concurring.
I concur in the Court’s disposition of this appeal to the extent that it holds that summary judgment was improperly granted and remands the matter to the Law Division. I write separately to advance a different basis for the police officer’s immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3, one that I believe better comports with the plain language of the Act.
I
The Court relies on N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) to hold immune from civil liability a law-enforcement officer who strikes and injures a third party in the course of pursuit. That provision of the Act states that “[njeither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for * * * any injury 'caused by * * * an escaping or escaped person.” Read literally, N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) provides a limited source of immunity to law-enforcement officers confined to those instances in which the injury is caused primarily by the escaping party, such as when a pursued automobile strikes and injures a third party. Although the immunity provided by N.J.S.A 59:5-2b(2) is narrow, that provision represents a deliberate judgment on the part of the Legislature. Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 388, 627 A.2d 1090 (1993) (“The Legislature’s use of the phrase ‘caused by * * * an escaping or escaped person’ in section 5-2b * * * represents a considered choice.”) (Clifford, J., concurring). Nevertheless, if N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) were the only source of legislative immunity available to the pursuing officer, I would agree that the compelling legislative policy identified by the Court supports an expansive reading of that provision. However, the Legislature has provided a separate source of statutory immunity to the officer in N.J.S.A. 59:3-3.
N.J.S.A 59:3-3 states that “[a] public employee is not liable if he acts in good faith in the execution or enforcement of any law.” This Court has acknowledged the relevance of N.J.S.A 59:3-3 in the context of police pursuits. In Tice v. Cramer, supra, 133 N.J. *136347, 627 A.2d 1090, the Court considered whether the Act affords a police officer immunity when a car the officer had been pursuing had collided with another vehicle. Although relying on N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) to hold that the officer was immune, the Court questioned the conclusion of the Appellate Division in Fielder v. Jenkins, 263 N.J.Super. 231, 622 A.2d 906 (1993), that “section 3-3 (good faith immunity in enforcing the law) does not apply to a high speed chase.” Tice, supra, 133 N.J. at 371, 627 A.2d 1090. Justice O’Hern, concurring in Tice, indicated his preference “that the dismissal be ujoheld on the basis of the immunity afforded under N.J.S.A. 59:3-3,” and expressed his belief “that a holding under section 3-3 would be more consistent with the internal structure and language of the Act.” Tice, supra, 133 N.J. at 382, 627 A.2d 1090.
Our Court’s recognition that N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 can serve as the source of immunity from liability arising from police pursuits is supported by the finding that the immunity accorded by that provision has potentially broad factual application. Courts have considered the application of N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 in various contexts, including the decision by officers to restrain an arrestee with leg shackles, Lear v. Township of Piscataway, 236 N.J.Super. 550, 554, 566 A.2d 557 (App.Div.1989), the execution by officers of a lawfully issued warrant, Gurski v. New Jersey State Police Dep’t, 242 N.J.Super. 148, 162, 576 A.2d 292 (App.Div.1990), the use of certain procedures by officers to confirm the identity of an alleged suspect, Evans v. Elizabeth Police Dep’t, 236 N.J.Super. 115, 116, 564 A.2d 462 (App.Div.1983), and the jDursuit by officers of a car in an attempt to execute an arrest warrant on the driver. Wood v. City of Linden, 218 N.J.Super. 11, 17, 526 A.2d 1093 (App.Div.1987).
That the plain language of N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, as well as the judicial construction of that jorovision, provides immunity to those officers who injure others in the course of a pursuit conducted in good faith is clear’. Rather than extend the apjDlication of N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) to encompass those situations not within the plain and *137clear purview of the statutory language, I would apply the immunity accorded by N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 that the Legislature specifically has provided to police officers acting in “good faith” in the enforcement of any law.
