OPINION
GAULTNEY, Justice.North American Refractories Company (“NARCO”) seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Patrick A. Clark, judge of the 128th District Court of Orange County, Texas, to grant a continuance of a trial originally scheduled to commence on June 25, 2001. The underlying asbestos products liability suit involves over 4000 plaintiffs. This particular trial affects ten plaintiffs1 designated as the trial group by plaintiffs’ counsel on June 11, two weeks before trial was to begin. NARCO filed its motion for continuance on June 19, on the grounds that lead counsel had a timely vacation letter on file for the week of June 25 and on the grounds that discovery was incomplete. The trial court denied the motion on June 22.
The relator now suggests the petition may be moot because the week of June 25 passed while our stay order was in effect and before we ruled on the issue before us. Nevertheless, the act complained of in the petition is arguably “capable of repetition yet evading review.” See General Land Office of the State of Texas v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex.1990). More importantly, the real parties in interest have requested sanctions be imposed upon NARCO for filing a groundless petition for purposes of delay. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.11. We must determine whether the petition has merit even though the original June 25 trial setting has passed.
Although mandamus is generally not available to review the denial of a motion for continuance, General Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex.1997), mandamus will issue to enforce the trial court’s ministerial duty to grant a mandatory continuance. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Salyer, 814 S.W.2d 211, 212-13 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, orig. proceeding). Appellate courts have ordered trial judges to honor legislative continuances, for example. Collier v. Poe, 732 S.W.2d 332, 346 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); In re Starr Produce Co., 988 S.W.2d 808, 811-812 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, orig. proceeding); Salyer, 814 S.W.2d at 213.
Legislative continuances are subject to mandamus because a statute makes *919them mandatory. Mora v. Ferguson, 145 Tex. 498, 199 S.W.2d 759, 762-63 (1947); see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 30.003 (Vernon 1997). We must decide whether a similarly mandatory law applies in this case. Normally, absence of counsel is not good cause for a continuance, but a continuance may be granted in the discretion of the judge. Tex.R. Civ. P. 253. In this case, however, relator relies on a local mandatory rule approved by the Texas Supreme Court. Trial courts are governed by local rules approved by the Texas Supreme Court. Tex.R. Civ. P. 3a. The real parties in interest do not challenge the local rule. Rule 11 of the Regional Rules of Administration for the Second Administrative Judicial Region of Texas provides:
Rule 11: Attorney Vacations
a. DESIGNATION OF VACATION. Subject to the provision of subparts b and c of this rule, an attorney may designate not more than four weeks of vacation during a calendar year as vacation, during which that attorney will not be assigned to trial or required to engage in any pretrial proceedings. This rule operates only where lead counsel, as defined by T.R.C.P. 8, is affected, unless the trial court expands coverage to other counsel.
b. SUMMER VACATIONS. Written designation for vacation weeks during June, July, or August must be filed with the district clerk by May 15. Summer vacation weeks so designated will protect the attorney from trials during those summer weeks, even if an order setting the case for trial was signed before the vacation designation was filed.
c. NON-SUMMER VACATIONS. Written designations for vacation in months other than June, July, or August must be filed with the district clerk by February 1. Non-summer vacation weeks may not run consecutively for more than two weeks at a time. Non-summer vacation weeks so designated will not protect an attorney from a trial by an order signed before the date the designation is filed, (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court approved the adoption of this rule pursuant to its rule-making authority. See Misc. Docket No. 96-0006 (Tex. January 3, 1996); see Tex. Const. art. V, § 31; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 74.021; 74.046(1), 74.048(c) (Vernon 1998); Tex.R. Civ. P. 3a. Under proper circumstances, a trial court’s violation of a local mandatory rule may be corrected through mandamus. See Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex.1991). In this case, the rule expressly provides that a vacation letter filed by May 15 will protect the lead attorney from trial during the designated weeks, even if the order setting the case for trial was signed before the letter was filed. The rule is mandatory and precludes the exercise of discretion that would otherwise reside with the court.
The real parties in interest cite Siegler v. Williams, 658 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ), in support of their argument that NARCO failed to exercise diligence in obtaining a continuance. In Siegler v. Williams, the court found the right to a continuance was waived by co-counsel’s agreement to a preferential setting after a vacation letter was filed. Id. NARCO’s counsel, on the other hand, did not act in a manner inconsistent with his reliance on his timely filed vacation letter. Furthermore, in Siegler, after agreeing to the preferential setting, the party did not appear for trial and did not file a motion for continuance based on the vacation letter. Id. at 238. Here, relator did file a proper motion for continuance based in part on the vacation letter and the mandatory language of Rule 11. *920Once the motion was filed invoking the rule, the trial court had no discretion to ignore the mandatory language in the rule.
The real parties in interest do not contend that denial of the June 25 trial setting deprived them of due process. See Waites v. Sondock, 561 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex.1977). Absent a due process exception, the trial court had a ministerial duty to grant the continuance in compliance with the local rules of procedure.
