concurring.
Although the majority issues an insightful resolution of the issues raised in the appeal brought at No. 2605 Philadelphia, 1994,1 am somewhat perplexed with the majority’s characterization of appellant Tinari’s petition to rescind his expulsion as a complaint in equity.
Appellant Tinari filed before the Orphans’ Court of Montgomery County a pleading entitled “PETITION OF NICHOLAS TINARI, JANET CUSACK, AND DOLORES LOMBARDI FOR AN ORDER DIRECTING THE TRUSTEES OF THE BARNES FOUNDATION TO RESCIND THE EXPULSION OF NICHOLAS TINARI, TRUSTEE AD LI-TEM.” In the petition, appellant requests “that the Court enter an order directing that the trustees of The Barnes Foundation rescind the notice of January 19, 1992 and permit Nicholas Tinari to continue his studies and his visits to the Gallery and Arboretum.” The majority states that “[a] fair reading of the petition ... leads equally to the conclusion that it is addressed to the extensive equity powers of Orphans’ Court.” Slip Opinion at 5. However, a “fair reading” of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923), and Strank v. Mercy Hospital of Johnstown, 376 Pa. 305, 102 A.2d 170 (1954) (Strank I), would clearly indicate that Tinari’s petition sounds in mandamus, not equity.1 Therein lies the jurisdictional dilemma.
*383The facts in Barker are strikingly similar to those in the instant case. In Barker, plaintiff filed a mandamus action to compel Bryn Mawr College, a private institution, to reinstate Margery Barker as a student. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court that “on the facts showing the character of Bryn Mawr College, as an institution privately conducted which receives no state aid, ‘the relation between the student and the college is solely contractual in character, [and] the court of common pleas does not have jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to compel [appellant’s] reinstatement[.]’” Id. at 122, 122 A. at 221.
.The petition’s resemblance to a mandamus action grows even more apparent when contrasting the Supreme Court’s holding in Strank v. Mercy Hospital of Johnstown, 376 Pa. 305, 102 A.2d 170 (1954) (Strank I), with Strank v. Mercy Hospital of Johnstown, 383 Pa. 54, 117 A.2d 697 (1955) (Strank II). In Strank I, a private nursing school expelled the nursing student/appellant for an infraction of the rules. The nursing student brought an action in mandamus before the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County. In her complaint, the nursing student sought to obtain a judgment against the school and the hospital commanding them to give to her transfer credits for the two years’ work she had completed. With these credits, appellant nursing student could secure advanced standing in some other nursing school.
The nursing student’s petition and defendants’ answer thereto admitted that The Mercy Hospital of Johnstown was a non-profit corporation operating a school for the education and training of nurses. The sole question before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the cause of action sued upon and sought to be enforced by mandamus was within the general class of controversies committed to the jurisdiction of the lower court. The Supreme Court, referring to its prior holding in Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923), held that the nursing student sought to enforce a right arising out of contract, not one imposed by law, against a private institution. In accordance with its holding in Barker, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower court was with*384out jurisdiction to hear the action. See id. (court of common pleas lacks jurisdiction to issue writ of mandamus against a non-profit corporation which receives no state aid in order to enforce a contract).
Thereafter, the nursing student initiated the cause of action commonly referred to as Strank II. To overcome the jurisdictional problem, the nursing student reformulated her petition for mandamus into a complaint in equity. Rather than merely demanding that the school transfer her credits, the nursing student (1) set forth her oral arrangements made with the school at the time of her admission; (2) alleged that the arrangements and understandings underlying her agreements imposed upon the school the legal duty to give her proper credits for work completed; and (3) averred that the school’s failure to issue her credit caused her to lose time (the two years of schooling), a damage for which no adequate remedy at law exists. The school again filed preliminary objections. This time, the lower court dismissed the objections and ordered the school to file an answer. The school appealed.
