(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant intended an injury. I would hold that plaintiff’s allegations constitute an intentional tort as a matter of law, falling under the exception to the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1). The injury under the tort is the apprehension of an immediate battery. This injury satisfies the requirements of the act. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for trial. Genuine issues of material fact exist concerning defendant’s intent at the time he allegedly swerved his pickup truck.
The intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provision states:
*746The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee’s exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease. The only exception to this exclusive remedy is an intentional tort. An intentional tort shall exist only when an employee is injured as a result of a deliberate act of the employer and the employer specifically intended an injury. An employer shall be deemed to have intended to injure if the employer had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge. The issue of whether an act was an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court. This subsection shall not enlarge or reduce rights under law. [MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1) (emphasis added).]
In Travis v Dreis & Krump Mfg Co,1 this Court held that the statutory phrase “specifically intended an injury” means that “the employer must have had in mind a purpose to bring about given consequences.” Id. at 171. “[I]n other words, [the employer] must have had the particular purpose of inflicting an injury upon his employee.” Id. at 172.
Both the defendant and the majority agree that an assault is a true intentional tort, satisfying the intentional tort exception. For purposes of this review, we take as true plaintiff’s allegations that the defendant drove “deliberately” in an erratic manner for the purpose of scaring the plaintiff. Ghrist v Chrysler Corp, 451 Mich 242; 547 NW2d 272 (1996). However, the majority holds that the defendant’s alleged conduct rises only to the level of gross negligence or recklessness, not to the level of an intentional tort.
Plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally swerved the truck as he drove it to scare the plaintiff *747and to watch him “roll around” in the back. If so, the defendant did in fact intend to commit an injury. That injury is the tort of assault.
Liability for assault attaches if the actor intends to commit a battery or the actor intends to put the victim in fear or apprehension of an immediate battery. Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich 396; 295 NW 201 (1940). Under 1 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 21, p 37, the protected interest under the tort of assault is freedom from the apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact. This interest alone is protected, even if there is no contact with the plaintiff’s person. The law affords protection against purely emotional disturbances; it is not necessary that the plaintiff be put in fear. Id?
According to plaintiff’s allegations in this case, the defendant had driven erratically on earlier occasions for the purpose of watching plaintiff “roll around in the back of the truck.” Plaintiff had told defendant that he “didn’t like being thrown around in the back of the truck.” On the day in question, plaintiff was thrown from the back of the truck after the defendant made “[a] sudden jerk.” The defendant’s attorney admitted during the hearing on the motion for summary disposition that it would “be foolish to argue that this was not a deliberate act by Mr. Morley.”
I submit that plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to show, at least, that he had been assaulted.2 3 Defendant may have been only behaving playfully, not intending *748to cause physical injury.4 However, his alleged erratic driving with the intent to watch the plaintiff “roll around” in a moving truck bed constitutes the intentional tort of assault.5 The jury could infer from the evidence presented that the defendant’s sole purpose was to cause plaintiff fear.6 According to plaintiff, defendant had laughed at him in the past when he lost his balance because of the swerving. Defendant thought it was funny, “like it was a game.” The defendant’s prior alleged actions could certainly shed light on his intent when he allegedly swerved the truck. See MRE 404(b)(1).
To summarize the analysis, for an intentional tort to exist, the worker’s disability statute requires a finding that the defendant employer intended to commit or inflict an injury. The injury protected under the tort of assault is the apprehension of an immediate battery. Assuming plaintiff’s allegations to be factual, the defendant drove the truck in a manner to cause the plaintiff apprehension of an immediate battery (assault). Accordingly, the plaintiff suffered an injury *749in the form of the apprehension inflicted by the defendant.
The statute states that the “issue of whether an act was an intentional tort shall be a question of law for the court.” MCL 418.131(1); MSA 17.237(131)(1). The plaintiff’s allegations, as a matter of law, are sufficient to show a prima facie case of the intentional tort of assault. However, there are material issues of fact regarding the defendant’s intent. The defendant asserts that he did not make erratic maneuvers. If this is true, then the defendant could not have formed the requisite intent to be liable for an intentional tort. Resolution of this credibility dispute should be made only by the trier of fact. McFadden v Tate, 350 Mich 84; 85 NW2d 181 (1957).
Accordingly, I would hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that “[t]here was simply no evidence that defendant specifically intended to injure plaintiff or that defendant had ‘actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur and willfully disregarded that knowledge.’ ” Consequently, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Cavanagh, J., concurred with Kelly, J.453 Mich 149; 551 NW2d 132 (1996).
“There is ‘a touching of the mind, if not of the body.’ ” Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 10, p 43.
Plaintiff may well have a case for battery. Under the transferred intent doctrine, an actor is liable for battery if a contact results from the intentional tort of assault. Prosser & Keeton, n 2 supra, § 8, p 38.
Even so, liability for an intentional tort may still attach.
The intent with which tort liability is concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids. The defendant may be liable although intending nothing more than a good-natured practical joke, or honestly believing that the act would not injure the plaintiff, or even though seeking the plaintiff’s own good. [Prosser & Keeton, n 2 supra, § 8, pp 36-37.]
“[T]he intent need not necessarily be to inflict physical injury, and it is enough that there is an intent to arouse apprehension.” Prosser & Keeton, n 2 supra, § 10, p 46.
The tort of assault would be completed when the plaintiff experienced the apprehension of being thrown onto the truck bed or the road itself.