¶ 49. (dissenting). This is the way I see this case:
¶ 50. Yolanda Spears wanted vengeance. Other people would have been satisfied with the beating that she and her sister and a stranger had administered to the man who had assaulted her and taken her purse. When the stranger came out of the night to pursue and tackle her assailant, she and her sister were able to catch up with the man and kick him and punch him with the same ferocity as he had punched her.1 She had retrieved her purse and taken her licks. But that wasn't enough to salve the hurt and indignity she felt she had suffered, and it wasn't enough to contain her rage. She had been wronged, a mighty unprovoked wrong, and she wanted vengeance. "That m-f-don't play like that with me," she said.2
*518¶ 51. Other people would have turned to the police and demanded that the State seek justice from the offender. But the law was too slow for Yolanda Spears. She could pass judgment herself; she could execute sentence herself. Why should she surrender to the State the righteous power she had to impose justice personally?
¶ 52. She grabbed the keys to a friend's car and sped off looking for the fleeing robber. She saw him on the sidewalk a few blocks away. He hadn't flashed any weapon when he hit her, but maybe he had a weapon after all. The automobile was her equalizer — in fact, the automobile put her in charge, gave her power, made her the boss. She drove the car onto the sidewalk and attempted to hit the man but he jumped away. She drove back onto the street, then up on the sidewalk again and chased him down the sidewalk, in hot pursuit, hitting him and knocking him into the street.
¶ 53. She drove off leaving the nameless man sprawled out in the intersection. But as she drove away, something made her stop, turn around, and go back. There was no way this punk deserved to live. She drove back several blocks to the intersection and aimed her car at the punk still laying helpless in the street. She accelerated the car and drove over his body, leaving tire tracks of vengeance on the man's back.3
¶ 54. Within a few days, Yolanda Spears was charged with first degree intentional homicide. The crime shocked her friends. She was a vigilante who took the law into her own hands and exacted a punishment grossly disproportionate to her victim's crime.
*519¶ 55. The nameless person she had killed was Phillip Young. He turned out to be a mother's son, a brother, a family member, the father of a small child. She had no justification in law for running him down and leaving him as road kill on a Milwaukee street.
¶ 56. The enormity of her troubles soon became clear. The legal system that was too slow to deal with Phillip Young started to crank up against her. The police located her almost immediately out in Omaha. Fortunately, she was given an excellent public defender who skillfully initiated the process of trying to rehabilitate her image.4 Fortuitously, she had a victim with a criminal record. If her attorney and her friends could just divert attention from the conduct and the crime of Yolanda Spears to the life and crimes of Phillip Young, perhaps she could escape serious punishment.5
¶ 57. A preliminary hearing was held on August 1. Sometime between the August 7 arraignment and the September 6 pretrial, Spears received an offer from the State. On September 13 she accepted it, entering *520an Alford plea to second degree intentional homicide. As part of the plea bargain, the State conceded that it could not prove that she did not have "adequate provocation" for the offense of first degree intentional homicide and promised to recommend only 15 years. All things considered, it was a good deal.
¶ 58. But Young's family would not cooperate. They weren't tolerant enough to understand her actions. They couldn't understand her view of the incident or why the State had reduced the charge. They worked themselves into an outrage over the demise of this no account career criminal.6 What right did they have to spout off this way? They shouldn't be permitted to mislead the judge about the type of person Phillip Young was. They shouldn't confuse the judge about how Young had assaulted her and provoked her. She was the victim. She had given up her right to trial.7 Still, Young's family was out for blood. They wanted to put her away for a long time. These people were unforgiving, vengeful. Maybe if. the judge saw this guy's whole criminal record — why, there's even an unprosecuted attempted murder arrest in there — the judge would realize there's no real loss in Young's death. Maybe the judge would realize that she actually did the community a favor.
¶ 59. This, in substance, is my interpretation of this case. A young woman committed a crime of such *521wanton depravity that it cannot be minimized through public relations and cannot be excused. Her crime was mitigated when the charge was reduced. The circuit court was thus entirely correct in its determination that the victim's criminal record was not relevant to anything at the sentencing hearing.
¶ 60. The majority tries to cut and paste random comments into a thesis that there was a real issue about Phillip Young's assault on the defendant. This revisionist history does not hold up. In addition, this case casts an ominous shadow over future sentencing hearings. The precedent set here could live on to harm future victims of crime, victims far more sympathetic and vulnerable than Phillip Young. With this decision, this court has seriously damaged the victim's rights movement in Wisconsin and undermined a constitutional amendment. Because I believe profound issues have been wrongly decided, I dissent.
