concurring.
I respectfully concur in the result reached by the Majority.
Four years ago, in Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), this Court asserted the right to provide broader protections to our citizens under the Pennsylvania Constitution than provided by the United States Constitution. Our decision in Edmunds provides a clear analytical framework for discussion of when additional protections under our own state constitution are warranted. This framework requires the courts of our Commonwealth to analyze the following four factors:
1) the text of the Pennsylvania constitutional provision
2) the history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case-law
3) related case-law from other states;
4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and applicability within modem Pennsylvania jurisprudence.
Id. at 390, 596 A.2d at 895.
We further held in Edmunds that it was “essential” that our courts “undertake an independent analysis under the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id. at 391, 567 A.2d at 895. We also *59recognized that it was “important” for litigants to analyze and brief the four prongs of this analysis when implicating a provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 390, 567 A.2d at 895.
In the instant case, the Majority has failed to employ the Edmunds analysis in deciding that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides more protections than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution as interpreted in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). The Majority has also held that litigants asserting additional rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution do not have to argue the Edmunds analysis before this Court in any meaningful way. Combined, I believe that these two actions have the effect of weakening our decision in Edmunds. The Majority has sent a message to the lower courts and to litigants that the Edmunds analysis does not have to be argued by the parties nor used by our courts in deciding when additional rights are extended under the Pennsylvania Constitution. I disagree. Instead, I would reaffirm the Edmunds analysis as vital in deciding when additional rights are required under the Pennsylvania Constitution by requiring litigants to argue it and by requiring courts, including this Court, to employ it in their decisions.
Within that framework, I believe that it is essential for this Court to engraft a standard on to the Edmunds analysis. This case demonstrates that the Edmunds analysis is a rather loose analytical tool which, as currently interpreted, fails to provide sufficient guidance to litigants or to the lower courts. Thus, in addition to making the four prongs of Edmunds mandatory, I believe that we need to provide a clear constitutional standard for evaluating these prongs. In my opinion, the standard implicitly created by Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032, 100 S.Ct. 704, 62 L.Ed.2d 668 (1980) and Edmunds encourages us to deviate from the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court when there are important and substantial reasons for doing so. My analysis of our Edmunds jurisprudence is that we have not departed from the federal interpretation unless *60there was an important reason to do so. Compare United Artist Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 585 Pa. 370, 635 A.2d 612 (1993) (Pennsylvania takings clause does not provide more protections than federal takings clause) with Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 534 Pa. 97, 626 A.2d 537 (1993) (rejecting federal case-law and holding that Pennsylvania Constitution requires 12 member jury to parties who request them). In short, I would make explicit this implicit standard so as to provide a maximum amount of guidance to our lower courts and to litigants.
In summation, I believe that we must re-affirm the Ed-munds analysis and strengthen it. I would do this by (1) making it mandatory for litigants to brief the four prongs of Edmunds; (2) making it mandatory for the courts of our Commonwealth to engage in the Edmunds analysis; and (3) adopting an “important and substantial reason” standard for departing from decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Only with these reforms, I believe, will litigants and the lower courts have clear guidance as to when our Constitution provides additional protections.
Analyzed under the four prongs of Edmunds, I believe that this case presents important reasons for departing from the United States Supreme -Court’s holding in Belton and providing additional protections under our Constitution. The first prong we are required to analyze under Edmunds is the text of the Pennsylvania Constitutional provision. In Edmunds, we noted that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is “similar in language” to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Edmunds, 526 Pa. at 391, 586 A.2d at 887. However, we concluded that we “are not bound to interpret the two provisions as if they were mirror images, even where the text is similar or identical.” Id. at 391, 586 A.2d at 895-96. Therefore, the similarity between the text of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the text of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not require us to adopt Belton as the rule in this Commonwealth.
