The Attorney Grievance Commission here seeks the immediate suspension of Stanley E. Protokowicz, Jr., pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Rule BY16.
Maryland Rule BV16 a 2 provides:
If an attorney is convicted of a crime to which this Rule is made applicable pursuant to Rule BV16 a 1, whether the conviction results from a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere or from a verdict after trial, and regardless of the pendency of an appeal or any other post-conviction proceeding, the Bar Counsel shall file charges with the Court of Appeals alleging the fact of the conviction and requesting that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law. A certified copy of the judgment of conviction shall be attached to the charges and shall be prima facie evidence of the fact that the attorney was convicted of the crime charged.
Rule BV16 a 1 defines the crimes to which the Rule applies. It includes crimes that are felonies under Maryland law and “any other crime punishable by imprisonment for three years or more.”
On 17 January 1992, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, respondent pled guilty to and was convicted of breaking and entering the dwelling house of another, Art. *71627, § 31A of the Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.), and cruelly killing an animal, Art. 27, § 59. He was sentenced to imprisonment for one year on the first count and 90 days on the second count, but the execution of those sentences was suspended, and the respondent was placed on probation for 18 months, with conditions. He was also fined $1,000, and that portion of the sentence was not suspended.
On 12 February, acting pursuant to Rule BV16, the Attorney Grievance Commission filed a petition with this Court asking that respondent be suspended. Respondent, by counsel, filed an answer suggesting that his misconduct “was an isolated aberration of character brought about by an unusual set of circumstances which created tremendous stress and depression ...” and asking that the petition be denied. Attached to the answer was an unsworn and unsigned statement of facts which we are told was prepared by respondent. Petitioner filed a rebuttal to respondent’s answer, and we heard argument from the attorneys for both parties.
The purpose of Rule BV16 is to protect the public from acts of an attorney who has been convicted of certain crimes and to maintain public confidence in the legal profession.
In discussing the purpose of disciplinary proceedings, this Court has said:
[B]ecause ‘an attorney’s character must remain beyond reproach, ’ this ‘Court has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute. Disciplinary proceedings have been established for this purpose, not for punishment, but rather as a catharsis for the profession and a prophylactic for the public.’
Bar Ass’n of Balto. City v. Siegel, 275 Md. 521, 528, 340 A.2d 710 (1975) (emphasis in original), quoting Maryland St. Bar Ass’n v. Agnew, 271 Md. 543, 549, 318 A.2d 811 *717(1974). Similarly, we said in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reamer, 281 Md. 323, 332-33, 379 A.2d 171 (1977), that
the interest of the public, the legal profession, and the judicial system itself far outweighs the convicted attorney’s interest in continuing to practice law. We think that the interim suspension provisions of BV16 are an appropriate response to society’s interest in protecting and safeguarding its legal and judicial systems____
Other courts have taken a similar view of the purposes supporting interim suspensions. See, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436, 449-50 (5th Cir.1984) (“allowing a lawyer to practice pending appeal of a criminal conviction not only affects the public’s appraisal of the legal profession, but also the interests of individual clients”); State Bar of Tex. v. Heard, 603 S.W.2d 829, 834 (Tex.1980) (“[a]n attorney who is convicted of the enumerated crimes cannot hold the confidence of the public or the profession as long as the conviction stands”); United States v. Friedland, 502 F.Supp. 611, 614-18 (D.N.J.1980), affd, 672 F.2d 905 (3d Cir.1981) (purposes of interim suspension are protection of public and preservation of integrity and reputation of the profession).
Standard 2.4 of The Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, developed by the American Bar Association Joint Committee on Professional Standards and adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, provides as follows concerning interim suspensions:
Interim suspension is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending imposition of final discipline. Interim suspension includes:
(a) suspension upon conviction of a ‘serious crime’ or,
(b) suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and serious injury to a client or the public.
The commentary to that Standard states, in part:
Interim suspension is necessary in [cases involving convictions of serious crimes] both to protect members of the *718public and to maintain public confidence in the legal profession. As explained in the commentary to Standard 6.5, it is difficult for members of the public to understand why a lawyer who has been convicted of stealing funds from a client can continue to handle client funds. Public confidence in the profession is strengthened when expedited procedures are available in such instances of lawyer misconduct.