I-H
¶ 61. The holding in this case is that a computer printout of a victim's entire criminal record, including multiple arrests with unknown dispositions, is relevant to the defendant's sentence when it arguably supports the defendant's view of the crime.8 The circuit court is directed to consider the victim's criminal *522record when it sentences the defendant, even though the record may be given no weight. This holding is indefensible on the facts of this case.
¶ 62. Yolanda Spears was charged with first degree intentional homicide in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.01. The charge was filed on July 18, 1995. In the criminal complaint, Necole M. Winters is reported as saying that she observed Phillip Young hit Yolanda Spears in the face twice with his fist.
¶ 63. On August 1, the State conducted a preliminary examination. Officer Christopher Kraft testified he was told that the victim of a purse snatching had been hit! He received this information from a witness before he and the witness discovered the purse snatcher's body.
¶ 64. On August 7, the State filed an information, unilaterally reducing the charge from first degree intentional homicide to second degree intentional homicide. The reduction was justified on grounds that the State could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no "adequate provocation" in the case.
¶ 65. At the plea hearing on September 13, the assistant district attorney was asked by the court whether the defendant had made any incriminating statements. She replied that the defendant recalled "being struck, I believe she told the police, in the face and that her purse was taken."
¶ 66. On November 9, the defense filed a Sentencing Memorandum with the court. This was five days before the November 14, 1995, sentencing hearing. Referenced in and attached to the Memorandum was a 14-page computer printout of Phillip Young's criminal record. The report had been obtained on August 11,1995, shortly after the defendant's arraignment. The report showed 18 arrests. Although the *523public defender's office had almost three months to edit, correct, and clarify the printout, separating the wheat from the chaff, it did not do so.
¶ 67. On November 14, at the sentencing hearing, the State took exception to the criminal record:
Ms. Heard: I.. .1 do have an objection to some — to one of the documents. I have an objection to the sentencing memorandum that was prepared by-Mark D. Natwick, the Client Services Specialist with the Public Defender's Office. I think it's inappropriate to have attached to this document what purports to be, I think, the criminal record of the victim in this case, Phillip Jerome Young. I don't believe that's relevant. . . .1 guess I'd ask that that portion be deleted or removed from the presentence. I don't — I've never heard of such a thing. I don't believe it's relevant. I certainly think it's something that if Mr. Ksicinski wishes to address in sentencing statements, he can, but I don't think it's anything that should be of record and filed in this court file with regards to this case.
THE COURT: It was filed as a part of these proceedings. I'm not going to strike it or delete it in some formal way. I will listen to what Mr. Ksicinski wants to say, but I agree that the specific prior record of the victim is not relevant at all to these proceedings.
¶ 68. Later in the hearing, the court reiterated that the victim's criminal history was not relevant, when it stated, "I agree that any prior record the victim might have had is irrelevant here, but I would like to achieve as best an understanding as I can of what caused this to happen."
¶ 69. The majority writes that "whether Young physically assaulted Spears is the only disputed ques*524tion for the purposes of this appeal." Majority op. at 499. The victim's criminal record is held to be relevant to that question.
¶ 70. But there was no real dispute about that question. The fact that two of the victim's relatives, two people who were not present at the robbery and had no first hand knowledge, offered unsworn emotional testimonials about the victim — "I cannot perceive my brother being that type of person" and "He would never hurt a woman" — did not create a real issue of fact because other relatives of the victim acknowledged his problems with the law, witnesses at the scene said there was an assault on Spears, and the State so strongly believed the assault claim that it reduced the first degree homicide charge saying it could not disprove that Spears had "adequate provocation" for the offense.
¶ 71. The circuit judge resolved the question at the sentencing hearing. He said:
There appears to be some question about the degree of provocation, but I'm satisfied that the victim in this case engaged in an assaultive offense against you and your friends. I'm satisfied that he set about, with whatever intent or particular motives he may have had, to snatch your purse, snatch more than one purse, and that this was done with some violence or at least some threat of violence.
[I]n sentencing you, I do have to try to understand what it was you did and why you did it, and whether or not a physical blow was struck. It's quite clear that you were subject to some assault, either by violence or the threat of violence, and it's on that basis - those bases that I am proceeding to decide upon a sentence that is hopefully fair to you, and *525fair to the victim's family in this case, and fair to the community. (Emphasis supplied.)
¶ 72. The judge's last comments before imposing sentence were these:
Given that your crime resulted from a situation which was not of your making, in fact a situation that did result initially from the victim's acts of aggression, and given your lack of prior record, and the lack of an indication of other violent behavior on your part, I am satisfied that a maximum sentence is not necessary or appropriate in this case. (Emphasis supplied.)