The real parties in interest also rely on Cezeaux v. Libby, 539 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1976, no writ), which held that the appellant failed to demonstrate either an abuse of discretion or harm from the denial of a motion for continuance based upon a vacation letter. Cezeatix pre-dates the adoption of Rule 11. After the adoption of the rule, with its clearly mandatory language, it cannot reasonably be stated that honoring a vacation letter remains a matter of court discretion. Also, the harm in the refusal to honor a vacation letter inures not to the litigant, but to his counsel, who must attend the trial or face professional censure. Mora recognized the public interest served by permitting members of the legal profession to serve in the legislature without surrendering their law practice to do so. Mora, 199 S.W.2d at 763. Likewise, a mandatory local rule requiring vacation letters be honored serves the public interest by allowing those who devote their lives to the practice of law to also devote some reserved time to their families. Because the trial court’s arbitrary refusal to recognize counsel’s vacation letter cannot be remedied on appeal, mandamus will be issued to prevent the violation of the rule.
Secondly, the relator contends, both in its motion for continuance and its petition for writ of mandamus, a continuance is necessary in order to conduct additional pre-trial discovery.2 The underlying suit has been brought by over 4000 plaintiffs. In November 2000, three trial settings were identified for fifty plaintiffs. A group of fifty plaintiffs was severed from the rest in February 2001. Not until June 11, 2001, did plaintiffs’ counsel inform NARCO of the names of the specific ten plaintiffs who would go to trial on June 25. NARCO’s motion for continuance alleged that the group of plaintiffs was the first involving a particular employer, American Cast Iron Pipe Company, that NARCO was in the process of seeking subpoenas in Alabama to obtain purchasing records from that employer, that plaintiffs’ counsel had not yet forwarded all of the experts’ medical reports and pathology specimens, and that independent medical examinations were scheduled for June 11-12 and could not be completed due to the fault of plaintiffs. The real parties in interest do not contest these facts and we must accept them as true. See Whitehead v. Julian, 476 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex.1972).
The real parties in interest argue in response that the trial court complied with the rule requiring forty-five days notice of a first setting for trial. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 245. We disagree. The suit commenced in 1992. A group of fifty plaintiffs apparently was severed from the rest of the suit in February 2001, but the parties whose claims NARCO must defend against in the trial in question were unilaterally selected by plaintiffs’ counsel and notice of their identity provided to the defendant a *921scant fourteen days before trial. “A party’s due process rights are violated when he does not receive adequate notice of a hearing or trial setting.” Brosseau v. Ranzau, 28 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, no pet.). The notice must be “meaningful” to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex.1983). We hold that two weeks notice of the first trial setting is not meaningful notice under these circumstances; the notice does not satisfy due process requirements or the specific forty-five day requirement of Rule 245. NARCO did not need to submit evidence regarding notice in the hearing on its motion for continuance; the lack of sufficient notice is shown on the face of the record.3 See In re Marriage of Parker, 20 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.). See also Henderson v. O’Neill, 797 S.W.2d 905 (1990) (mandamus issued to enforce Rule 87 requiring forty-five days notice on motion to transfer). By denying the relator a continuance to complete the medical examinations and the product exposure discovery, the trial court effectively prevented the defendant from developing critical evidence that goes to the heart of this case. See Thompson v. Davis, 901 S.W.2d 939, 940 (Tex.1995). As in Davis, “remedy by appeal is inadequate because the missing discovery cannot be made part of the appellate record.” Id. More importantly, the denial of reasonable notice of the trial setting and of the opportunity to complete discovery that goes to the heart of this case severely compromises the relator’s ability to present its case, “so that the trial would be a waste of judicial resources.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex.1992). Under these circumstances, relator’s remedy by eventual appeal is inadequate.
We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by denying the relator’s first motion for a continuance. Because the case was not tried the week of June 25, 2001, however, we need not order the trial court to grant the continuance from that trial setting. The trial court must, however, grant sufficient time for discovery and reasonable notice of the trial setting. See Tex. Const, art I, § 19. We are confident that the trial court will follow the principles set forth in this opinion should these circumstances be repeated. The stay order is lifted.
The motion for sanctions of the real parties in interest is denied.
WRIT CONDITIONALLY GRANTED; STAY ORDER LIFTED; MOTION FOR SANCTIONS DENIED.
. The real parties in interest have been identified as Jim Amison, Jr., Tony Houston Belle, Sr., Richard Deed, George Dudley, Dock Sha-heen Farris, Johnnie Hughes, Joe Daniel Miles, Gene Tunney Saulters, Melvin Curtis Story, and Mardis Bryan Wallis, Jr.
. This is NARCO's first motion for continuance. Plaintiffs did not controvert NARCO's verified motion; "we must accept the statements in the motion as true.” Verkin v. Southwest Center One, Ltd., 784 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied). In Verkin, the court held that "[i]n ruling on a first motion for continuance, the trial court does not have the discretion to reject the uncontroverted facts established by defendant’s sworn motion.” Id.
. Relator complied with Tex.R.App. P. 52.7(a)(2) by providing an affidavit that no live testimony was presented at the hearing. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 n. 3 (Tex.1992). Relator complied with Tex. R.App P. 52.7(a)(1) by providing every material document; the real parties in interest do not contest the completeness of the appellate record.