concurring.
I concur in the majority’s holding but I write separately to emphasize that the majority’s holding today does not change the law of defamation with regard to an allegation of racism. The rule continues to be that a mere allegation of racism without more is, as a matter of law, not actionable in defamation. See McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 511, 72 A.2d 780, 783 (1950); Rybas v. Wapner, 311 Pa.Super. 50, 55, 457 A.2d 108, 110 (1983). See also Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record Co., 126 F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1942); Raible v. Newsweek, Inc., 341 F.Supp. 804, 807 (W.D.Pa.1972) and Stevens v. Tillman, 855 F.2d 394 (7th Cir.1988) (construing Illinois law). To the extent that the majority’s dicta appearing on page 126-27 of the Opinion suggests otherwise, I expressly disassociate myself therefrom. Furthermore, I note that as dicta, it is nonprecedential. Hunsberger v. Bender, 407 Pa. 185, 180 A.2d 4 (1962); In re Estate of Cassell, 334 Pa. 381, 6 A.2d 60 (1939)
Today, the majority merely decides that this Court can not conclude that the statement published by Appellees was, as a matter of law, incapable of a defamatory meaning. In other words, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the statement published by the Appellees amounted to a mere allegation of racism which would not be actionable. This decision is consonant with the standard of review at this juncture in the case. Appellees made preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer which the trial court granted. The standard of review for .preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer is limited; “the question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it.” AM/PM Franchise v. Atlantic Rich-field, 526 Pa. 110, 121, 584 A.2d 915, 921 (1990) (citations omitted). Because, at this stage of the proceedings, it cannot be said with certainty that the statement published by the Appellees amounted to a mere allegation of racism, the preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer should have been *129overruled. Indeed, because there is doubt as to the statement’s precise import, and as to whether reasonable minds could understand the statement to constitute a charge of abuse of public office, i.e., that the District Attorney was persecuting Lincoln in order to curry favor with the voters by playing to the voters’ supposed prejudice so as to advance his own political career, the demurrer should have been denied. Accordingly, I concur with the majority.1
. Additionally, I would note that the Court’s holding today does not preclude the factfinder from ultimately concluding that as a matter of fact, the statement amounted to a mere allegation of racism, and therefore Appellant would not be entitled to recovery. Again, this is so because we are reviewing preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer and as such, we are addressing a question of law, not of fact.