dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. While the majority correctly points out that this case calls for the application of the three-pronged test in Faulks v. Papo Bar, Inc., 280 Pa.Super. 454, 421 A.2d 810 (1980), the majority fails to state the proper standard of review we are to apply in reviewing the lower court’s determination. A petition to vacate a judgment of non pros is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed absent a showing that there was an error of law affecting the decision, or that there was a clear, manifest abuse of discretion. See, Balk v. Ford Motor Company, 446 Pa. 137, 285 A.2d 128 (1971); Beausang v. Bernotas, 296 Pa.Super. 335, 442 A.2d 796 (1982). Contrary to the view stated in the majority decision, the lower court, which is best situated to deal with matters relating to its own docket, did offer a reasonable explanation for the tardily-filed petition to vacate the judgment, and for the apparent lack of activity in the case from the date of the last docket entry to the dismissal of the case. I cannot say that the lower court order vacating the judgment of non pros based on these reasons is an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
The first prong of the Faulks v. Papo Bar, Inc. test requires that the petition for opening a judgment of non pros be timely filed. The majority points out that Philadelphia Rule 130 (also known as Philadelphia Star Rule 350) provides for a three month period for filing a petition to reinstate a case dismissed under the rule. The majority also recognized the limitation we imposed on the application of this rule in Stringer v. Kaytes, 286 Pa.Super. 551, 557, 429 A.2d 660, 663 (1981) where we wrote:
It would obviously be unfair to require a party to file a petition to reinstate within three months of the date of dismissal when the prothonotary has neglected to notify the party of the dismissal.
The proper notification here, under the generally applicable Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2), requires written notice by ordinary mail *52of the entry of the judgment “to each party who has appeared in the action or to the party’s attorney of record”.1 The lower court found, based on the affidavits of the parties, that neither the former attorney, Mr. Bongiovanni, whose name still appeared on the docket as attorney but who had since withdrawn from the case, nor the then current attorney, Mr. Katz, had received the requisite notice in the mail. I find no reason to question this finding.
Since the notification was inadequate, Stringer v. Kaytes, supra, requires that a determination of timeliness be based on the date when the plaintiff or his attorney received actual notice of the dismissal of the action. The court below did just that, and found that the six and one-half month delay in filing the petition from the date of actual notice was reasonably explained by the need of counsel to investigate the activities of the three other attorneys in three different firms. The lower court wrote:
In light of the ground work that had to be completed by Mr. Daniels prior to the filing of the petition, the six and one-half month delay cannot be classified as untimely. Rather, the time delay was timely, and reasonably explained.
Thus, the lower court found the “timely filed petition” prong to be satisfied. Given the facts presented in this case, I do not believe that this finding can be classified as an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
The second prong of the Faulks v. Papo Bar, Inc., supra, test requires that the plaintiff reasonably explain the lack of activity in the case from the date of the last docket entry to the date of dismissal. The majority contends that no explanation has been offered for the ten-year gap here. I, however, do not find this view of the record to be correct.
*53The lower court found a reasonable explanation for the lack of activity based on the fact that neither the attorney who appeared on the docket not the attorney who actually represented the plaintiffs were advised that the matter was subject to dismissal if no action was taken. The lower court wrote:
Clearly, had counsel been so advised they would have had an opportunity to take measures to prevent the dismissal, as was done after same was ascertained.
While this Court in Corcoran v. Fiorentino, 277 Pa.Super. 256, 419 A.2d 759 (1980), held that the lack of notice alone is insufficient to require reinstatement, the facts of this case reveal additional considerations that support the lower court’s decision. The plaintiffs have changed attorneys on four occasions between 1972 and 1980, and each change required a period of time for the new attorney to plan and plot trial strategy. In addition, the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the dismissal by Mr. Katz reveal that he was attempting to file a Certificate of Readiness under Philadelphia Rule 151,2 which required that the Certificate be filed by May 1, 1981 under penalty of dismissal. This filing, attempted to be taken without knowledge of the earlier judgment of non pros, supports the conclusion of the lower court that the attorney would not have allowed the case to go into default had he known that dismissal was possible, knowledge that he lacked because of the inadequacy of the notice. Based on these facts, I would find, as the lower court did, that the second prong of the Faulks v. Papo Bar, Inc., supra, test is satisfied.
The third requirement, that facts constituting grounds for a cause of action be alleged, is easily satisfied in this situation, since the complaint states a prima facie case if the facts, as alleged, are taken as true. International Telephone & Telegraph v. Philadelphia Electric Company, 250 Pa.Super. 378, 378 A.2d 986 (1977). Any arguments *54going to the merits of the cause of action need not be considered at this point.
Since I find that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in its application of the Faulks v. Papo Bar, Inc., supra, criteria to the facts presented, I would affirm the judgment of the lower court and vacate the judgment of non pros.
. On October 20, 1978, the Honorable David N. Savitt, Court Administrator of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, directed the prothonotary to give notice required by Pa.R.C.P. 236 whenever a case was dismissed under the local rule.
. This rule was passed on July 1, 1980, and became effective on September 12, 1980.