dissenting:
I agree with the majority that this Court’s en banc decision in Bujanowski 418 Pa.Super. 163, 613 A.2d 1227 (1992), alloc. den., 533 Pa. 642, 622 A.2d 1374 (1993), controls the present case. The trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce Bain’s prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence of Appellant’s guilt. I do not agree, however, that this error was harmless.
In Commonwealth v. Story, 476 Pa. 391, 383 A.2d 155 (1978), our Supreme Court announced that an error can be harmless only if the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error is harmless. Id. at 405, 383 A.2d at 162. Furthermore, if there is a reasonable probability that an error “might have contributed to the conviction,” the error is not harmless. Id. at 409, 383 A.2d at 164 (citation omitted).
In this case, I am not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Bain’s prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence did not influence the jury’s guilty verdict. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, the Commonwealth did not present overwhelming evidence linking Appellant to the murder of Chinn. The cruxes of the Commonwealth’s case implicating Appellant were the prior inconsistent statements of Witherspoon and Bain, which were both recanted at the preliminary hearing. The “additional” evidence presented by the Commonwealth which the majority cites as corroborative of Witherspoon’s prior inconsistent statement included the following evidence: (1) the pellets which were recovered from *244the victim’s body matched the twelve-gauge shotgun, (2) the victim died as a result of a wound from a gun fired at close range, (3) Officer John Ross found the victim lying next to a bench, and (4) Witherspoon could have observed the playground where the shooting occurred. Although this evidence is corroborative of portions of Witherspoon’s prior inconsistent statement to police, it does not identify Appellant as the man who fired the gun. The “additional” evidence introduced by the Commonwealth does not single out Appellant as the murderer. The majority overlooks the fact that “Hawk” and Jones came with Appellant to Witherspoon’s house on the night of the murder to retrieve the gun. According to the Commonwealth’s additional evidence, any one of the three men who arrived at Witherspoon’s house could have been the perpetrator. The Commonwealth did not present any additional evidence besides Witherspoon’s prior inconsistent statement and Bain’s improperly admitted statement which identified Appellant as the man who aimed and pulled the trigger. For this reason I cannot conclude that Bain’s improperly admitted statement did not contribute to Appellant’s guilty verdict.
The majority concludes that Bain’s improperly admitted prior inconsistent statement was merely cumulative of Witherspoon’s statement. In Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 472 Pa. 435, 372 A.2d 771 (1977), Justice Roberts, writing for a plurality of our Supreme Court, explained a cumulative evidence test first propounded by Professor Field. Id. at 448-451, 372 A.2d at 777-78; see Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error — A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 15 (1976). In order for evidence to be considered cumulative and its admission therefore harmless error, the following three requirements must be met: (1) There should be substantial similarity in type of evidence and incriminating factual details between the tainted evidence and the untainted evidence of which it is cumulative. (2) The untainted evidence should be indisputable, either because the facts are in some way affirmatively accepted by the defendant or for other reasons. (3) The untainted evidence is not derived from the tainted evidence. Rodgers, at 448-451, 372 A.2d at 777-78. *245Moreover, “the cumulative evidence test “would limit harmlessness to situations in which the unconstitutionally admitted evidence in retrospect was wholly unnecessary.’ ” Id. at 451, 372 A.2d at 778 (citation omitted).
In the present case, I agree with the majority that there is substantial similarity between Witherspoon’s statement to police and Bain’s improperly admitted prior inconsistent statement. I also agree that the third test is met — Witherspoon’s statement was not derived from Bain’s statement to police. However, I do not find that Witherspoon’s statement was “indisputable.” When Witherspoon gave his statement to police which implicated Appellant he was already in police custody and may have been seeking lenient treatment for his cooperation with police. At trial Witherspoon recanted the story he originally told police. Furthermore, the Commonwealth did not present any additional evidence which corroborated Witherspoon’s identification of Appellant as the man who shot Chinn.
For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Bain’s improperly admitted statement was “wholly unnecessary” and harmless error to admit.