(dissenting). I conclude that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in Vivid's favor on the trespass claim because the lease of the sign constituted a bailment; and therefore, the responsibilities of Vivid and MEI in regard to the bailed property are either controlled by the agreement in fact of the parties or by an implied contract determined by the common law of bailment. Because there was no agreement in fact that assigned the responsibility to return or reclaim the bailed property, and because the common law does not obligate Vivid to reclaim the bailed property, I would adopt comment n of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160 and conclude the abandoned posts did not create a trespass on MEI's land. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the part of the majority opinion which addresses trespass.
*404A bailment is created by delivery of personal property from one person to another, to be held temporarily for the benefit of the bailee, the bailor or both, under an express or implied contract. Bushweiler v. Polk County Bank, 129 Wis. 2d 357, 359, 384 N.W.2d 717, 718 (Ct. App. 1986). The agreement between the bailee and bailor involves the temporary transfer of physical possession and control of the property from the bailor to the bailee. Dahl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 420, 423-24, 153 N.W.2d 624, 625-26 (1967); Burns v. State, 145 Wis. 373, 380, 128 N.W. 987, 990 (1910). For example, a lease of personal property generally creates a bailment because the lessor relinquishes physical possession of the property to the lessee, while retaining legal title to the property. Cook v. Gran-Aire, Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 330, 340, 513 N.W.2d 652, 656 (Ct. App. 1994). Furthermore, the bailee is not required to have complete possession of the property to the exclusion of the bailor, and under the terms of the agreement, the bailor may retain some control over the property. Dahl, 36 Wis. 2d at 424, 153 N.W.2d at 626.
During the term of the lease at issue here, Vivid, the bailor, relinquished possession and control of the sign, which includes the supporting structures, to MEI, the bailee, while retaining ownership1 and limited control of the bailed property for maintenance and repairs. Because Vivid received rental payments in exchange for MEI's right to use the sign for advertising purposes, the arrangement was mutually beneficial to the par*405ties. Therefore, I conclude that the lease of Vivid's sign and supporting structures to MEI was a bailment.2
When the term of a bailment ends, under common law, the bailee must redeliver the bailed property to the bailor and if he fails to do so, the bailor has the right to consider the bailment continued or renewed. However, the parties may make a contract under which the bailor agrees to remove the property upon termination of the bailment. Umentum v. Arendt, 267 Wis. 373, 376, 66 N.W.2d 192, 194-95 (1954).
The common law, which gives no obligation to the bailor to remove the bailed property, is consistent with comment n of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160, which provides that the bailor's failure to remove bailed property when the bailment concludes is not a trespass. Additionally, even if the parties had agreed that removal was the bailor's obligation, no tort of trespass may be brought because the bailee's remedy is in contract, not in tort. See Madison Newspapers, Inc. v. Pinkerton's Inc., 200 Wis. 2d 468, 473-76, 545 N.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Ct. App. 1996) (we rejected a tort claim arising from the negligent performance of a contract because the plaintiff had a contract remedy). Either way, the bailor's refusal to remove the property is not a trespass; rather, it is the abandonment3 of bailed property.
*406Under both comment n of the RESTATEMENT (Se COND) of Torts § 160 and the common law, abandoned property which was the subject of a bailment cannot create a trespass, because its disposal is the responsibility of the bailee, unless the parties contract for a different result. See Umentum, 267 Wis. at 376, 66 N.W.2d at 194-95. The common law and comment n thereby promote the policy of encouraging the bailee, who would otherwise bear the burden for the removal of abandoned property under common law and whose land is affected by abandoned property, to contract to require the bailor to remove the bailed property, if that is the result he wants. Stated another way, the bailee has the greater incentive to create a contract which requires removal of all bailed property upon termination of the bailment, as his interests are more affected than those of the bailor by abandoned property.
There is no evidence that Vivid and MEI contracted for Vivid to remove the sign, which includes the supporting posts;4 therefore, Vivid was not obligated to retrieve the bailed property upon the termination of the bailment. In my view, the majority opinion creates a tort claim in trespass for MEI which, in essence, gives it a contract provision MEI should have bargained for but did not. I conclude this is also contrary to the policies underlying the common law of contracts, be they bailments or some other form of contract.
*407Therefore, I conclude that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in Vivid's favor on the trespass issue because pursuant to common law of bail-ments, and consistent with comment n of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160, which I would adopt, Vivid had no obligation to remove the support posts. Without such a duty, there can be no trespass for lack of its performance, see Madison Newspapers, 200 Wis. 2d at 473, 545 N.W.2d at 846, and accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
On October 3,1995, the circuit court concluded that Vivid owned the sign and issued a writ of replevin permitting Vivid to take possession of its property, the sign, which includes the supporting structures.
Other jurisdictions have held that sign rental agreements create bailments. Young Elec. Sign Co. v. Capps, 492 P.2d 57, 60 (Idaho 1971); see also Wm. G. Tannhaeuser Co., Inc. v. Holiday House, Inc., 1 Wis. 2d 370, 83 N.W.2d 880 (1957) (a sign case where the supreme court treats the contract as a bailment, as do the headnotes, but the question of whether a bailment was created was not squarely addressed by the court).
Abandoned property is that which was intentionally and voluntarily left behind by the lawful owner. See Oconto Elec. Co. *406v. Peoples L. & M. Co., 165 Wis. 467, 480, 161 N.W. 789, 793 (1917).
In a letter dated December 17,1990, Vivid offered to cancel the contract and remove the sign, but the circuit court concluded that there was no evidence of acceptance of this offer, and therefore, no contract. The record supports this factual finding. See § 805.17(2), Stats.; Noll v. Dimiceli's, Inc., 115 Wis. 2d 641, 643, 340 N.W.2d 575, 577 (Ct. App. 1983).