UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 95-31146
(Summary Calendar)
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JOHN W PATTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JEFFERSON PARISH SHERIFF’S OFFICE; SUSAN D
RUSHING, Lt; FRED WILLIAMS, Major; JPSO; HARRY
LEE, Sheriff; RICHARD RODRIGUE, Chief; JPSO;
RICHARD P IEYOUB, Attorney General; JANET
RENO, U S Attorney General; TAMMY LYNN
DAVIDSON; ROY J CASTANEDO; TAMEKA ROBERTS;
THOMAS REED; ANITA REED; MAUREEN MCKINNEY;
PATRICIA J LATON; ANN LECOMTTE; CAREN MORGAN;
KENNETH KLINE, Detective; G PATRICK HAND, III;
JUANITA VERNON; HINTON CASTANEDO; TONI
STONEBERGER; ERNEST V RICHARDS, IV, Judge,
Division B; ANDRE MAILLHO, Captain; LAWRENCE E
BIRI, JR; GREG NOBLE; ALLAN J GREEN; CHARLES
KILBOURN; CHRISTINE CAMPAGNO; TERRY GRAFFED,
Detective; LINDA MATTHEWS; ROBERT LONG,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(CA-95-2253-R)
June 27, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHÉ, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:1
Plaintiff John W. Patton brought this suit, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was falsely arrested and charged
with 160 crimes on January 7, 1994. The suit was assigned to a
magistrate judge, who ordered Patton to answer written
interrogatories. In Patton’s answers to the written
interrogatories, Patton stated that three months after being
falsely arrested he was further charged with seven more crimes, two
of which resulted in convictions. According to Patton, he was
never convicted on any of the 160 allegedly false charges. After
receiving Patton’s answers to the interrogatories, the magistrate
judge held a telephone conference with Patton. The magistrate
judge reported that during this conference Patton “admitted” that
he had been arrested on all 167 charges on January 7. Based on
this fact, the magistrate judge recommended that Patton’s suit be
dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). The magistrate
judge reasoned that because Patton was ultimately convicted for a
crime upon which his arrest was predicated, attacking that arrest
would necessarily implicate the validity of his subsequent
conviction. Accordingly, the magistrate judge felt that Patton’s
§ 1983 suit was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114
S. Ct. 2364, 2372-74, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994) (holding that a
1
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
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plaintiff cannot recover damages under § 1983 for actions which, if
found unlawful, would render a state conviction or sentence invalid
unless that conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged,
invalidated, or otherwise called into question). Patton
vociferously objected to the magistrate judge’s findings. He asked
to speak to the magistrate judge again to correct his
“misstatements” to the magistrate judge’s questions. He then filed
written objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations in
which he continued to maintain that his January 7 arrest did not
involve any charges upon which he was later convicted. The
district court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate, and
dismissed Patton’s suit based on Heck.
We review a district court’s § 1915(d) dismissal for abuse of
discretion. Denton v. Hernandez, ___ U.S.___, ___, 112 S. Ct.
1728, 1734, 118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992); Ancar v. Sara Plasma, Inc.,
964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). A court may dismiss an in forma
pauperis claim under § 1915(d) “if satisfied that the action is
frivolous or malicious.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). A complaint is
frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in
fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S. Ct. 1827,
1831-32, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989). “[A] finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the
level of the irrational or the wholly incredible.” Denton,___ U.S.
at ___, 112 S. Ct. at 1733. A court may not dismiss an in forma
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pauperis complaint merely because it finds the plaintiff’s
allegations to be unlikely, but may do so only when the alleged
facts are "clearly baseless.” Id. (citations omitted).2 A § 1983
claim that is barred by the rule in Heck is legally frivolous under
§ 1915(d). Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1994).
We find the district court abused its discretion in dismissing
as frivolous Patton’s § 1983 suit. On the record presented, Patton
has maintained throughout these proceedings that his arrest on
January 7 was malicious and false, and that he was never convicted
on any of the 160 charges brought at the time of his January
arrest. In dismissing Patton’s suit as frivolous, the district
court relied solely on the magistrate judge’s statement in his
recommendations that Patton “admitted” in his telephone conference
that all 167 charges were brought pursuant to Patton’s January
arrest. The record contains no transcript or recording of this
telephone conference, and we are thus unable to review it.3 In
2
In reviewing a district court's frivolousness determination, we
consider factors such as whether the plaintiff was proceeding pro se, whether the
district court inappropriately resolved genuine issues of disputed fact, whether
the court applied erroneous legal conclusions, whether the district court
provided a statement explaining the dismissal that facilitates intelligent
appellate review, and whether the district court dismissed the complaint with or
without prejudice. Denton, ___ U.S. at ___, 112 S. Ct. at 1730.
3
We note that it is standard procedure for a magistrate or district
court to conduct Spears hearings on the record in order to facilitate meaningful
appellate review. See, e.g., Eason v. Holt, 73 F.3d 600, 603-04 (5th Cir 1996)
(looking to transcript of Spears hearing to evaluate propriety of district
court’s dismissal under § 1915(d)); Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 282 (5th
Cir. 1990) (holding that district court erred in adopting the recommendations of
the magistrate “without benefit of a transcript or tape recording of the Spears
hearing”).
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light of Patton’s original answers to his interrogatories, and his
protestations that he misspoke to the magistrate, we cannot
determine from this record whether Patton was arrested on all 167
charges in January or not. Patton continues to maintain that his
conviction arose from charges independent from and filed subsequent
to his allegedly unlawful January arrest. If these facts are true,
Patton’s § 1983 suit challenging the validity of his January arrest
is unrelated to the validity of his subsequent conviction.4
Further, “[i]t is well established that a claim of unlawful
arrest, standing alone, does not necessarily implicate the validity
of a criminal prosecution following the arrest.” Mackey v.
Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995). As we have previously
noted, if a defendant “is tried and convicted and in his contested
criminal case no evidence is presented resulting directly or
indirectly from any of his arrests, it is difficult to see how any
illegality in any of his arrests could be inconsistent with his
conviction.” Id.; see also Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 421 (5th
Cir. 1995) (noting the “established rule that illegal arrest or
detention does not void a subsequent conviction”). A conviction
does not ipso facto establish that probable cause existed for the
4
We also note that the record is silent as to the procedure by which
Patton was arrested. The details of Patton’s arrest could be determinative of
his claim. See Campbell v. City of San Antonio, 43 F.3d 973, 976 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding that indictment by a grand jury establishes probable cause for arrest);
Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that “[i]t is well
settled that if facts supporting an arrest are placed before an independent
intermediary such as a magistrate or grand jury, the intermediary’s decision
breaks the chain of causation for false arrest”).
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defendant’s arrest. Thus, even if Patton was ultimately convicted
on charges brought pursuant to his January arrest, Patton’s § 1983
suit challenging the validity of that arrest would not necessarily
implicate the invalidity of his conviction, and therefore would not
be barred by Heck. See Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746 (holding that
district court erred in dismissing as frivolous prisoner’s § 1983
suit challenging the validity of his arrest on the basis that false
arrest did not necessarily implicate the invalidity of his
conviction and therefore Heck did not bar the prisoner’s suit).
Accordingly, the district court decision to dismiss Patton’s suit
as frivolous under § 1915(d) was erroneous.
We VACATE the district court’s § 1915(d) dismissal of Patton’s
§ 1983 suit, and REMAND for further proceedings.
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