The Supreme Court, after reviewing the averments set forth in the nurse’s complaint, concluded that the new action sounded in equity, not in mandamus. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the lower court had jurisdiction over the controversy. In doing so, the Supreme Court noted that the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction to enforce obligations, whether arising under express contracts, written or oral, or implied contracts, including those in which a duty may have resulted from long recognized and established customs and usages. The Supreme Court further recognized that it is the peculiar province of equity to afford relief where the measurement of damages cannot be ascertained. Strank II. Thus, jurisdiction is vested where the action properly invokes the equity powers of the lower court.
In the instant case, appellant Tinari seeks relief in the nature of mandamus through an inartfully drafted petition requesting the trial court to compel The Barnes Foundation to rescind his expulsion. The majority points out the inadequacies of the petition and reaches the conclusion that the peti*385tion, therefore, must be a complaint in equity. However, a complaint does not automatically sound in equity merely because it is poorly drafted. A careful reading of Tinari’s petition reveals striking similarities to the mandamus petitions filed in Barker and Strank I, and no resemblance at all to the equity complaint filed in Strank II.
Tinari’s petition avers that he was not expelled for violations of the rules of conduct, but for his efforts to document violations of the trust indenture. See Petition at ¶ 5. Unlike the complaint in Strank II, Tinari does not set forth obligations arising out of contract, either express or implied, nor does he aver that a recovery in damages would provide an inadequate remedy. I am compelled to disagree with the majority’s contention that an inadequate mandamus petition inescapably results in a complaint in equity.
The majority also notes that “numerous courts have assumed jurisdiction over claims similar to that presented by appellant herein.” Slip Opinion at 6 n. 11. In addition to Strank II, discussed supra, the majority cites Psi Upsilon v. U. of Pa., 404 Pa.Super. 604, 591 A.2d 755 (1991); Boehm v. U. of Pa. School of Veterinary Medicine, 392 Pa.Super. 502, 573 A.2d 575 (1990); and Schulman v. Franklin and Marshall College, 371 Pa.Super. 345, 538 A.2d 49 (1988) in support of its position. This court’s holdings in Psi Upsilon, Boehm and Schulman addressed the merits of specific requests for preliminary injunctions, not generalized complaints in equity. It appears that the majority additionally seeks to characterize Tinari’s petition as closely resembling a request for a preliminary injunction.2 However, I find this analysis is even more strained than a comparison of Tinari’s petition to the complaint in Strank II. Tinari does not aver even one of the prerequisites to an action seeking a preliminary injunction.
*386Although the petition is not captioned as an action in mandamus, the nature of the action became apparent to the lower court during a hearing conducted on May 11,1993. The Orphans’ Court opined:
Succinctly put, it became quite obvious at the time of [the] hearing on May 11, 1993, that the court had become embroiled in a matter in which it had no business. See Barker, appellant, v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121 [122 A. 220] (1923) [mandamus action].
Trial Court Opinion at page 2. Rather than straining to find a tenuous resemblance to an action in equity, I would affirm the lower court’s determination that Tinari’s petition seeks relief in mandamus.
Accordingly, I concur with the majority’s result, but would affirm the Orphans’ Court’s determination that it was without jurisdiction to rule in a mandamus action.
. An action in mandamus lies "to compel official performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a lack of any other adequate and appropriate remedy at law.” Delaware River Port Authority v. Thornburgh, 508 Pa. 11, 20, 493 A.2d 1351, 1355 (1985). A mandamus action is proper to compel the performance of legal duties, even where the existence and scope of the duties must be defined and found in the course of the mandamus action itself. Id.
. A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy available only where the party seeking it establishes that: 1) it is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm not compensable in damages, 2) greater harm would result from denying it than from granting it, 3) the right to it is clear and 4) the status quo would be restored if it were to be granted. John G. Bryant Co., Inc. v. Sling Testing & Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 7, 369 A.2d 1164, 1167 (1977).