Although the convictions in this case are not for stealing, the conviction of breaking and entering is a “serious crime” within the definition of Rule BV16 a, because it is a “a crime punishable by imprisonment for three years or more.” Prior to 1 July 1978, the test of whether a crime for which an attorney had been convicted was sufficiently serious to support an interim suspension was whether it was “a crime involving moral turpitude.” See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reamer, supra, 281 Md. at 325, 379 A.2d 171. In Reamer and in earlier cases, this Court wrestled with the sometimes elusive concept of what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, and largely because of the difficulties inherent in applying that definition the Court changed the rule to its present form, effective 1 July 1978. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Klauber, 283 Md. 597, 600, 391 A.2d 849 (1978). Accordingly, we have for the last 14 years recognized that a crime punishable by imprisonment for three years or more is sufficiently serious to justify an interim suspension.
As respondent points out, Rule BV16 authorizes an interim suspension; it does not mandate such action. This Court does, therefore, consider the relevant circumstances surrounding the conviction before deciding whether suspension is appropriate.
The crime of breaking and entering the dwelling house of another is a misdemeanor. To convict for this offense the State need not prove an intent to commit a crime within the dwelling house. The State must, however, show a general criminal intent, i.e., that the actor was *719aware that he was making an unwarranted entry. Warfield v. State, 315 Md. 474, 498, 554 A.2d 1238 (1989). The maximum penalty for the commission of this crime is imprisonment for a term of not more than three years; thus, the offense qualifies as a serious offense under Rule BV16. These factors, standing alone, may suggest that an interim suspension would be inappropriate in a variety of circumstances surrounding a conviction of this offense. The facts surrounding this conviction, however, lead to no such conclusion.
At the time of the incident in this case, respondent was a roommate of Thomas Sanders. Both men were separated from their wives. Respondent had earlier represented Sanders in his divorce action, but had withdrawn his appearance following a hearing on Mrs. Sanders’ motion to have respondent disqualified because of an alleged conflict of interest. Bar Counsel alleges:
The Respondent and Mr. Sanders broke into Mrs. Sanders’ home to take a stock certificate claimed by Mr. Sanders. Mrs. Sanders’ toilet was stopped up and her contraceptive devices were placed on the bathroom floor. A photograph of Mrs. Sanders and her daughter was turned on its side. The Respondent allegedly stole and read Mrs. Sanders’ personal letters. During the break-in, the Respondent advised his former client that he could remove marital property from Mrs. Sanders’ residence. The Respondent assisted his former client with the theft of Mrs. Sanders’ jewelry and other personal property. The Respondent took a bottle of champagne from Mrs. Sanders’ refrigerator and spilled the champagne on the floor.
Bar Counsel further advises that
[a]t a deposition of the Respondent taken in the Sanders’ divorce case in September, 1991, the Respondent testified at length regarding his dislike of Mrs. Sanders.
Respondent says that at the time of the incident he was severely depressed because of the death of a close friend, the breakup of his marriage, and a condition of high blood *720pressure. He states that he began to abuse alcohol after he separated from his wife in September, 1991, and that he had been drinking heavily before entering Mrs. Sanders’ home during the early morning hours of 14 October 1991. He characterized the unlawful entry as “more than a drunken lark” but said he intended no harm. He admitted drinking champagne he “found” in the refrigerator and said that due to sloppiness he spilled the champagne in several places, including on the kitchen floor.
When Mrs. Sanders and her children returned to their home they found their pet cat dead on the kitchen floor, either in a puddle of champagne or covered with champagne. The cause of the cat’s death was not known for several months, and became known only when respondent admitted in a statement to prosecuting authorities that he had killed the cat by placing it in a microwave oven and activating the oven. It was for this conduct that the State charged, and the respondent admitted by his plea, that the respondent “unlawfully did cruelly kill and cause to be killed one feline” in violation of Art. 27, § 59 of the Maryland Code.
Having fully considered the surrounding circumstances of the offense as established by facts not in dispute, and having considered the purposes of Rule BV16, we are persuaded that the petition of the Attorney Grievance Commission should be granted. Accordingly, we direct that Stanley E. Protokowicz, Jr. be immediately suspended from the practice of law in this State.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ELDRIDGE and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ., concur and file opinions.