concurring and dissenting.
While I agree with my esteemed colleagues that the the trial court erred by awarding Appellee an additional buccal *558swab paternity test without proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the initial test was defective, I must dissent from the Majority’s interpretation of DeAngelo v. Murray, 536 Pa. 206, 638 A.2d 966 (1994).
The Majority states that the Supreme Court did not consider the Fourth Amendment interest in reaching its decision in DeAngelo. DeAngelo cites Koleski v. Park, 363 Pa.Super. 22, 525 A.2d 405 (1987), which stated:
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States expressly provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ...” Compulsory administration of a blood test falls within the scope of the Amendment. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). The Fourth Amendment’s “proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions [into the body for blood] as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances.” Id., at 768, 86 S.Ct. at 1834. (Footnote omitted).
Koleski, 363 Pa.Super. at 29, 525 A.2d at 408.
Furthermore, we held in Koleski that “constitutional rights implicated in the extraction of blood samples and resolution of questions of paternity require that the moving party show by a preponderance of the evidence that the results of the first tests were inaccurate before a second blood extraction can be ordered.” Id., 525 A.2d at 406. We concluded that requiring a hearing for a determination on the inaccuracy of the first blood test prior to an order for a second blood test extraction protects the parties’ Fourth Amendment rights and limits the potential for harassment. Koleski. This ruling was not premised on the intrusiveness of the procedure, but on the constitutional protection to be secure in one’s person.
Since DeAngelo relied on Koleski, our Supreme Court applied Fourth Amendment protections in setting the standard for when additional paternity tests can be ordered. The court required a showing of defective testing before subjecting *559someone to another test. Given that standard, I conclude that additional swab samples are constitutionally prohibited and cannot be compelled absent a showing the initial test was inaccurate. Therefore, I concur in the result.