(dissenting)
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree that the certified question is important and doubtful, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent should not be allowed to recover emotional distress damages based on the fear she experienced for her son’s safety and based on the anxiety and distress she suffered upon witnessing her son sustain serious injuries. Because respondent was undisputedly in the “zone of danger” and sustained emotional distress damages based on fear for her own safety, she should also be able to present evidence on the emotional distress she sustained as a result of witnessing injury to her child. I would therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative.
I do not believe that in so ruling, we would be “creating new law in Minnesota.” A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress has existed in Minnesota since 1892. See Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892) (allowing recovery by woman who suffered miscarriage after cable car on which she was riding narrowly avoided collision with another car). This cause of action has been limited over the years to require that a successful plaintiff be within the zone of danger of physical impact, reasonably fear for his or her own safety, and suffer severe emotional distress with attendant physical manifestations. K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn.1995). These limitations act as safeguards to insure the genuineness of claims based on emotional distress. See id. at 559 (noting courts have required objective component to in*874sure stability and predictability in disposition of emotional distress claims).
Contrary to the majority’s characterization of the claims presented here, respondent does not seek to recover damages based on her son’s injuries: she seeks damages based on the emotional distress she has suffered. This is not, as the majority concludes, an attempt to create new law. Indeed, the case cited by the majority is easily distinguishable because the plaintiff in that case was not in the zone of danger and merely witnessed the accident in which her child was injured. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419, 421 (1969) (refusing to recognize “entirely new cause of action” based on mother’s witnessing car striking child, when mother sustained no physical impact in accident and did not fear for her own safety). The unique fact situation presented here may make this a “case of first impression,” but it does not make this a case in which we are being asked to make new law or create a new cause of action not yet recognized in Minnesota.
To the contrary, this case presents the logical extension of the two cases cited by the majority, Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 (Minn.1980), and Carlson v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 534 (Minn. App.1994). In Stadler, 295 N.W.2d at 554, the supreme court held that a mother could not bring an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress for damages based on injuries to her child because the mother was not in the zone of danger. The court was concerned with the problems that such limitless liability would impose on tortfeasors. Id. Here, recovery should be allowed because respondent was in the zone of danger and feared for her own safety as well as her son’s. This case thus draws a bright-line rule and provides the “workable, reasonable, logical, and just” limits found to be necessary in Sta-dler. See id.
In Carlson, 520 N.W.2d at 538, this court held that a plaintiff cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from witnessing the death of a friend, even when that plaintiff was inside the zone of danger. This court reasoned that the tortfeasor, the driver of the car in which the plaintiff and her friend were riding, “had no duty to protect [the plaintiff] from distress arising from the fate of her friend” and that to impose such a duty would render the tortfeasor’s liability out of proportion to his culpability. Id. at 537. Again, making a tortfeasor liable for the distress suffered by a mother, herself in danger, at witnessing injury to her child, places limits on liability that are workable and in proportion to culpability.
As recognized by at least one commentator, allowing respondent to recover fully for the emotional distress she has suffered is consistent with basic negligence principles, as set out in Minnesota case law and the Restatement of Torts. See Michael K. Steenson, The Anatomy of Emotional Distress Claims in Minnesota, 19 William Mitchell L.Rev. 1, 11-15 (1993). Professor Steenson offers the following analysis:
The plaintiff was in the zone of danger. She reasonably feared for her own safety. She suffered severe emotional distress that was the product of fear for herself or the safety of a family member. The distress resulted in physical harm within the meaning of [existing Minnesota cases discussing proximate cause]. Because emotional harm and resultant physical injury were foreseeable under the circumstances, it is irrelevant if the defendant was unable to foresee the exact manner of occurrence.
Id. at 13. Section 436 of the Restatement further supports recovery for these types of damages:
*875(1) If the actor’s conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results solely through the internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(2) If the actor’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and immediate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal operation of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection 2 applies where the bodily harm to the other results from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in his presence.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 436 (1965). One of the comments to subsection 3 explains:
The reason for this exception to the general rule that there cannot be recovery for emotional disturbance, or its consequences, arising from the peril of a third person lies in the fact that the defendant, by his negligence, has endangered the plaintiffs own safety and threatened him with bodily harm, so that the defendant is in breach of an original duty to the plaintiff to exercise care for his protection.
Id., cmt. f.
Thus, the concerns voiced by Minnesota courts in prior cases limiting recovery of emotional distress damages are simply absent here. There is no danger that respondent’s claims are not reliable or genuine because she has met the limits set out by Minnesota courts to “lead to reasonable and consistent results”: she was within the zone of danger, feared for her own safety, and has exhibited physical manifestations caused by her emotional distress. See K.A.C., 527 N.W.2d at 555.
I would therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative and allow respondent to present evidence on her emotional distress, whether caused by fear for her own safety or for her son’s safety, or by the distress or anxiety she experienced upon witnessing her son being severely injured by another’s negligence.