*61Next, Edmunds requires us to examine the history of the provision along with the relevant case-law. In Edmunds, we concluded that Article I, Section 8 “is meant to embody a strong notion of privacy, carefully safeguarded in this Commonwealth for the past two centuries.” Id. at 394, 586 A.2d at 897. However, I cannot accept the Majority’s blanket assertion that Pennsylvania “has struck a different balance than has the United States Supreme Court, and under that balance, an individual’s privacy interests are given greater deference than under federal law.” Majority Opinion at 56. The Majority would apparently extend additional privacy protections under Article I, Section 8 to all who assert them. Instead, I believe Edmunds commands that we must carefully scrutinize the asserted privacy interest to determine whether it is protected under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
In the instant case, Appellant is asserting a privacy interest in his automobile. Of course, our cases have long recognized a diminished privacy interest in an automobile based on federal case-law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Milyak, 508 Pa. 2, 7, 493 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1985); Commonwealth v. Timko, 491 Pa. 32, 38, 417 A.2d 620, 623 (1980); Commonwealth v. Mangini, 478 Pa. 147, 156, 386 A.2d 482, 487 (1978); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 110, 307 A.2d 875, 877 (1973). However, that federal privacy interest was substantially curtailed by the United States Supreme Court in Belton. My research indicates that we have also recognized a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Holzer, 480 Pa. 93, 101 & n. 4, 389 A.2d 101, 105-6 & n. 4 (1978); Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 148, 541 A.2d 1381, 1383 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Rosario, 538 Pa. 400, 648 A.2d 1172 (1994); Commonwealth v. Morris, 537 Pa. 417, 422 & n. 3, 644 A.2d 721, 724 & n. 3 (1994), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 115 S.Ct. 610, 130 L.Ed.2d 519 (1994). In Holzer we held that “constitutional protections are applicable to a person’s car” under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. *62Holzer, 480 Pa. at 103, 389 A.2d at 106. In Baker, we held that “[i]t is well established that automobiles are not per se unprotected by the warrant requirements of ... Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.” Baker, 518 Pa. at 148, 541 A.2d at 1383.
Thus, the history of Article I, Section 8 and case-law interpreting it reveal a history of according a limited expectation of privacy in an automobile independently under the Pennsylvania Constitution. Therefore, the question before us today is not whether we wish to extend additional privacy protections to the Appellant but whether we wish to follow the United States Supreme Court and sharply curtail a privacy interest long recognized by this Court. In my opinion, this prong weighs against automatically adopting Belton. Instead, I believe we must carefully consider the merits of severely diminishing a privacy right independently recognized under our own constitution.
The third prong of the Edmunds analysis requires that we examine related case-law from our sister states. A review of this case-law reveals that the vast majority of states have adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Belton. See, e.g., Baxter v. State, 274 Ark. 539, 626 S.W.2d 935, 937 cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 2930, 73 L.Ed.2d 1331 (1982); People v. Henry, 631 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Colo.1981); State v. Waller, 223 Conn. 283, 612 A.2d 1189, 1193 (1992); Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1173 (Del.1983); State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 530, 661 P.2d 311, 315 (1983); People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill.2d 209, 78 Ill.Dec. 107, 111, 461 N.E.2d 941, 945, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 840, 105 S.Ct. 142, 83 L.Ed.2d 81 (1984); Jackson v. State, 597 N.E.2d 950, 957. (Ind.1992); cert. denied, 507 U.S. 976, 113 S.Ct. 1424, 122 L.Ed.2d 793 (1993); State v. Sanders, 312 N.W.2d 534, 539 (Iowa 1981); State v. White, 230 Kan. 679, 640 P.2d 1231, 1232 (1982); Brown v. Commonwealth, 890 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Ky.1994); State v. Lamare, 463 A.2d 279, 280 (Me.1983); Ricks v. State, 322 Md. 183, 586 A.2d 740, 746 (1991); People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 485 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1992); State v. Liljedahl, 327 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Minn.1982); Horton v. State, 408 So.2d 1197, 1198-99 *63(Miss.1982); State v. Harvey, 648 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Mo.1983); State v. Roth, 213 Neb. 900, 331 N.W.2d 819, 821 (1983); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 286 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1982); State v. Rice, 327 N.W.2d 128, 131 (S.D.1982); State v. Cabage, 649 S.W.2d 589, 591-92 (Tenn.1983); State ex rel. K.K.C., 636 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1981); State v. Phillips, 140 Vt. 210, 436 A.2d 746, 749 (1981); State v. Smith, 119 Wash.2d 675, 835 P.2d 1025 (1992); State v. Boswell, 170 W.Va. 433, 441-42, 294 S.E.2d 287, 295 (1982); State v. Fry, 131 Wis.2d 153, 388 N.W.2d 565, 571-72 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 583, 93 L.Ed.2d 586 (1986); Lopez v. State, 643 P.2d 682, 685 (Wyo.1982).
