concurring in the result.
The majority opinion sustains the admissibility of the decedent’s body into evidence, concluding that the State “has met its burden in showing that the victim’s body inevitably would have been discovered.” Ante at 156. We do not reach the inevitable discovery issue. We conclude, as did the trial court in its initial disposition of defendant’s suppression motion, see State v. Sugar, 100 N.J. 214 (1985) (Sugar II), that the search that resulted in the discovery of the victim’s body was impliedly consented to by Dr. Sugar.
I
It is undisputed that a consensual search constitutes an exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the fourth amendment:
It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is “per se unreasonable * * * subject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions.” It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent. [Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854, 858 (1973) (citations omitted).]
In State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349 (1975), we modified the United States Supreme Court’s holding in SchnecJcloth by adopting the added requirement under our state constitution that the State may justify a warrantless search on the basis of consent provided that it “demonstrates knowledge on the part of the person involved that he had a choice in the matter.” Id. at 354. Subject to that qualification, a search conducted after a voluntary consent is clearly valid. See State v. King, 44 N.J. 346 (1965).
It is well recognized that a consent sufficient to avoid the necessity of a warrant may be express or implied from the circumstances. See People v. Engel, 105 Cal.App.3d 489, 504, *167164 Cal.Rptr. 454, 463 (1980) (“[T]he existence of a ‘consent’ and the ‘scope’ of a consent may be determined equally from reasonable implications derived from a person’s express words and conduct as well as from a person’s express words which require no implications. * * * An implied consent to search is as efficacious and effective as an express consent to search.”); Steigler v. State, 277 A.2d 662, 667 (Del.1971) (“We think that appellant’s actions amounted to an implied consent to the search and seizure. One can hardly expect the police to get a search warrant for a house or building when the owner is obviously cooperative and gives every appearance of being the victim, rather than the perpetrator, of a crime.”), judgment vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 939, 92 S.Ct. 2872, 33 L.Ed.2d 760 (1972); State v. Fredette, 411 A.2d 65, 68 (Me.1979) (“The State carries the burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that an objective manifestation of consent was given by word or gesture by one bearing an appropriate relationship to the property searched.”) (citations omitted); cf. Thompson v. McManus, 512 F.2d 769, 771 (8th Cir.1975) (aggrieved husband’s objective manifestations of consent were sufficient to imply consent to a second search of his residence), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014, 95 S.Ct. 2421, 44 L.Ed.2d 683 (1975); Lewis v. State, 285 Md. 705, 717-21, 404 A.2d 1073, 1080-81 (1979) (“[I]n the instant case we have more than simple acquiescence to the police officer’s claim that it was necessary to search the house. The defendant had indicated a purpose of cooperating with the police and then affirmatively made arrangements for the police to obtain a house key during his absence.”); Kelly v. State, 75 Wis.2d 303, 313, 249 N.W.2d 800, 805 (1977) (“In the case before us the presence of the officers was by the implied consent of the defendant, not only to help the victim but to investigate.”); W. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 8.2(1), at 219 (2d ed. 1987) (describing cases where consent was recognized “notwithstanding the fact that the person allegedly consenting has never explicitly stated that he is willing to allow the *168authorities to search his person, premises or effects. * * * Sometimes the consent is implied from the fact that the person in question has elected to engage in a certain form of activity-on a continuing basis.”).
In its opinion granting defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s body, the trial court imposed an extremely restrictive standard for' evaluating whether the search of defendant’s property had been consented to. The court stated that
there was no evidence produced at this hearing to indicate the precise circumstances under which defendant gave the police the permission established by-Mrs. Kushner and Mrs. Meyers Ambrose. The State has failed to demonstrate that defendant consented in the manner and to the extent required by the authorities previously cited. State v. Johnson, supra; State v. King, supra. To whom did he give such permission? What were the circumstances under which he did so? Was he made aware of the consequences? * * * Hence, the State has failed to produce the necessary “clear and positive evidence” that defendant orally consented to the search.
Preliminarily, we observe that the standard most recently applied by the trial court in determining whether or not the search of defendant’s property was consensual differs from the standard that had been applied by the trial court at the conclusion of the earlier suppression hearing. There, the trial court assessed the evidence and determined that there had been an implied consent to the search, a determination that was reversed because it relied in part on the tainted testimony of Detective Mazzeo. As the majority opinion observes, it may well be that in our opinion in Sugar II, supra, “while encouraging the trial court on remand to exercise its full discretionary responsibilities, our instructions may not have been as comprehensive or clear as they ought to have been.” Ante at 159 n. 2. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the Court’s holding in Sugar II required a change in the standard that determines the existence of implied consent.
