dissenting:
I dissent from the decision to remand this case for further proceedings on the former wife’s claims for equitable distribution and other economic relief under the Divorce *460Code. By participating in the Nevada divorce with her husband, and permitting that divorce to become final, the wife gave up her right to litigate in Pennsylvania property issues which the Nevada court could have determined.
Section 301 of the Code provides that (a) The courts of this Commonwealth ... shall have original jurisdiction in cases of divorce ... and, where they have jurisdiction, shall determine in conjunction with any decree granting a divorce ... the following matters
(1) The determination and disposition of property rights and interests among spouses, ... and the order of any alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees, or costs authorized by law.
23 P.S. § 301 (emphasis added). When the Nevada court granted the parties’ final decree in divorce, the power of the Pennsylvania court to grant financial relief in the Pennsylvania divorce action was extinguished, because the court could no longer act “in conjunction with” the granting of a decree in divorce. Mrs. Coleman’s full participation in the Nevada divorce proceedings eliminated her right to economic relief under the Pennsylvania Divorce Code; her property rights arising from the marital relation are terminated under 23 P.S. § 401(j), and her recourse, if any, is an action, to partition the property held in common.
The exception to the Pennsylvania courts’ lack of jurisdiction to proceed on economic claims in divorce actions after entry of a foreign divorce appears in section 505 of the Code, which permits the Pennsylvania courts to grant alimony to a Pennsylvania resident who has been subjected to a foreign divorce proceeding ex parte. Our court has noted that the Code might even offer other forms of economic relief, including equitable distribution of the marital property, such as Mrs. Coleman seeks, where the party asking for the relief has been the victim of an ex parte foreign divorce:
We note that even if Mr. Bell brings an ex parte divorce action in Nevada, his wife is not foreclosed from seeking alimony, child support and equitable distribution of mari*461tal property under Pennsylvania’s New Divorce Code of 1980. See 23 P.S. § 101 et seq.; Stambaugh v. Stam-baugh, 458 Pa. 147, 329 A.2d 483 (1974); Sohmer v. Sohmer, 318 Pa.Super. 500, 465 A.2d 665 (1983), petition for allowance of appeal denied January 20, 1984 [No. 608 E.D. Allocatur Docket 1983].
Bell v. Bell, 326 Pa.Super. 237, 252 n. 2, 473 A.2d 1069, 1077 n. 2 (1984) (dictum). However, as the court clearly held in the Sohmer case, the doctrine of “divisible divorce” “is limited to cases of foreign, ex parte divorces and does not apply where, as here, the defendant has appeared in the foreign proceeding.” 318 Pa.Super. at 507, 465 A.2d at 668. Mrs. Coleman has forfeited the protection of the doctrine of “divisible divorce” by appearing in the foreign forum and litigating her divorce there.
In Cheng v. Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. 515, 500 A.2d 1175 (1985), we held that the broad policy of the Divorce Code to “[e]ffectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced,” 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6), permitted the Pennsylvania court to exercise jurisdiction over and adjudicate Mrs. Cheng’s economic claims in a Pennsylvania divorce action despite her participation in a South Carolina court’s decree granting a divorce in Mr. Cheng’s earlier-filed action. However, in Cheng we found the South Carolina divorce proceeding “essentially ex parte” as to the economic issues, “in operation if not in form,” 347 Pa.Super. at 526, 500 A.2d at 1181, because although Mrs. Cheng had appeared through counsel in the South Carolina action and filed a counterclaim requesting economic relief, the South Carolina court refused to decide the economic issues, stayed proceedings on the counterclaim, and “specifically conditioned its issuance of a divorce decree on the parties’ agreement to resolve their economic and property issues in Pennsylvania.” Id., 347 Pa.Superior Ct. at 524, 500 A.2d at 1180. Consequently, Mr. Cheng filed a stipulation in the Pennsylvania court consenting to its resolution of the economic matters, Mrs. Cheng withdrew her objections to Mr. Cheng’s motion to sever the divorce claim from the counter*462claim in the South Carolina court, and the South Carolina court granted the divorce, preserving its jurisdiction over the matter pending the outcome of the Pennsylvania proceedings on the economic issues. Had it not been for Mrs. Cheng’s agreement to drop her objections to severance, there would have been no South Carolina divorce decree to hamper the Pennsylvania court’s jurisdiction, and so it would have been particularly unfair to deny her the right to litigate the economic claims in Pennsylvania. Even more importantly, though, the Pennsylvania court in Cheng was acting “in conjunction with” a divorce decree — the South Carolina decree that was specifically conditioned on and left open pending the Pennsylvania court’s resolution of the economic issues.
The situation is different where both parties participate in a foreign divorce that becomes final, and then attempt to obtain the jurisdiction of a Pennsylvania court to decide unresolved economic issues. The Pennsylvania court is no longer deciding a divorce dispute, and I agree with my Brother Tamilia that parties cannot step across state lines at their own pleasure to obtain a divorce, then expect a Pennsylvania court to take up the issues ancillary to divorce when there no longer is a divorce pending before it. I also agree with my Brother Tamilia that the doctrine of divisible divorce might be applicable to divorce proceedings that are not ex parte, where the parties first obtain an order of bifurcation to litigate the divorce and economic claims in separate fora. See generally Wolk v. Wolk, 318 Pa.Super. 311, 464 A.2d 1359 (1983) (authority of court to bifurcate divorce from other claims implicit in § 401(b) of the Divorce Code and Pa.R.C.P. 1920.52(c)), allowance of appeal denied, 318 Pa.Super. 311, 464 A.2d 1359 (1984). Where I part with my learned colleague is in his belief that Cheng was not a bifurcated divorce; it was, only the South Carolina court, rather than the Pennsylvania court, ordered the severance, retaining jurisdiction over the divorce until all economic matters were resolved in this State.
*463The Colemans, however, did not proceed in this way, instead choosing to litigate their entire divorce in Nevada, returning to the Pennsylvania forum only after there was no longer a divorce left to litigate. The parties’ attempt to reserve the right to litigate economic issues in Pennsylvania by agreeing to a clause in the Nevada decree that it was “without prejudice” to Mrs. Coleman’s right to pursue economic relief in our courts is invalid. “The parties’ stipulations did not confer jurisdiction on a Pennsylvania court which would not otherwise exist.” Cheng, 347 Pa.Super. at 525, 500 A.2d at 1180. Since there is no divorce pending, there is no jurisdiction in the Pennsylvania courts to litigate economic claims in divorce. I would affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing this action.