dissenting.
Because I do not believe that the employer in the instant matter met its burden of proving job availability, I dissent.
The majority correctly states that Appellant satisfied his burden of proving that the reasons for the suspension of his benefits no longer existed, thereby shifting the burden to the employer to prove job availability. In order for a position to be actually available, the employee must be able to perform it “having regard to his physical restrictions and limitations, his age, his intellectual capacity, his education, his previous work experience, and other relevant considerations, such as his place of residence.” Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vepco Constr. Co.), 516 Pa. 240, 251, 532 A.2d 374, 379 (1987) (quoting Kachinski v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Vepco Constr. Co.), 91 Pa.Commw. 543, 546, 498 A.2d 36, 38-39 (1985)). Clearly then, this Court allows consideration of several factors other than the work-related injury in determining whether a position is actually available to an injured employee.
The majority cites Sheehan v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Supermarkets General), 143 Pa.Commw. 624, 600 A.2d 633 (1991), appeal denied, 530 Pa. 663, 609 A.2d 170 (1992), in support of its position. However, I do not agree with the majority’s reading of that case. In Sheehan, the Commonwealth Court held that the physical restrictions and limitations to consider when determining if a job is available
are those resulting from the work-related injury or those existing, or flowing from conditions already existing, prior to the injury. Physical limitations taken into consideration to determine job availability cannot be construed to include those physical limitations resulting from a non-work-related injury with no casual [sic] connection to the prior work-*159related injury nor which are related to physical limitations existing prior to the injury.
Id. at 632, 600 A.2d at 637 (emphasis added). According to the majority, Sheehan stands for the proposition that physical limitations which existed prior to a work injury are not to be considered in determining job availability. Op. at 1358. However, Sheehan clearly states that conditions which existed prior to the injury can be considered. The language addressing physical limitations which are non-work-related is ambiguous and could lead to the conclusion that prior existing conditions are not a factor when considering job availability; however, I do not believe such an interpretation is valid in light of the preceding quoted language and the facts of Sheehan. There, the employee suffered a back injury during the course of his employment and began receiving workers’ compensation benefits. Sheehan, 143 Pa.Commw. 624, 627, 600 A.2d 633, 635. While recovering from his work injury, the employee suffered a non-work-related heart attack. Id. The employer filed a Petition for Suspension of Benefits, claiming that the employee had partially recovered from his work injury and could return to his pre-injury position with certain modifications made due to his back injury. Id. No consideration was given to restrictions which may have been related to the employee’s heart attack. Id.
In holding that the residual effects of the employee’s heart attack were irrelevant in determining work availability, the Commonwealth Court sought to prevent the employer from having to “compensate an employee for injuries occurring away from the job during the period that the employee is recovering from his or her work-related injury.” Id. at 632, 600 A.2d at 637 (emphasis added). This language does not contemplate a pre-existing condition, nor was the Commonwealth Court reviewing the effect of a pre-existing condition on the employee’s ability to return to work or an alternative position referred by the employer.
The majority and the lower tribunals also cite several other cases in support of the position that a pre-existing medical *160condition is not a factor to be considered in determining job availability. However, these cases are distinguishable from the instant case. The Board relied upon Farquhar v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Corning Glass Works), 515 Pa. 315, 528 A.2d 580 (1987); Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 498 Pa. 263, 445 A.2d 1212 (1982); and Lash v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 491 Pa. 294, 420 A.2d 1325 (1980), for the proposition that when an employer asserts that an employee can return to his or her pre-injury position but the employee is unable to because of the risk of further harm as shown by medical evidence, the employer’s burden is met if the risk of harm is unrelated to the work-related injury. In the instant case, the employer is not asserting that Appellant is capable of returning to his preinjury position. If Appellant were able to return to that job, he would not be entitled to compensation for lost wages. However, because he remains disabled from performing his pre-injury position, he is entitled to compensation for lost wages unless his employer finds him a position as required by Kachinski. Moreover, as these cases all precede this Court’s opinion in Kachinski, they are of little help in determining what factors can be considered in determining job availability.
The Commonwealth Court relied on its prior decision in Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Seybert), 154 Pa.Commw. 408, 623 A.2d 955, appeal denied, 535 Pa. 640, 631 A.2d 1011 (1993), in affirming the Board. Like the cases cited by the Board, Carpentertown Coal addressed the issue of whether an employee was able to return to his pre-injury position based on his alleged recovery from his work-related heart attack. The issue of what constitutes job availability was not addressed, therefore, Carpenter-town Coal is not controlling. The majority also cites USX Corp. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Hems), 167 Pa.Commw. 19, 647 A.2d 605 (1994). Like the other cited cases, USX Corp. does not reach the issue of whether an employer’s burden of proving job availability has been met, rather, it addresses the question of whether an employee *161remains unable to return to his pre-injury position because of his work-related injury.
As this Court stated in Pawlosky v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd., 514 Pa. 450, 525 A.2d 1204 (1987), “[i]t may now be said, generally, that an employer takes an employee as he comes.” Id. at 458-59, 525 A.2d at 1209 (emphasis added). Instantly, Appellant suffers from pulmonary emphysema. Because this is “as he comes,” this condition should be a factor in determining if a position is available to Appellant, provided the condition existed prior to Appellant’s work injury.
A medical condition which predates a work-related injury should be no less important in determining job availability than the employee’s previous experience, intelligence, education or the distance from his or her home to the referred position. These are factors which the employer must consider as being inherent in the employee when making a referral. A pre-existing medical condition which would preclude an employee from being physically able to perform a job without risk to his or her health should be given the same consideration.
This is consistent with this Court’s holding in Kachinski that “the viability of [the workers’ compensation] system depends on the good faith of the participants. The referrals by the employer must be tailored to the claimant’s abilities and be made in a good faith attempt to return the injured employee to productive employment.... ” Kachinski, 516 Pa. 240, 252, 532 A.2d 374, 380 (citation omitted). A position can not be said to be tailored to an employee’s abilities if that employee has a physical condition which precludes him or her from performing that position.
Allowing consideration of a pre-existing condition in determining job availability does not contravene the language of the Act where the employee is unable to return to his or her preinjury position because there has not yet been a full recovery from the work injury. Section 413(a) of the Act allows for the *162resumption of benefits when partial disability is payable unless a loss of earnings is not the result of the work-related injury. Where the employee is not able to return to his or her preinjury position because of the work injury and a position is not available which the employee is capable of performing, the loss of earnings is due to the work injury. Such is the case presently before us. Appellant has not recovered from his work injury and remains unable to return to his pre-injury position without restriction. Therefore, until a position is made available to him which is tailored to his abilities, his loss of earnings does result from his work injury. Moreover, “the ... Act is remedial in nature and intended to benefit the worker, and therefore, the Act must be liberally construed to effectuate its humanitarian objectives.” Peterson v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Bd. (PRN Nursing Agency), 528 Pa. 279, 287, 597 A.2d 1116, 1120 (1991). Requiring consideration of a medical condition which predates a work injury in determining job availability serves this purpose.
Because I would hold that when an employer is making job referrals pursuant to Kachinski it is required to consider physical conditions which predate a work-related injury, I would remand this matter for a workers’ compensation judge to determine whether Appellant contracted pulmonary emphysema before or after the occurrence of his work-related injury. Therefore, I dissent.
CAPPY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.