dissenting.
I dissent.
This case is a classic example of the manifest injustice that often arises when an unwary and unsuspecting individual attempts to amicably settle a claim with an insurance company. The majority concludes that the release in question insulates from possible liability not only appellees William G. and Caroline Barber, but also appellees James P. and Madelyn C. Calhoun and appellee John A. Fay. The majority reaches this conclusion despite the fact that appellants negotiated the settlement and release with the agent of the Barbers’ insurance company only. Appellants entered into settlement negotiations with none of the remaining appellees or their agents.
The deposition of the Barbers’ insurance adjuster clearly indicates that he had no intention of negotiating a settlement and release for any party other than the Barbers. The deposition in relevant part is as follows:
Q. Now did you at any time specifically mention to Mr. or Mrs. Wolbach that this release was releasing anyone besides William C. Barber or Caroline Barber?
A. No.
Q. At the time this release was executed on October 21,1974, did you have any knowledge that there were any other parties involved in this accident?
A. Yes.
Q. You were aware of this?
A. Yes.
Q. You were merely concerned with doing your job for your company, for your insured?
A, Right.
Q. And you had absolutely no intent of representing Mr. Fay in this release?
A. No.
Q. Did you have any intention of negotiating any release for James or Madeline Calhoun?
A. No.
*244Yet, because of a single boilerplate provision in the release, appellants are barred from litigating their claim against appellees James P. and Madelyn C. Calhoun and appellee John A. Fay.
The practical effect of the majority’s decision is to further encourage deceptive practices when negotiating settlements and releases. I believe that, as a matter of public policy, a release should not inure to the benefit of third parties who took no part in the settlement negotiations.
I would, therefore, reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this case for a trial on the merits as to the liability of appellees James P. and Madelyn C. Calhoun and appellee John A. Fay.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.