In any event, we are satisfied that the trial court has applied an incorrect standard for assessing whether the police search was consensual. We disagree that the State’s burden must be to prove either the precise circumstances under which defend*169ant expressed his consent to the police or the specific individual or individuals to whom such express consent was communicated. The fact that the consent may be either express or implied from all of the attendant circumstances requires a thorough review of the entire record to determine whether the testimony and exhibits support the State’s contention that defendant impliedly consented to the August Sixth search.1
The record of the second suppression hearing incorporated by reference defendant’s testimony at the first suppression hearing. Dr. Sugar testified that his first contact with the police occurred when they called him at his office on July 10, 1979, to notify him that they had found his wife’s car on a nearby street. The next day he voluntarily went to the Vineland police station and filled out a missing person’s report, assisted by Patrolman Austino. He testified that after that time he was in daily contact with the Vineland police. As noted by the majority opinion, Dr. Sugar admitted to
being fully cooperative with the police in their efforts to find his wife: “ * * * once they asked me something, I cooperated with them.” Dr. Sugar provided the police with the names of friends and relatives, access to financial records, a photograph of his wife to be printed in the newspaper, and information that a friend had seen a picture resembling his wife in a local newspaper. Dr. Sugar acknowledged that when he provided the police with leads, he anticipated that they would investigate. [Ante at 162.]
Dr. Sugar also testified that because of his wife’s affinity for casinos, he made at least one trip to Atlantic City, purportedly to locate her.
Defendant testified that he conferred with Detective Mazzeo and Lieutenant Tirelli at police headquarters on July 31, 1979, and was asked if the police could search his house and property. Dr. Sugar acknowledged his awareness that he was a possible suspect and that the police thought there was a possibility that *170his wife might be buried on his property. Nevertheless, he executed a written “consent to search” form authorizing the City of Vineland Police Department “to conduct the complete search of my house and grounds located at 391 West Walnut Street, Vineland, New Jersey.” The consent form recited that Dr. Sugar had the right to refuse consent or to stop the search at any time. Defendant testified that he read the form and understood it “as best as I could at the time.”
The initial search occurred on July Thirty-first and lasted for several hours. Dr. Sugar testified that he was never asked to consent to an additional search of his property. He said that after the July Thirty-first search, he did not want the police on his property and that “there was a point in time when I didn’t feel that they should — I did not feel comfortable for some reason to have them come on my property.” However, he acknowledged that he did not convey that change in attitude to anyone. When asked if there was any way that “the police would know anything more than Harry Sugar wants to cooperate and wants us to do everything we can to find his wife,” he responded, “I don’t know.”
Subsequent to the July Thirty-first search, Dr. Sugar called the police on August Second or Third to advise them that he would be going to California to see his son. He left a phone number at which he could be reached if needed. Also on August Second or Third, Dr. Sugar was asked by the Vineland police to bring certain personal items of his wife’s to the police station for use by a psychic. The psychic was to assist the police in their efforts to locate Mrs. Sugar. Dr. Sugar testified that he was skeptical about the psychic but that he cooperated by taking the items requested to the police station so that the police could continue to search for the whereabouts of his missing wife.
The majority opinion summarizes the balance of the testimony before the trial court pertinent to the issue of consent:
*171The other testimony before the trial court was that of Barbara Meyers Ambrose, Joyce Lowenstern, Bernice Kushner, and Detective Frederick Taverner. Mrs. Ambrose, a former employee of defendant and a friend of both defendant and his wife, testified that she spoke with defendant before he departed for California and that he told her that he had given the police permission to search his property while he was gone if they so desired. Joyce Lowenstern, a friend of both Dr. Sugar and his wife, testified that Dr. Sugar specifically told her that the police “had free access to his property at any time.” Mrs. Kushner, also a friend of defendant and his wife, testified that Dr. Sugar informed her that the police had searched his property and that he had left his phone number in California in the event the police needed him.
In this connection, Detective Taverner testified that when he interviewed Mrs. Ambrose in August 1979, she told him that Dr. Sugar had given the police permission to search his property even after the search of July 31 had been completed. Dr. Sugar also testified about his conversations with Bernice Kushner, Joyce Lowenstern, and Barbara Meyers Ambrose, acknowledging that he conveyed to each of them the clear understanding that he wished the police to do anything possible or necessary to find his wife. [Ante at 163.]
The trial court, noting the testimony of Barbara Meyers Ambrose, specifically observed that
it is true that her testimony was vague and inconsistent regarding the exact date and time when defendant told her before he left for California. Nevertheless, it is clear defendant did make such a statement before he left for California, not only to Mrs. Lowenstern and Mrs. Kushner but also to Mrs. Meyers Ambrose.
