dissenting:
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s view that Jones v. Industrial Comm’n, 188 Ill. 2d 14 (1999), and Berry v. Industrial Comm’n, 55 Ill. 2d 274 (1973), are “factually inapposite.” After considering the facts and circumstances in the case at bar in accordance with the reasoning in Jones and Berry, I would reverse the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the petition for judicial review and remand the case for a decision on the merits.
It is well settled that the circuit court exercises a special statutory jurisdiction in review of decisions of the Commission and that the court obtains jurisdiction only in the manner prescribed by the statute. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 319-20; Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 275-76. When construing and applying statutes related to jurisdiction, reviewing courts should “liberally construe” those granting a right to appeal in order to permit cases to be considered on the merits and to provide that statutes be applied in a practical and commonsense manner. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 328; Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 277-78.
In Jones, the claimant initiated the appeal, filed a request for summons in a timely manner, and exhibited proof of payment of the probable cost of the record within the 20-day period for filing the appeal, but he did not exhibit that proof of payment at the time he filed his request for summons. The Illinois Supreme Court found that the claimant’s failure to exhibit proof of payment at the time he filed the request for summons was a mere oversight, that there was no strategic basis behind the claimant’s omission, and that the circuit clerk had compounded the oversight by accepting the filing of the request for summons and allowing the summons to issue on that date. The supreme court noted that there was no allegation or showing of any prejudice to the respondent or to the Commission as a result of the claimant’s oversight. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 324.
In considering the jurisdictional requirements under section 19(f)(1), the supreme court initially noted that it is essential that appeals from the Commission be taken in a timely manner in order to obtain a prompt resolution of an injured employee’s claim, and thereby satisfy a key goal of the workers’ compensation law. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 321. The court recognized that it had consistently held that the timely filing of a request for summons and the timely exhibition of proof of payment for the probable cost of the record are jurisdictional requirements that must be strictly adhered to in order to vest the circuit court with jurisdiction over an appeal from the Commission. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 320. But the court also recognized its consistent holding in prior cases that where timely initiation of an appeal was not at issue, substantial compliance with the precepts of section 19(f)(1) was sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction. See Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 321-22; Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 277-78.
The supreme court then considered the purpose behind section 19(f)(l)’s requirement that the party seeking judicial review exhibit to the circuit clerk proof of payment of probable cost as a precondition to the issuance of a summons, and it concluded that the proof-of-payment requirement serves to eliminate a potential administrative inconvenience for the Commission. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 325-26. The court reasoned that if the proof-of-payment requirement did not exist, the Commission could be faced with cases in which it would be compelled to file a motion to quash summons because it had been served with a summons directing it to prepare the record by a designated return date, but had not received payment for the probable cost of the record prior to the return date. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 325-26. In considering the facts before it, the court noted that the claimant had paid the cost of preparing the record well in advance of the return date on the summons and that the Commission had not been compelled to contest the summons.
The supreme court next noted that section 19(f)(1) does not indicate what consequences should follow from a failure to satisfy the proof-of-payment requirement. The court stated that in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary, it would not presume that the legislature, having granted a right to judicial review, intended the right to be lost on “ 1 “narrow or technical” ’ ” grounds. See Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 328, quoting Lee v. Industrial Comm’n, 82 Ill. 2d 496, 500 (1980), quoting Smith v. Estate of Womack, 12 Ill. 2d 315, 317 (1957) (when construing statutes related to jurisdiction, there must be substantial compliance with the provisions conferring jurisdiction, but the construction must not be “ ‘so narrow or technical’ ” as to defeat the intent of the act where all material provisions of the statute have been met). In keeping with the principles that statutes be liberally construed to permit a case to be considered on the merits and that statutes be applied in a practical manner to avoid unjust results, the supreme court determined that the claimant had timely filed the request for summons, that the claimant had satisfied the material provisions of section 19(f)(1), and that jurisdiction properly vested in the circuit court. Jones, 188 Ill. 2d at 325-27.
In Berry, the claimant timely filed a praecipe for certiorari, forwarded to the Commission a check for the probable cost of the record, and tendered to the clerk a copy of the transmittal letter he sent to the Commission. The clerk, before issuing the summons, telephoned the Commission to verify that a timely payment had been received. The Illinois Supreme Court stated that the statute required that the receipt for the probable cost of the record be exhibited to the clerk of the court before a writ of certiorari is issued, and it determined that a confirmation by telephone to the circuit clerk was sufficient compliance with the statute. Berry, 55 Ill. 2d at 277-78.
In the case at bar, claimant timely filed his request for summons and thus initiated his appeal in the circuit court in a timely fashion. The record shows that the word “Affidavit” is hand-printed above the title on the document, “REQUEST TO THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT,” and provides some evidence that the clerk of the court, before issuing summons, took steps to verify that claimant’s attorney had exhibited proof of payment. The record does not contain a receipt or a separate affidavit evidencing proof of payment, but the Commission prepared and submitted the transcript of proceedings by the designated return date. In this case, as in Jones, the key purposes of section 19(f)(1) have been met. The petition for review and the request for summons were timely filed, and the Commission, having received payment for the record before the return date, was not caused to contest the summons for nonpayment.
Remaining mindful that the Act is a remedial statute intended to provide financial protection for injured workers and that it should be liberally construed to accomplish that primary purpose (Flynn v. Industrial Comm’n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 556 (2004)), and applying the reasoning in Jones and in Berry, I find that claimant satisfied the material provisions of section 19(f)(1), that jurisdiction properly vested in the circuit court, and that the circuit court erred in dismissing with prejudice claimant’s petition for administrative review. I would reverse the circuit court’s judgment dismissing with prejudice claimant’s petition for administrative review and remand the case to the circuit court with instructions to decide the case on the merits.
For the reasons stated herein, I respectfully dissent.
HOLDRIDGE, J., concurs in this dissent.