However, a close examination of these cases shows that few of our sister states have addressed the applicability of Belton in light of their own state constitutions. Only a handful of these states have engaged in an independent state constitm tionai analysis. See, e.g., Waller, 612 A.2d at 1193; Hoskins, 78 Ill.Dec. at 111, 461 N.E.2d at 945; Sanders, 312 N.W.2d at 539; State v. Hensel, 417 N.W.2d at 849, 853 (1988); Rice, 327 N.W.2d at 131; Fry, 388 N.W.2d at 574.
For example, in Hoskins, the Supreme Court of Illinois adopted Belton after rejecting the assertion that its own state constitution provided more protections than the United States Constitution:
Any suggestion that it was intended that section 6 of the bill of rights in our own constitution was to be interpreted differently from the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the search provisions of the fourth amendment cannot be supported. The constitutional debates do not indicate any wish or intent to provide protections against unreasonable searches and seizures broader than those existing under decisional interpretations of the United States Constitution.
Hoskins, 78 Ill.Dec. at 111, 461 N.E.2d at 945.
In Sanders, the Supreme Court of Iowa deferred to the balance struck by the United States Supreme Court and refused to adopt a stricter standard under its state constitution than the one set forth in Belton:
*64“Defendant’s objections to the search and seizure are based on both federal and state constitutional protections. We can, if we choose, impose stricter standards in applying our own constitutional provisions than the United States Supreme Court did in Belton. However, we believe that Belton strikes a reasonably fair balance between the rights of the individual and those of society. We adopt it now as our rule.”
Sanders, 312 N.W.2d at 539.
In Fry, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin voiced concerns for national uniformity of Fourth Amendment law in not extending additional protections under its own state constitution:
“By adopting the Belton rule, Wisconsin police officers can follow the fourth amendment’s mandates without worrying about whether some different restrictions might be imposed on them under the Wisconsin Constitution. Uniformity of interpretation, as long as consistent with the protections of art. 1, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, reduces to a minimum the confusion and uncertainty under which police must operate. Moreover, conforming Wisconsin’s search and seizure law to that developed by the Supreme Court under the fourth amendment is not only consistent with the text of Wisconsin’s search and seizure provision, its constitutional history and its judicial history, but is also in accord with sound public policy.”
Fry, 388 N.W.2d at 575.
In contrast, several of our sister states have refused to follow Belton. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 410 So.2d 1381, 1385 (La.1982); Commonwealth v. Toole, 389 Mass. 159, 448 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (1983); State v. Greenwald, 109 Nev. 808, 858 P.2d 36, 37 (1993); New Jersey v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 642 A.2d 947, 963 (1994); People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 874, 432 N.E.2d 745, 746 (1982); State v. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 588 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 862, 113 S.Ct. 182, 121 L.Ed.2d 127 (1992).
For example, in Pierce, the Supreme Court of New Jersey refused to apply Belton to a case involving an arrest after a *65routine traffic stop. The court relied exclusively on state constitutional grounds holding that “under article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution the rule of Belton shall not apply to warrantless arrests for motor vehicle offenses.” Pierce, 642 A.2d at 959. The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted that motorists arrested for traffic offenses are usually removed from the vehicle and secured. Thus, the court reasoned:
When an arrestee, as was the case with [the defendant], has been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, and the passengers are removed from the vehicle and frisked, the officer’s justification for searching the vehicle and the passenger’s clothing is minimal. Thus, in the context of arrests for motor-vehicle violations, the bright-line Belton holding extends the [United States v.] Chimel[, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)] rule beyond the logical limits of its principle.
Id. at 960.
The court concluded:
We acknowledge the virtue of simple, straightforward rules to guide police officers in applying Fourth Amendment doctrine. Nevertheless, we are convinced that automatic application of the Belton bright-line rule to authorize vehicular searches incident to all traffic arrests poses too great a threat to rights guaranteed to New Jersey’s citizens by their state constitution, and that threat to fundamental rights outweighs any incidental benefit that might accrue to law enforcement because of the simplicity and predictability of the Belton Rule.
