dissenting.
The majority concludes that in order to be eligible for workmen’s compensation benefits as a “dependent” of a deceased child, the parent simply must be dependent upon the *604financial contributions of the deceased child to any extent. In determining what qualifies as “to any extent,” the majority believes that a rudimentary mathematical calculation which pits normal monthly bills against normal monthly income will be dispositive of the issue, as long as the normal monthly expenses exceed the normal monthly income and further provided that the monthly expenses are reasonable in light of the parent’s station in life. Because I do not believe that such an arbitrary standard should be applied, I must dissent.
Our legislature has provided that:
§ 561. Persons entitled to compensation on death of employe; amounts
In case of death, compensation shall be computed on the following basis, and distributed to the following persons: Provided, That in no case shall the wages of the deceased be taken to be less than fifty per centum of the Statewide average weekly wage for purposes of this section:
* * * * * *
5. If there be neither widow, widower, nor children entitled to compensation, then to the father or mother, if dependent to any extent upon the employe at the time of the injury, thirty-two per centum of wages but not in excess of the Statewide average weekly wage: Provided, however, That in the case of a minor child who has been contributing to his parents, the dependency of said parents shall be presumed: And provided further, That if the father or mother was totally dependent upon the deceased employe at the time of the injury, the compensation payable to such father or mother shall be fifty-two per centum of wages, but not in excess of the Statewide average weekly wage.
77 P.S. § 561 (emphasis supplied).
It is well established that the test for determining dependency under this section is:
whether or not the child’s earnings were needed to provide the parents with some of the ordinary necessities of life suitable for persons in their class and position, and that the parents were, consequently, dependent to some extent upon *605the child at the time of the accident causing his death. If the contribution of the deceased child were [sic] necessary to maintain the parents in an established, reasonable standard of living, this existing standard must be considered in determining the necessity for such contribution from the child.
Leipziger v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 12 Pa. Commw. 417, 420, 315 A.2d 883, 885 (1974) (citations omitted). Moreover, “[t]he term ‘dependency’ as used in Section 307(5) [77 P.S. § 561] contemplates ‘actual dependency’.... ” Haller v. W.C.A.B. (Rainbow Sign Services), 153 Pa.Commw. 149, 153, 620 A.2d 657, 659 (1993) (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, the Commonwealth Court has held that “[ordinary necessities do not include such ‘capital expenditures’ as new siding for the claimant’s house or furniture and amounts expended for such items are not properly chargeable to the claimant’s expenses in the year of the child’s death.” No. 1 Contracting Corp. v. W.C.A.B. (Van Horn), 74 Pa.Commw. 340, 346, 460 A.2d 374, 377 (1983) (citing DeGuffroy & Associates v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 52 Pa. Commw. 58, 415 A.2d 437 (1980)). See also Cook v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 64 Pa.Commw. 278, 440 A.2d 652 (1982) (wherein the Commonwealth Court recognized that expenses for college tuition of adult children should not be considered in the parent’s expenses because, while important, an education is not one of the ordinary necessities of life suitable for persons in the parent’s class).
Without addressing the Act’s overall objective to provide compensation to individuals who are actually dependent, the majority simply concludes that the cost of maintaining a vacation home is an expense appropriate to Claimant’s life circumstances. I disagree. I do not believe that a vacation home is one of the ordinary necessities of life which our legislature sought to protect. Rather, I agree with the Commonwealth Court that just as capital expenditures and college educations are not considered to be “necessities of life,” the cost of maintaining a vacation home cannot be considered a necessity of life either. Therefore, I would affirm the Com*606monwealth Court’s decision to exclude this expense from the referee’s calculation.1
CASTILLE, J., joins in this Dissenting Opinion.. Alternatively, I also dissent from the majority's conclusion that “once benefits are paid to a parent who is dependent, they are payable until the parent's death or remarriage.” Op. at 601. Contrary to the majority's cursory analysis of this point, the Commonwealth Court has recognized that the resolution of this question is not as simple as it may seem. Claws Refuse v. W.C.A.B. (Squires), 164 Pa.Commw. 424, 643 A.2d 742 (1994). In that case, the Commonwealth Court noted that, " '[tjhis issue has been the subject of several Commonwealth Court decisions. Kreider vs. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 10 Pa. Comwlth.Ct. 79, 308 A.2d 187 (1973) and Broadwood Chuckwagon v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 112 Pa.Comwlth.Ct. 213, 535 A.2d 272 (1987). The cases hold that dependent parents were entitled to benefits until they died.’ ” Claws Refuse, 164 Pa.Commw. at 427-28, 643 A.2d at 744 (citing Decision of the Board, November 30, 1993, pp. 3-4). After reviewing the several cases and addressing the equities of the situation in light of the intent of the Act, the Court held that:
fatal claim benefits to a dependent can be limited in duration where, as in this case, the limitation is for financial reasons — i.e., financial dependency in fact no longer exists at some point — and is performed at the initial determination of dependency. We therefore are bound to follow [Broadwood], despite some of the language in Canton Plumbing [and Heating v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Robbins), 135 Pa.Commw. 641, 582 A.2d 90 (1990)].
Claws Refuse, 164 Pa.Commw. at 431, 643 A.2d at 746.
In this case, as the majority notes, Claimant’s average monthly income was $1,322.00, while her average monthly expenses were $1,400.00, including monthly mortgage payments on the vacation home which ranged from $193.79 to $387.58. As of October 1994, when the mortgage on the vacation home should have been paid in full, Claimant’s expenses would no longer be greater than her income, and as such, any benefits awarded under the majority’s analysis should have been limited to the period of the mortgage.