Pennsylvania, § 3(2)(i), or if the Commonwealth can otherwise prove that the owner’s last known address is in the Commonwealth, § 3(2)(iv).
There can be no question that the Commonwealth may proceed under the old Act of 1953 even though the new Act supplants it, for under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1976 the “repeal” of “civil provisions of a statute” shall not affect “any civil action pending to enforce any right under the authority of the statute repealed.” See Cavanaugh v. Gelder, 364 Pa. 361, 72 A.2d 85 (1950). But there also can be no question of the relevance of the new Act’s specific definition of what prop*355erty is within the “custody and control of the Commonwealth.” The Commonwealth does not deny that the new Act’s provision on multiple liability, section 15, must be followed here.5 And surely the Legislature’s guides to statutory interpretation sufficiently demonstrate that where, as here, the new and old Acts address the same concerns and employ similar language, the two Acts must be read together. Under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1953, an amending act and an act amended “shall be read together and viewed as one statute passed at one time.” And under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(8), when the words of a statute are not explicit, legislative intent may be ascertained by considering “[legislative . . . interpretations of such statutes.” See e. g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1801-1802, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1968).
Thus, borrowing from section 3 of the new Act, specifically defining intangibles subject to the Commonwealth’s custody and control, it is clear that the intangibles of S & H are not within the Commonwealth’s reach under the Act of 1953. S & H is not domiciled in Pennsylvania and therefore the Commonwealth has no custody and control over the funds regardless of whether S & H’s records reflect the owner’s last known address. The only circumstances in which the Commonwealth may claim custody and control over the non-domiciliary’s funds are if the non-domiciliary’s records reflect the owner’s last known address or if the Commonwealth can prove the owner’s last known address. Yet the Commonwealth agrees that neither of these circumstances here are present. Thus, the funds in question are beyond the Commonwealth’s reach. The Commonwealth’s present petition must be dismissed.6
*356I would, therefore, vacate the order of the Commonwealth Court and direct the court of common pleas to dismiss the Commonwealth’s petition.
. Section 15 of the Act provides:
“Relief from liability by payment or delivery
Upon the payment or delivery of the property to the secretary, the Commonwealth shall assume custody and shall be responsible for the safekeeping thereof. Any person who pays or delivers property to the secretary under this act is relieved of all liability with respect to such property so paid or delivered for any claim which then exists or which thereafter may arise or be made in respect to such property. Any holder who has paid moneys to the secretary pursuant to this act may make payment to any person appearing to such holder to be entitled thereto, and upon proof of such payment and proof that the payee was entitled thereto, the secretary shall forthwith reimburse the holder for the payment”
Although the Commonwealth does not expressly admit it is willing to appear and defend on S & H’s behalf should another state attempt to impose judgment against S & H based on the same funds, it is reasonable to presume the Commonwealth would do so. Indeed, were it to fail to appear and defend, the Commonwealth would depart from the very first principles of fairness embodied in the statute and to which the Commonwealth presently purports to adhere.
. Presumably, a state with a superior claim would include any state which demonstrates that it is the state of the creditors’ “last known address.” Presumably, too, New Jersey, the state of domicile, would also be within the Commonwealth’s contemplation of those states with a “superior claim.”
. The parties agreed to defer argument on the pleadings until the Supreme Court decided Pennsylvania v. New York. That decision came in June, 1972, after replacement of the old Act. See text.
. Section 3 of the new Act provides:
“All abandoned and unclaimed property as hereafter set forth is subject to the custody and control of the Commonwealth:
(1) If it is tangible and physically located within the Commonwealth; or
(2) If it is intangible, and
(i) The last known address of the owner, as shown by the records of the holder, is within the Commonwealth; or
(ii) The last known address of the owner as shown by the records of the holder is within a jurisdiction, the laws of which do not provide for the escheat or custodial taking of such property, and the domicile of the holder is within the Commonwealth; or
(iii) No address of the owner appears on the records of the holder and the domicile of the holder is within the Commonwealth. Where the records of the holder do not show a last known address of the owner of a travelers check or money order it shall be presumed that the state in which the travelers check or money order was issued is the state of the last known address of the owner; or
(iv) No address of the owner appears on the records of the holder and the domicile of the holder is not within the Commonwealth, but it is proved that the last known address of the owner is in the Commonwealth.”
. See supra at note 1 and accompanying text.
. Because I am of the view that the property held by S & H is not within the Commonwealth’s control, I need not decide whether the property is “abandoned and unclaimed.” See Disposition of Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Act, § 11, 27 P.S. § 1-11. See generally, R. Ely, Revision of Pennsylvania’s Escheat Laws, 74 Dick. L.Rev. 179, 185 & 187 n. 59 (1970).
*356One final observation must be made. Although there is nothing on this record to indicate that any other state presently seeks the funds the Commonwealth claims, there is likewise nothing on this record to indicate that no state will not do so in the future. It is not at all unlikely that while these proceedings are pending another state may establish its priority under Texas and assert a claim on the funds. So too, another state might await judgment and, if favorable to the Commonwealth, then assert a claim.
In either case, in light of the Commonwealth’s position that it will hold the funds subject to the rights of priority states, one would expect that the Commonwealth will fairly honor the asserting state’s claim. Suffice it to say that a policy of cooperation aimed at avoiding unfortunate controversy between states is far more advisable. See State of New Jersey v. Amsted Industries, 48 N.J. 544, 548, 226 A.2d 715, 718 (1967).