¶ 73. Forcing the circuit court to consider the victim's criminal record as probative of whether the victim assaulted the defendant is not useful here because the circuit court determined that issue in the defendant's favor. The assault against Spears had already served as mitigation for her crime.
¶ 74. Had there been a trial of Spears for first degree intentional homicide, proof of assaultive offenses by the victim would have been relevant to the issue of whether there were mitigating circumstances in the case. But in a trial for second degree intentional homicide, mitigating circumstances are not a defense. Mitigating circumstances are irrelevant to second degree intentional homicide because they have already been factored into the charge.
¶ 75. By the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant had entered her plea to second degree intentional homicide. Hence, the victim's criminal record did not make the existence of the assault on her "more probable." The mitigating circumstance of provocation had already been conceded.
*526¶76. When this court not only admits the victim's criminal record but also instructs the circuit court to consider it in sentencing the defendant, it is really declaring open season on the victim. He is dead. He cannot defend himself. What is worse, the precedent set by the court cannot logically be confined to scatter-shot criminal records.9 The rule in this case is that evidence arguably relevant to the defendant's view of the crime is admissible in a sentencing hearing. The evidence need not comply with the rules of evidence.10 Consequently, defendants are likely to cite this case as authority to admit evidence that would be suppressed under the rape shield statute11 in other circumstances. Defendants are likely to cite this case as authority to bring in other kinds of evidence to discredit the victim at a sentencing hearing so long as it supports the defendant's view of the crime.
HH H-!
¶ 77. In holding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion when it ruled the victim's *527criminal record was irrelevant, this court affirms the decision of the court of appeals.
¶ 78. The court of appeals employed its own rationale in reversing the circuit court. The court said:
Spears argues that Young's "prior criminal record was relevant to rebut his family's inaccurate portrayal of him." She contends that the sentencing court erred in ruling that Young's criminal record was irrelevant to the sentencing decision. Spears's contention is correct.
Understandably, Young's relatives spoke glowingly of his character and, at times, they vigorously urged lengthy incarceration for his killer... .Young's relatives attempted to convey their sense that substantial incarceration was warranted for reasons including what they perceived as Young's good conduct and what they believed to be Young's virtues. ... .
Spears was entitled to attempt to counter the weight of the victim impact evidence by introducing evidence showing that Young's relatives may have overstated their loss, or may have misconceived the character of their loved one.. ..
Spears.. .should have had the opportunity to recommend a lesser sentence, in part, because Young's criminal record compromised claims about his virtue.
State v. Spears, 220 Wis. 2d at 723, 726, 728.
¶ 79. While this court has chosen a different rationale, it has not disavowed the rationale used by the court of appeals. The majority writes: "Because we hold that a defendant has the right to present evidence supporting her view of the crime, we decline to address the defendant's additional [argument] that the victim's *528criminal record was relevant to rebut 'good' character evidence with evidence of the victim's 'bad' character " Majority op. at 517 n. 1. Later, in the body of the opinion, the majority opines that "As part of the [due process] guarantee that he or she be sentenced on reliable information, a defendant has the right to rebut evidence that is admitted by a sentencing court." Id. at 508.
¶ 80. At oral argument, counsel for the defendant explained that the victim's criminal record was included in the Sentencing Memorandum, filed five days before the sentencing hearing, in order to rebut letters written to the court by the victim's family and to anticipate what might be said at the hearing.
¶ 81. Inasmuch as this court has not disavowed the rationale employed by the court of appeals, we are apparently recognizing two distinct grounds on which to attack the character of a victim at a sentencing hearing. This court has even placed the right to rebuttal on a due process pedestal.
r-H hH hH
¶ 82. In Spears' motion for postconviction relief, her counsel openly raised the possibility that victims of crime should be treated differently, depending on their character:
Clearly, homicides involving totally innocent victims (or even less than innocent victims whose misdeeds are themselves an isolated incident, rather than a way of life) are far more "destructive of the public safety and happiness" than this case, involving the death of a career criminal. The point is not that Ms. Spears should escape all responsibility, merely that the blameworthiness of her act must be *529measured not only against the precipitating events, but the character of her assailant.
¶ 83. This theme was repeated over and over in the defendant's brief to this court. According to the brief, "The Victim's Prior Record is Relevant Because the Law Affords Some Victims Greater Protection than Others." App. at 17. "The death of Mr. Young was less 'destructive of the public safety and happiness' than the death of a totally innocent person. . . .At common law the use of deadly force to stop a fleeing felon was often considered legally justified. . . .Id. at 18. . . .The death of Mr. Young provides permanent protection for his likely future victims." Id. at 21.