Id. at 963.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Brown refused to apply the Belton bright line rule. The court opined: “We do not believe that the certainty generated by a bright-line test justifies a rule that automatically allows police officers to search every nook and cranny of an automobile just because the driver is arrested for a traffic violation.” Brown, 588 N.E.2d at 115. Accordingly, the court held that the warrant-*66less search of the defendant’s automobile violated the Ohio Constitution. Id.
My review of these decisions of our sister states reveals that they are inconclusive on the question of whether Pennsylvania should adopt the Belton rule. New of these cases present any detailed analysis of state constitutional concerns in deciding to follow or reject the Belton rule. The only case which engages in any meaningful analysis under its state constitution is Pierce which I find well reasoned in its criticism of the Belton bright-line rule.
The fourth prong of the Edmunds analysis requires us to examine public policy considerations. Belton was a case essentially decided on policy grounds. In Belton, the United States Supreme Court lamented the fact that “no straightforward rule has emerged from the litigated cases respecting the question involved here — the question of the proper scope of a search of the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful custodial arrest of its occupants.” Belton, 453 U.S. at 459, 101 S.Ct. at 2863. The Court stated the proposition that “[w]hen a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a recurrent situation, that person cannot know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his authority.” Id. at 459-60, 101 S.Ct. at 2864. The Court then concluded that courts had found no workable definition of the “area within the immediate control of the arrestee” test formulated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Thus, the United States Supreme Court established a “bright-line” rule holding “that when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” Belton, 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. at 2864. The Court explained that “the justification for the search is not that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have.” Id. at 461, 101 S.Ct. at 2864.
*67The Belton bright-line rule has been widely criticized. See, e.g., Catherine Hancock, State Court Activism, and Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 Va.L.Rev. 1085, 1130-31 (1982) (Belton rule dramatically reduces the level of Fourth Amendment protection afforded to motorists); David S. Rudstein, The Search of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis of New York v. Belton, 67 Marq.L.Rev. 205, 261 (1984) (urging return to Chimel rule) David M. Silk, When Bright Lines Break Doum: Limiting New York v. Belton, 136 U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 313 (1987) (urging that Belton be applied narrowly). One such commentator has stated that the Belton rule “does a disservice to the development of sound Fourth Amendment doctrine.” Wayne R. Lefavre, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith”, 43 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 307, 325 (1982). Another has specifically criticized Belton for allowing searches once the occupant has been removed from the vehicle and arrested:
If any bright line rule had been necessary to resolve the issue in Belton, it would have been the opposite of the rule that the court announced____ [0]ccupants almost invariably are removed before an automobile is searched; and once they have been removed, there is no longer much chance that they can secure weapons from the automobile or destroy evidence there.
Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 227, 274 (1984).
I agree that the Belton rule is seriously flawed and has no place in Pennsylvania jurisprudence. It has long been the rule in this Commonwealth that the police may search the passenger compartment of a car incident to an arrest only to protect their safety or to prevent the occupants from destroying contraband. Timko, 491 Pa. at 37, 417 A.2d at 622. In contrast, the Belton rule allows the police to search the passenger compartment and any containers contained therein even where no such exigency exists. The instant case demonstrates this point. Here, the defendant was removed from the car and arrested. At this point, the safety of the officers was no longer in jeopardy, and the defendant was unable to *68destroy any evidence contained in the passenger compartment. Had the officers wanted to conduct an evidentiary search of the car, they could have secured the vehicle and obtained a proper search warrant. In my opinion, Belton carves too wide an exception to the warrant requirement where none is justified. We are asked today to follow Belton and dispense with the privacy interest in an automobile long recognized in our state constitution for the sake of a bright line rule. I am not convinced that our previous rule found in Timko and based upon Chimel created such practical law enforcement problems in this Commonwealth as to mandate that we dramatically curtail the privacy rights of motorists for the sake of a bright-line rule. In short, I do not believe that the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Belton carries the day. In my opinion, the widely criticized reasoning of Belton, the long-recognized privacy interest in an automobile under the Pennsylvania Constitution, and the lack of any evidence of insurmountable law enforcement problems in enforcing the current rule in this Commonwealth convince me that there are important and substantial reasons for departing from federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in this case. Like several of our sister states, I would not follow the Belton bright line rule; instead I would maintain the rule set forth in Chimel.