II
Despite concluding that N.J.S.A. 59:3-3 “applies generally to the tortious conduct of public employees, specifically police officers, engaged in the enforcement of the law, and * * * in the context of police pursuits,” ante at 133-34, 661 A.2d at 247, the Court elects not to rest its judgment on that provision. The Court does “acknowledge room for debate on this issue based on the language of the Act.” Ante at 122-23, 661 A.2d at 241. Instead, the Court chooses to expand the scope of N.J.S.A 59:5 — 2b(2) to provide a source of tort immunity, not only when an “escaping or escaped person” actually causes the injury, but also when an officer strikes the third party. That decision is premised on the belief that determining immunity by evaluating whether the officers acted in “good faith” will impair the legislative purpose of encouraging law-enforcement officers to pursue fleeing persons. By relying on its expansive interpretation of N.J.S.A. 59:5 — 2b(2), the Court’s ruling imposes liability only when the officer’s actions constitute “willful misconduct.” See N.J.S.A 59:3-14a.
The immunity provided to officers acting in “good faith” pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:3-3, and the Legislature’s refusal to grant the officer immunity in those cases in which the officer acts with “willful misconduct,” see N.J.S.A. 59:3-14a, are not necessarily two sides of the same coin. See Marley v. Borough of Palmyra, 193 N.J.Super. 271, 293-95, 473 A.2d 554 (Law Div.1983). Although the distinction is subtle, an action lacking “good faith” does not necessarily constitute “willful misconduct.” However, the distinction between a lack of “good faith” and the presence of “willful misconduct” is a narrow one.
“Good faith” is defined as “honesty of purpose and integrity of conduct without knowledge, either actual or sufficient to demand *138inquiry, that the conduct is wrong. * * * Reckless action may deny good faith.” Id. at 294, 473 A.2d 554. The presence of negligence does not necessarily prevent a finding of “good faith.” In fact, N.J.S.A 59:3-3 “provides immunity to public employees engaged in law enforcement notwithstanding their negligence, so long as they act in ‘good faith.’ ” Marley, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 295, 473 A.2d 554. Therefore, to avoid the immunity afforded to the “good faith” actions of the public employee, the complaint must allege a cause of action based on conduct more culpable than simple negligence. Delbridge v. Schaeffer, 238 N.J.Super. 323, 345, 569 A.2d 872 (Law Div.1989). The standard for evaluating reasonableness under 42 U.S.C.A § 1983, which consists of both objective and subjective aspects of good-faith immunity, “also applies ‘in determining questions of good faith arising under * * * N.J.S.A. 59:3-3.’ ” Gurski, supra, 242 N.J.Super. at 162, 576 A.2d 292 (quoting Lear, supra, 236 N.J.Super. at 553; 566 A.2d 557). New Jersey decisional law “allows immunity under section 3-3 if the public employee can show either objective or subjective good faith.” Bombace v. City of Newark, 125 N.J. 361, 374, 593 A.2d 335 (1991).
Although “willful misconduct” is something more than the absence of “good faith,” Marley, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 295, 473 A.2d 554, “no simple formula [exists that] will describe with exactness the difference” between the two. McLaughlin v. Rova Farms, Inc., 56 N.J. 288, 305, 266 A.2d 284 (1970). We have stated that a person acts with “willful misconduct” when that person, “with knowledge of existing conditions, and conscious from such knowledge that injury will likely or probably result from his conduct, and with reckless indifference to the consequences, consciously and intentionally does some wrongful act or omits to discharge some duty [that] produces the injurious result.” Ibid; Mahoney v. Carus Chem. Co., 102 N.J. 564, 574, 510 A.2d 4 (1986).
