dissenting:
The effect of the majority’s decision is to order the elected Attorney General of this Commonwealth to prosecute a criminal case when he has declined to do so .in the first instance in the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion. Because of the deference which I would accord to such prosecutorial decision, and because the record is devoid of any showing that the policy reasons advanced by the Attorney General in support of his declination were merely pretextual or offered in bad faith, I respectfully dissent.
The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of this Commonwealth, and the district attorneys are the chief law enforcement officers for the counties in which they are elected. Commonwealth Attorneys Act, 71 P.S. § 732-206(a). It is well established that a prosecutor in this Commonwealth has broad discretion concerning the decision of whether criminal charges should be brought in any given case. “ ‘A District Attorney has a general and widely recognized power to conduct criminal litigation and prosecutions on behalf of the Commonwealth, and to decide whether and when to prosecute, and whether and when to continue or discontinue a case.’ ” Commonwealth v. Stipetich, 539 Pa. 428, 430, 652 A.2d 1294, 1295 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. DiPasquale, 431 Pa. 536, 540-541, 246 A.2d 430, 432 (1968) (emphasis omitted). In exercising this power, a prosecutor is “... obligated to perform this task intelligently and impartially ... [, and] is under no compulsion to prosecute every alleged offender.... ” Commonwealth v. Malloy, 304 Pa.Super. 297, 302, 450 A.2d 689, 691 (1982) (citation omitted). “Thus, the district attorney is permitted to exercise sound discretion to refrain from proceeding in a criminal case whenever he, in good faith, thinks that the prosecution would not serve the best interests of the state.” Id., 304 Pa.Super. at 303, 450 A.2d at 692.
The Attorney General’s decision to disapprove Buckley’s private criminal complaint was reviewed by the trial court pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 106. Criminal Rule 106 reposes an awesome power in the judiciary, namely, the authority to order a prosecutor, an elected official *475of the executive branch of our government, to prosecute a criminal complaint in the name of the Commonwealth. With this grant of power comes a concomitant responsibility to exercise such oversight in an extremely judicious manner.
Therefore, our courts have traditionally extended great deference to a prosecutor’s decision to decline prosecution when the declination is grounded upon policy considerations. It follows that a reviewing court will not interfere with a prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in such instance, absent a showing of a gross abuse of the prosecutor’s discretionary powers. This deference is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of powers. See, Commonwealth v. Buonopane, 410 Pa.Super. 215, 221, 599 A.2d 681, 684 (1991) (“... interference with the prosecutor’s discretionary functions, absent a threshold showing of a valid claim of purposeful abuse, violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers.”); see also, Commonwealth v. Slick, 432 Pa.Super. 563, 639 A.2d 482 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Benz, 523 Pa. 203, 565 A.2d 764 (1989).
The Superior Court has summarized these principles as follows:
When the district attorney rests the disapproval of a private criminal complaint on wholly discretionary matters of policy, this Court will not disturb that determination, absent a gross abuse of discretion.... The special deference extended a policy decision not to prosecute arises from the deference accorded the discretionary use of executive powers conferred in the district attorney.
Commonwealth v. Jury, 431 Pa.Super. 129, 137, 636 A.2d 164, 168 (1993) (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). In Commonwealth v. Slick, 432 Pa.Super. 563, 639 A.2d 482 (1994), the Superior Court further stated:
... courts will not review the actions of governmental bodies or administrative tribunals involving acts of discretion, in the absence of bad faith, fraud, capricious action or abuse of power; they will not inquire into the wisdom of such actions or into the details of the manner adopted to *476carry them into execution. It is true that the mere possession of discretionary power by an administrative body does not make it wholly immune from judicial review, but the scope of that review is limited to the determination of whether there has been a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency’s duties or functions.
Id., 432 Pa.Super. at 564-565, 639 A.2d at 483, quoting In re Petition of Acchione, 425 Pa. 23, 30, 227 A.2d 816, 820 (1967). Accord, Pennsylvania Social Services Local 668 v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 481 Pa. 81, 392 A.2d 256 (1978).
Courts have also recognized, however, that the phrase “prosecutorial discretion” will not be permitted to serve as “a magical incantation which automatically provides a shield for arbitrariness.” Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15, 32-33, 506 A.2d 1312, 1322-1323 (1986) (Spaeth, J., dissenting). Accordingly, prosecutors may transgress the bounds of their discretionary authority by engaging in a pattern of discriminatory, retaliatory or arbitrary prosecutions, or refusing to. prosecute certain classes of people or crimes. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886); Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 (D.C.Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. Komatowski, 347 Pa. 445, 450, 32 A.2d 905, 908 (1943). See also, Commonwealth v. Muroski, 352 Pa.Super. 15, 32-33, 506 A.2d 1312, 1322-1323 (1986) (en banc) (collecting cases).
In this case, the Attorney General, in disapproving the private criminal complaint, stated that “It is the considered good faith belief of the Office of the Attorney General that the best interests of the Commonwealth would not be advanced through a prosecution of Michael Brown____” After enumerating several practical considerations in addition to a review of the evidence available against Brown, the Attorney General concluded that “[t]he decision to decline prosecution in this matter is based upon factors broader than simply the quantum of evidence available and is founded in the policy considerations inherent in this Office as public prosecutor.” Finally, *477the Attorney General concluded that such decision “would be the same whether or not a prima facie case could be established .... ” See, Commonwealth v. Jury, 431 Pa.Super. 129, 636 A.2d 164 (1993) (even though prima facie case may exist on face of complaint, prosecutor is not bound to prosecute, and may, in proper exercise of discretion, disapprove complaint wholly for policy reasons).
In reviewing the Attorney General’s decision, the trial court acknowledged the deferential “gross abuse of discretion” standard which was to guide its review but proceeded to re-weigh the factors upon which the Attorney General had based his decision and substitute its own judgment for that of the Attorney General, who had ultimately concluded that prosecution would not serve the ends of justice. This was, I believe, an impermissible usurpation of the discretionary authority reposed in the Attorney General. “That the court might have a different opinion or judgment in regard to the action of the [prosecutor] is not a sufficient ground for interference; judicial discretion may not be substituted for administrative discretion.” Commonwealth v. Slick, supra, 432 Pa.Super. at 564-565, 639 A.2d at 483.
The trial court made no finding, nor indeed does the record disclose any evidence, that the Attorney General’s reasons for disapproving Buckley’s complaint were merely pretextual or advanced in bad faith, or that the decision to disapprove the complaint was based upon any improper motive. Rather, the Attorney General’s actions in disapproving the complaint were predicated upon his determination that it would not be in the best interests of the state to initiate prosecution, given the fact that Brown’s perjury at trial was so obvious as to be harmless, that there were significant financial concerns, and that Brown was already incarcerated on other charges.
Although the majority is concerned by what it views as the failure of the Attorney General to produce evidence of the policy underlying his decision, in my judgment a judicial tribunal is bound to accept the assertion of the Commonwealth’s chief law enforcement officer that he chooses not to devote his limited resources to prosecuting a particular indi*478vidual for a particular crime, absent a showing of bad faith or improper motive. Indeed, a decision regarding the prosecution of a case often involves “the allocation of scarce resources.” Mummau v. Ranch, 531 F.Supp. 402, 405 (E.D.Pa. 1982), affirmed, 687 F.2d 9 (3d Cir.1982), citing United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir.1973).
In summary, I do not believe that Rule 106 was intended to permit a trial court, at the behest of a private individual, to compel the initiation of a prosecution deemed by the prosecutor to be against public interest. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
CAVANAUGH, J., joined.