dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the district court correctly determined as a matter of law that Goff-Hamel could not proceed under either a breach of contract or a promissory estoppel theory of recovery. I cannot reconcile the result reached by the majority or its rationale with our firmly established legal principles governing at-will employment. As succinctly and, in my view, correctly stated by the district court: “Since plaintiff could have been terminated after one day’s employment without the defendant incurring liability, logic dictates she could also be terminated before the employment started.”
The majority relies in part on Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981), which concluded that the principles of promissory estoppel set forth in the Restatement of Contracts § 90 (1932) could apply to a termination of at-will employment which occurred before the employee actually started working because “under appropriate circumstances we *31believe [Restatement of Contracts] section 90 would apply even after employment has begun.” Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116. However, we held in Merrick v. Thomas, 246 Neb. 658, 522 N.W.2d 402 (1994), that an at-will employee who was discharged a short time after she began working could not, as a matter of law, assert a promissory estoppel claim for damages resulting from resignation of her previous employment. Thus, this essential premise of the holding in Grouse is directly contrary to our law. Another basis for the decision in Grouse, as quoted in the majority opinion, is that one who is offered employment has “a right to assume he would be given a good faith opportunity to perform his duties to the satisfaction” of the employer. 306 N.W.2d at 116. This concept is foreign to our law and entirely inconsistent with the established principle, acknowledged by the majority, that in the absence of contractual, statutory, or constitutional restrictions, an employer may discharge an at-will employee “whenever and for whatever cause it chooses.” Myers v. Nebraska Equal Opp. Comm., 255 Neb. 156, 163, 582 N.W.2d 362, 368 (1998). Accord Gillis v. City of Madison, 248 Neb. 873, 540 N.W.2d 114 (1995). See, also, Hamersky v. Nicholson Supply Co., 246 Neb. 156, 517 N.W.2d 382 (1994). Thus, whether an at-will employee performs in a satisfactory manner is immaterial to the employer’s right to discharge, and there is no basis under our law for an assumption that satisfactory performance by such an employee would create an entitlement to continued employment.
The majority also includes Bower v. AT & T, Technologies, Inc., 852 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988), among those decisions recognizing potential liability of the employer under a theory of promissory estoppel, notwithstanding the fact that the promised employment was at will. The federal court in Bower applied the substantive law of Missouri. Three months after Bower was decided, its reasoning was repudiated by the Missouri Court of Appeals in Rosatone v. GTE Sprint Communications, 761 S.W.2d 670 (Mo. App. 1988), which found Bower to be in direct conflict with Missouri law established in Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 344 S.W.2d 639 (Mo. App. 1961). Referring to the holding in Bowers upon which the majority relies in this case, the court in Rosatone stated:
*32If we were to accept the holding in Bower, then we would be faced with the prospect of anomalous results such as the following: Suppose plaintiff in this case had not been told not to report to work. Instead, suppose plaintiff packed his belongings, sold his house, and moved himself and his family to a new location to commence employment with defendant. After working one day, plaintiff is discharged. The plaintiff in this example would be denied recovery altogether, although he incurred considerably more “reliance” damages than were alleged by the plaintiff in the case at bar, who, under Bower would be allowed to recover.
761 S.W.2d at 673. See, also, Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing & Serv., 954 S.W.2d 383 (Mo. App. 1997), holding that under Morsinkhojf and Rosatone, a promise to hire an at-will employee could not form the basis for promissory estoppel regardless of the nature of damages claimed. The logical inconsistency cited in Rosatone as the basis for rejecting Bower now exists in our jurisprudence by virtue of the holding of the majority in this case and our prior holding in Merrick v. Thomas, supra.
The conflict between the court’s decision today and the law of at-will employment is further demonstrated by the manner in which the majority addresses the issue of damages. GoffHamel’s damage claim is based entirely upon her allegation that after learning on October 3, 1993, that appellee had withdrawn its offer of employment, she was unable to find “comparable” full-time employment until May 15, 1995. The majority acknowledges that under the theory of recovery which it recognizes in this case, damages cannot be “based upon the wages the employee would have earned in the prospective employment because the employment was terminable at will.” Following the same logic, damages based upon wage loss during any interval between withdrawal of a promise of at-will employment and the securing of “comparable” employment would not be recoverable, because the promised employment could have been terminated by either party at any time after it had begun. Thus, the record reflects no factual basis upon which damages claimed by Goff-Hamel could be awarded under the remedy which the majority recognizes.
*33I would follow what I consider to be the better reasoned view, that promissory estoppel may not be utilized to remedy an unfulfilled promise of at-will employment. See, White v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 807 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.C. 1992); Bakotich v. Swanson, 91 Wash. App. 311, 957 P.2d 275 (1998); Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing & Serv., supra; Heinritz v. Lawrence University, 194 Wis. 2d 606, 535 N.W.2d 81 (Wis. App. 1995); Meerman v Murco, Inc, 205 Mich. App. 610, 517 N.W.2d 832 (1994); Rosatone v. GTE Sprint Communications, supra; Morsinkhoff v. DeLuxe Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., supra. I acknowledge that this reasoning would produce a seemingly harsh result from the perspective of GoffHamel under the facts of this case, but to some degree, this is inherent in the concept of at-will employment. For example, in Hamersky v. Nicholson Supply Co., 246 Neb. 156, 158, 517 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1994), a 22-year employee was discharged “ ‘without any notification, cause or reason,’ ” and although this action may seem harsh, we held that it was permissible where there was no contractual provision for employment of specific duration. Similarly, an employer which has made a significant expenditure in training an at-will employee may feel harshly treated if, upon completing the training, the employee immediately utilizes his or her newly acquired skills to secure more remunerative employment with a competitor. If the law of at-will employment were regularly bent to circumvent what some may consider a harsh result in a particular case, its path would soon become hopelessly circuitous and impossible to follow.
Employment for a specific duration imposes certain benefits and burdens upon each party to the relationship. Under our established law, parties wishing to create such a relationship must do so by contract. Where, as in this case, the parties have not chosen to impose contractual obligations upon themselves, it is my view that a court should not utilize the principle of promissory estoppel to impose the subjective expectations of either party upon the other. I agree with the view that in the context of an employment relationship, promissory estoppel “should be construed ‘in such a way that it complements, rather than undermines, traditional contract principles.’ ” White v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 807 F. Supp. at 1220, *34quoting Blanton Enterprises, Inc. v. Burger King Corp., 680 F. Supp. 753 (D.S.C. 1988). In my opinion, the majority has done just the opposite in this case.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
Connolly, J., joins in this dissent.