dissenting.
I dissent.
The majority holds that the “complaint” filed by the Public Utility Commission is not an “order” from which a proceeding under Section 1111 of the Public Utility Law1 can be commenced. The majority feels that the appellant here must await the scheduling of a hearing before proceeding under that section. The clear language of Section 1111 and the complaint in question belie that conclusion. The statute refers to “any order”, and the “complaint” concludes with the following language:
IT IS ORDERED: That if respondent shall fail to answer said complaint within twenty (20) days of service *396hereof or, by answer, shall admit the allegations of this complaint, the Commission may issue an order in the matter without a hearing, imposing fines; otherwise, that a hearing be held at a time and place to be fixed by the Commission.
* * * * * *
ORDER ADOPTED: January 13, 1977
ORDER ENTERED: March 2, 1977 (emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, in Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 433 Pa. 495, 252 A.2d 367 (1969), this Court held that the setting of a hearing date was an “order” within the meaning of Section 1111. The rationale underlying that holding was, as the majority in the instant case notes, the prevention of the “long and burdensome ordeal” of a hearing where the Commission is without jurisdiction. That rationale applies here also, and I can perceive no substantive difference between .allowing the petition for review at this point, and waiting until the ministerial act of setting a hearing date has been performed. Consequently, I would hold that the “complaint” filed by the Commission was an “order” within the meaning of Section 1111 of the Public Utility Law and would permit appellant to proceed under that Section, i. e.: pursue an injunction.
I would also require the Commonwealth Court to adjudicate appellant’s challenge to the Commission’s jurisdiction. I do not construe Section 1111 as codifying either traditional equitable remedies or the writ of prohibition. Rather, I view it as a statutory provision parallel to the Act of March 5, 1925, P.L. 23, § 1, 12 P.S. § 672 which authorizes appeals from interlocutory orders involving jurisdictional matters. No citizen of this Commonwealth should have to suffer the expense, embarrassment, and inconvenience of having to defend the merits of an action commenced in a tribunal without jurisdiction, when that citizen .raises a timely objection to jurisdiction.
*397Accordingly, I would remand the case to the Commonwealth Court for an immediate disposition of the jurisdictional question.2
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.. Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1053, art. XI, § 1111, now section 903 of the Public Utility Code, Act of July 1, 1978, P.L. 598, No. 116 § 903, 66 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
. Additionally, for purposes of clarity, it should be pointed out that the restaurant which is described as “afloat” does not traverse the river, and is permanently affixed to the bank.