dissenting.
Appellant was convicted of the general crime of possessing an instrument of crime. That statutory offense requires the following:
*104A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.
18 Pa.C.S. 907(a).
The evidence in this case demonstrated that appellant shot and killed an unarmed man. While it is true that appellant possessed a subjective belief that his life was threatened, that is not normally enough to satisfy the burden of establishing self-defense. The jury, however, resolved this issue in favor of appellant and acquitted him of homicide. Nevertheless, it is clear that the jury did not consider appellant to be wholly blameless, effectively recognizing that appellant’s action in confronting a group of teenagers on a public sidewalk, with a loaded shotgun in hand, contributed to the escalating tensions which led to the victim’s death. Hence, there is no question in my mind that the verdict in this case was a compromise, and should be allowed to stand.
The opinion of the majority is grounded in a belief that appellant’s weapon conviction is invalid because a homicide conviction was not accomplished. However, such reasoning ignores the fact that appellant was convicted of an inchoate crime, which by its nature does not require the successful completion of an independent criminal act. Merely because the jury found that at the moment appellant fired the gun his actions did not warrant a homicide conviction does not mean that for the period of time up to that final moment appellant could not be guilty of this possessory offense.
Additionally, the reliance by the majority on Commonwealth v. Watson, 494 Pa. 467, 431 A.2d 949 (1981) is unpersuasive, and' it ignores the fact the crime in Watson was distinct from the crime at issue here.
In Watson the defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon, a crime which is defined as follows:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally.
*10518 Pa.C.S. § 907(b). Since Mrs. Watson only employed the admittedly concealed weapon at a time when her life was threatened, this Court held that there was no foundation upon which to conclude that she had been carrying the concealed weapon with an intent to commit a crime.
Here the appellant was convicted of possession of an instrument of crime generally, a crime which contains no element of concealment, and which can be committed, and obviously the jury believed was committed, prior to the situation which appellant believed he was facing.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.
HUTCHINSON, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.