¶ 84. These views are disturbing and inconsistent with the rule of law in a civilized society. They invite vigilantism; they rationalize intolerable behavior. It is a source of embarrassment that this court has nothing to say to repudiate these propositions.
IV.
¶ 85. In 1993, the people of Wisconsin added a victims of crime amendment to the state constitution. Article I, sec. 9m, reads as follows:
This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from the accused throughout the criminal justice process’, notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition; resti*530tution; compensation; and information about the outcome of the case and the release of the accused. The legislature shall provide remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.)
¶ 86. The amendment imposes a duty upon the State: "The state shall treat crime victims. . .with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy." It also provides, however, that neither the amendment nor legislation implementing it "shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law." The rights of victims do not trump "any right of the accused"; but in the absence of some right of the accused, the rights of victims require recognition.
¶ 87. The majority opinion fails to balance the rights of victims against the interests of criminals. Rather, it creates a blueprint for criminal defendants to attack and discredit victims — throughout the entire sentencing process — if the defendant can show the attack supports the defendant's view of the crime or rebuts favorable evidence about a victim. The opinion cannot help but discourage victims and the families of victims from participating in the sentencing process. It undermines the victims of crime amendment. What a legacy for Yolanda Spears.12
In the circuit court's decision denying defendant's postcon-viction motion for a new sentencing hearing, Judge John A. Franke wrote: "A person unrelated to the defendant's group gave chase and tackled Mr. Young, at which point Young was beaten and kicked, and the two purses were retrieved. Latoya Austin, another of the defendant's friends, indicated that she and the defendant participated in kicking [the victim] about 15 times before he left the area." Decision and Order at 2 (Jan. 28, 1997). Latoya Austin was a half-sister to the defendant, according to the Sentencing Memorandum, prepared for the circuit court by Mark D. Natwick, a client services specialist for the State Public Defender.
The defendant's statement was quoted by a named witness and reported on page 3 of the criminal complaint.
Two Milwaukee police officers, David Chavez and Christopher Kraft, are cited in the criminal complaint as observing a "tire track" or a "tire mark" across the victim's back. Kraft also testified to this at the August 1, 1995, preliminary examination.
The State Public Defender Office submitted to the circuit court an impressive 7 page Sentencing Memorandum to supplement the State's presentence investigation report. The memorandum includes Spears' educational and employment history and supportive statements from teachers, friends, and family. It also attached Phillip Young's criminal record.
The supplemental Sentencing Memorandum recommended that Yolanda Spears be "sentenced to a 5 to 8 year term of incarceration in the Wisconsin State Prison System." Sentencing Memorandum at p. 6. An attorney friend wrote asking "the Court to give Ms. Yolanda Spears probation with time at the House of Correction. If the Court is of the opinion that prison is justified, then I would request. . .that she receive the same 5 year prison sentence or less, as Mr. Young received for his ruthless robberies on March 6, 1993." Letter of Attorney Thomas L. Frenn, filed November 9,1995.
Young is described as a "career criminal" in the motion for resentencing filed by the State Public Defender.
In the Alford Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of Rights Form dated September 13,1995, Yolanda Spears signed a document which read in part: "I understand that by pleading under Alford plea I will be giving up any possible defenses, including but not limited to self-defense, intoxication, insanity, lack of intent..."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Bablitch disputes this statement. The facts are as follows: The Public Defender's Office submitted Phillip Young's entire criminal record on a computer printout. This printout was the document objected to by the State. This is also the document referred to in the majority opinion. The record also includes a copy of a robbery complaint filed against Young in 1993, but this was a document sent to the court by a citizen, Attorney Thomas L. Frenn, before the sentencing hearing. It is not the basis for the rule in this case.
The majority opinion stresses the fact that Young "was convicted of burglary on at least three occasions." Majority op. at 509-10. But the opinion does not reveal whether Young unlawfully entered garages or whether he was a notorious cat burglar in Shorewood. When Young's criminal record was offered, the sentencing judge was encouraged to infer the worst. The majority opinion admits that Young was "not prosecuted in the case involving attempted first degree murder." But it does not explain why Young was not prosecuted or whether he was exonerated. The majority cannot flesh out the details of Young's arrests and crimes because the details are not in the record. They can only ignore the prejudice in this exercise.
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 911.01(4)(c).
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2).
Circuit Judge John A. Franke performed admirably in a volatile situation. The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Abra-hamson reflects my views on how sensitively and intelligently he did his duty.