We also note that the police search on August Sixth involved only the area near the picnic table in the rear yard of defendant’s house. No entry of defendant’s home occurred on that date. It has often been noted that “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the fourth amendment is directed.” United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L.Ed.2d 752, 764 (1972); see also State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 217 (1983) (“Historically, the Court has applied a more stringent standard of the fourth amendment to searches of a residential dwelling.”), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030, 104 S.Ct. 1295, 79 L.Ed.2d 695 (1984). Although the United States Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984), held that there was no fourth amendment privacy interest in open fields, the Court observed that the “curtilage,” the land immediately surrounding the home, is entitled to *172fourth amendment protections that attach to the home. Id. at 180, 104 S.Ct. at 1735, 1742, 80 L.Ed.2d 214, 225. The Court in Oliver declined to elaborate on “the degree of Fourth Amendment protection afforded the curtilage, as opposed to the home itself,” id. at 180 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 1742 n. 11, 80 L.Ed.2d at 225 n. 11. Nevertheless, it has been recognized that there is a lesser privacy interest in the curtilage than in the interior of a residence. See Keyes v. City of Albany, 594 F.Supp. 1147, 1153-54 (N.D.N.Y.1984); cf. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, ___, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 1812, 90 L.Ed.2d 210, 216 (1986) (“That the area is within the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation.”). Whether a lesser privacy interest or not, under these circumstances the renewed search of Dr. Sugar’s yard was clearly consistent with the continuing duty of the police to locate the apparently missing person of Joan Sugar.
In the context of all of the surrounding circumstances, we are convinced that the Vineland police officers acted reasonably in concluding that defendant had impliedly consented to a second search of his backyard. Concededly, by July 31, 1979, defendant was a suspect and had been so advised by the Vineland police. However, there had as yet been uncovered no evidence of defendant’s involvement in his wife’s disappearance. The cooperation with the investigative efforts of the police that defendant had manifested from the time of his wife’s disappearance had continued unabated. Significantly, when confronted with Miranda warnings and an expression by the police that he was a possible suspect, defendant expressly consented to a search of his house and property on July Thirty-first, and continued to communicate and cooperate with the police until his departure for California. His delivery of personal articles belonging to his wife for use by the psychic further evidenced his cooperation and his knowledge that the police were continuing to search for his wife.
The Vineland police were confronted with the ambiguous conduct of a possible suspect who maintained his innocence and *173persisted in soliciting police efforts to investigate and solve his wife’s disappearance. Whether or not the police officers suspected that defendant's cooperative demeanor was a ruse, the police officers’ responsibility was to pursue the investigation into the disappearance of defendant’s wife. This responsibility led them to return to defendant’s property on August Sixth to reexamine the fresh dirt under the picnic table, leading to discovery of defendant’s wife buried in a shallow grave. If in fact the police misconstrued defendant’s manifestations of apparent cooperation, believing that their return to his property was authorized, it would be anomalous to allow defendant to be the beneficiary óf his ambiguous behavior. Cf. State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 52 (1968):
[A]s to the culprit who reveals his guilt unwittingly * * * it is no more unfair to use the evidence he thereby reveals than it is to turn against him the clues at the scene of the crime which a brighter, better informed, or more gifted criminal would not have left.
Based on all of the events and circumstances that had occurred since Mrs. Sugar’s disappearance in early July — including defendant’s filing of a missing persons report, his unabated communication and cooperation with the local police, his personal efforts to locate his wife (including at least one trip to Atlantic City to search for her), his voluntary authorization permitting a search of his house and grounds, his delivery of financial records, photographs, names of friends and relatives, clothes as requested by the psychic working with the Vineland police — we find that the police were warranted in concluding that their return to defendant’s property on August Sixth was impliedly authorized by defendant and did not require a search warrant. As the Supreme Court of Delaware observed in Steigler v. State, supra,
[i]n view of appellant’s apparent earnestness in assisting the police in every way, their failure to obtain a search warrant is understandable.
At that time, the house was not fit for human habitation and, as appellant knew, the police were in possession of it and were making a very careful search for anything that might shed light on the identity of the culprit. Obviously, the *174appellant appeared fully cooperative with the officers. At that time these officers had no facts upon which to base a definite belief or suspicion of the appellant. We think that appellant’s actions amounted to an implied consent to the search and seizure. One can hardly expect the police to get a search warrant for a house or building when the owner is obviously cooperative and gives every appearance of being the victim, rather than the perpetrator, of a crime. [277 A.2d at 667.]
Accordingly, we conclude that since the search of defendant’s yard on August 6, 1979, was impliedly consented to by defendant, the victim’s body and the derivative forensic test results should be admitted into evidence. We emphasize that our conclusion that the second search of defendant’s property was impliedly authorized is based on the uniqüe circumstances of this case and particularly on the defendant’s unabated and unqualified cooperation with police efforts to find his wife.
The constitutional requirement of probable cause that is the linchpin of the fourth amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, see State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987), is not directly implicated when a search is found to be consensual. The issue of consent, an exception to the constitutional requirement, is basically factual, to be determined in the context of all the relevant circumstances. In our view, the admissibility of this evidence does not compromise the constitutional principles that govern nonconsensual searches.
Accordingly, although we concur in the judgment of the Court, we do so on the ground that defendant had impliedly consented to the search of his property on August 6, 1979.
O’HERN and STEIN, JJ., concurring in the result.
For remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
Opposed — None.
We are in accord with the majority’s conclusion that a further remand is inappropriate, and that pursuant to R. 2:10-5 we should invoke our original jurisdiction to determine the admissibility into evidence of the victim's body. Ante at 159-160.