dissenting.
I dissent. The depraved sexual instinct rule merely makes evidence of past deviate sexual acts relevant to prove the charged crime. It does not alter the well-established rule that cross-examination must be limited to the scope of the witness' direct testimony. See, eg., Lambert v. State (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 288; Ingram v. State (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 18; Dean v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 446, 398 N.E.2d 1270. Therefore, although questions regarding Knisley's sexual acts with FH. and TL. were relevant, they were not within the seope of his direct testimony and should not have been allowed.
The majority believes that by denying he molested the victim, Knisley opened his entire relevant sexual history for cross-examination. I cannot agree. Although one of the main purposes of cross-examination is to elicit additional facts from the witness, those facts must be related to the witness's direct testimony. See McCOR-MICK, EVIDENCE § 29 (2d ed. 1972). Knisley's sexual activities with FH. and T.L. were not related to his alleged molestation of the victim. Furthermore, he made no statement on direct examination that could be interpreted as opening the door to those subjects.
The state was entitled to prove Knisley's alleged depravity through the testimony of FH. and TL.1 The depraved sexual in-stinet rule allows such evidence in order to bolster the credibility of the prosecuting witness in a sex crime case, whose testimony standing alone may seem unnatural or improbable. See Lamar v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 104, 195 N.E.2d 98. The rule does not, however, allow the state to inquire into the accused's past deviate acts on cross-examination unless the accused himself opens the door to the subject by his direct testimony. Merely denying he committed the instant crime does not automatically allow inquiry into the accused's entire relevant sexual history.
I believe the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Knisley to answer questions regarding F.H. and T.L. over his objection. I further believe that cross-examination of the accused on the subject matter of past deviate acts is reversible error when such questioning is beyond the scope of his direct testimony. I would, therefore, reverse and remand this cause for a new trial.
. Their testimony properly belonged in the state's case-in-chief, not in rebuttal. Our supreme court has held that such a procedural irregularity is not harmful error as long as the accused is given the opportunity for surrebuttal. Lamar v. State (1964), 245 Ind. 104, 195 N.E.2d 98.