Because “good faith” and “willful misconduct” are not equivalent standards, see Marley, supra, 193 N.J.Super. at 295, 473 A.2d 554, the Court expresses concern that the application of N.J.S.A. 59:3-*1393 “would subject an officer’s conduct to a more searching scrutiny.” Ante at 133-34, 661 A.2d at 247. If that were so, the result would follow from a legislative choice. However, I agree with the view expressed by Justice O’Hern that “[i]n fact, the immunities the two sections confer will likely converge when the contents of the ‘willful misconduct’ and ‘good faith’ exceptions to each immunity .are filled out.” Tice, supra, 133 N.J. at 382, 627 A.2d 1090 (O’Hern, J., concurring).. Because the question of the subjective “good faith” of. the officer “must be sensitively treated in light of all the attendant facts and circumstances [that] give color and meaning to otherwise neutral conduct,” summary judgment often will be inappropriate. Evans, supra, 236 N.J.Super. at 117, 564 A.2d 462. Determinations of subjective intent, motivation, and knowledge on the part of the officer would normally require sworn testimony. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737, 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 409 (1982) (“[A]n official’s subjective good faith has been considered to be a question of fact that some courts have regarded as inherently requiring resolution by a jury.”).
However, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, “a public employee need not establish his subjective, ie., actual, good faith if his conduct was objectively reasonable. Subjective good faith nevertheless remains available to a public employee as a second line of defense, which he may .raise at trial even if he was not acting reasonably.” Hayes v. County of Mercer, 217 N.J.Super. 614, 622, 526 A.2d 737 (App.Div.1987); see also Brayshaw v. Gelber, 232 N.J.Super. 99, 110, 556 A.2d 788 (App.Div.1989) (“[W]e are satisfied that defendant adequately established that she acted in an ‘objectively reasonable’ manner in the performance of her duties and, therefore, she was entitled to a qualified immunity under N.J.S.A 59:3-3.”).
As Justice O’Hern noted in Tice, high-speed police pursuits are both common and dangerous, requiring some degree of supervision. “Municipalities and local-government units will undoubtedly promulgate standards aimed at providing the police with guide*140lines concerning the appropriate time to commence and to terminate pursuits.” Tice,' supra, 133 N.J. at 383, 627 A.2d 1090 (O’Hern, J., concurring). As' the Court details, the Attorney General has issued a series of guidelines governing the conduct of law-enforcement officials pursuing vehicles. New Jersey Police Vehicular Pursuit Policy of 1993, reprinted in Report of the Attorney General’s Task Force on Police Vehicular Pursuit 55 (Apr. 1993). Those regulations are intended to be adopted and followed by each law-enforcement agency in New Jersey. Id. at 56. An officer who relies on and acts in accordance with those guidelines should be entitled to a finding that he or she acted with objective “good faith.” See Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir.1976) (“It is clear that ‘good faith’ enforcement of governmental regulations is a defense to a section 1983 Civil Rights Act claim.”); cf. Harlow, supra, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d at 410 (“Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law, should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.”) (footnote omitted). A tidal court could enter summary judgment in favor of a law-enforcement officer in the absence of any evidence that the officer did not act in conformity with established regulations. The determination that the officer acted with objective “good faith” would preclude a “searching scrutiny” into the officer’s conduct.
Ill
Summary judgment, however, is not appropriate in this case. Because the latest guidelines provided by the Attorney General were not in effect at the time of the pursuit at issue, they provide no assistance in evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct. Moreover, as the Court notes, the record demonstrates that the officer might have disregarded both internal departmental policy and specific instructions to terminate the pursuit. Ante at 129-31, 661 A.2d at 244-45. Such • behavior would not be *141entitled to the immunity accorded those who act with objective “good faith.”
I concur in the Court’s judgment that summary judgment is not warranted based on this record and its decision to remand the case to the trial court. However, I would require the trial court to focus on whether the officer acted with subjective “good faith” in pursuing the vehicle, despite failing to comply with the internal policy of the department and ignoring the instructions of a superi- or officer, assuming that the court determines that that conduct does not itself constitute “willful misconduct.” Because the question of the officer’s subjective “good faith” is an “undertaking [that] can rarely succeed except after a presentation of all the evidence through direct and cross-examination and until an opportunity has been afforded to observe the demeanor of the witnesses,” Evans, supra, 236 N.J.Super. at 117, 564 A.2d 462, the matter should be decided on a full record.
IV
I concur in the Court’s judgment remanding the matter to the trial court.