In this appeal, we review the trial court’s decision to sentence Sadiki Garden to death. In an earlier opinion, this Court affirmed Garden’s convictions, but held *313that the trial court did not give the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence appropriate weight.1 This Court instructed the trial court, on remand, to give the jury’s recommendation “great weight,”2 and to override that recommendation “only if the facts suggesting a sentence of death are so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”3 On remand, the trial court carefully reviewed the record, and again concluded that the aggravating factors far outweighed the mitigating factors. This Court agrees that the record supports the trial court’s analysis. The standard, however, is not whether the trial court’s decision is supportable; it is whether the jury’s opposite conclusion is supportable. Since the record is not so clear’ and convincing that no reasonable person could have voted for a life sentence, we must reverse.
Factual and Procedural Background
The facts surrounding the attempted robberies and murder of Denise Rhudy are detailed in Garden v. State,4 and will only be summarized here. In December 1999, Garden and his two codefendants, Christopher Johnson and James Hollis, were driving around looking for someone to rob. Garden and Johnson had robbed a couple the night before in a parking lot near Garden’s apartment, so the three men returned to the same area. Hollis waited in the car, while Johnson and Garden looked for victims. They spotted three people who had just parked their car — Rhudy, Stephanie Krueck and John Weilbacher. Krueck and Weilbacher had gotten out of their car when Garden approached, pointed a gun at them, and demanded money. Both responded that they did not have any money. Garden then confronted Rhudy, who was still sitting in the car. After she, too, said she had no money, Garden shot her twice. He also fired one shot at Krueck before fleeing. Rhudy died at the scene. Krueck was not injured. The three men went to a party after them crime spree. They were apprehended three days later.
Hollis and Johnson testified against Garden as part of their plea bargains. Garden was convicted of one count of intentional murder, one count of felony murder, and various robbery and weapons charges. In the penalty phase, the jury voted 10-2 in favor of life imprisonment for the intentional murder count, and 9-3 in favor of life for the felony murder count. Nonetheless, the trial court imposed the death penalty, both after trial and after remand.
Discussion
a. The Florida Connection
In our earlier opinion, this Court noted that Delaware’s 1991 death penalty statute was modeled after Florida’s law, which had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Given this “legislative linkage,” the Court determined that Florida’s death penalty jurisprudence should be followed in deciding when a judge may override the jury’s recommendation of a life sentence. Specifically, this Court applied the standard announced by the Florida Supreme Court in Tedder v. State,5 holding that a jury override is permissible only if the facts supporting a death sentence are “so *314clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ.”
The trial court took exception to this ruling, noting that the 2002 amendment to Delaware’s death penalty statute6 clearly demonstrates the General Assembly’s intention to vest primary sentencing responsibility with the judge, not the jury. The trial court also protested our reliance on Florida law, arguing that the Tedder standard is inconsistent with Delaware’s public policy, as expressed by our legislature.7 We respect the trial court’s views, and the General Assembly’s power to set public policy. But Garden’s sentence is controlled by the 1991 statute, not the 2002 amendment, or a 2003 amendment directed specifically at the weight to be given to the jury’s recommended sentence.8
The Synopsis to the 1991 statute expressly states that Delaware’s law was modeled after the Florida death penalty statute, as approved by the United States Supreme Court.9 In State v. Cohen,10 in response to certified questions regarding the constitutionality of the 1991 statute, this Court noted that the 1991 statute was patterned after Florida law. Moreover, this Court, in upholding the Delaware statute, relied on the fact that the United States Supreme Court had found Florida’s statute constitutional.11 The United States Supreme Court decision, Proffitt v. Florida,12 in turn, noted the Tedder standard in upholding the Florida statute13. Thus, Florida death penalty jurisprudence, in general, and the Tedder standard, in particular, have been recognized as the underpinning for the 1991 statute from the time the law was enacted.
The majority and the dissent are in complete agreement that the 1991 Delaware death penalty statute implicates the Ted-der standard imported from the Florida law upon which the Delaware statute was then based. The issue that we review, and on which the majority and the dissent part company, is how that standard should be applied to the facts of this case.
b. The Jury Override Standard.
Both the jury and the judge participate in a capital sentencing decision. Each is instructed to review the aggravating and mitigating factors, to evaluate their relative importance, and to decide whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. The judge must give the jury’s determination “great weight,” but the judge may override the jury’s recommendation in appropriate cases. Where the jury recommends death, the trial judge may reject that recommendation and impose a life sentence.14 Where the jury recommends a life sentence, however, the override threshold is extremely high. Under the Tedder standard, as interpreted numerous times by the Florida Supreme Court:
*315[W]hen there is a reasonable basis in the record to support a jury’s recommendation of life, an override is improper.... When there are valid mitigating factors discernible from the record upon which the jury could have based its recommendation an override may not be warranted.15
Florida cases in which overrides were upheld involved especially cruel and heinous murders by defendants who presented no mitigating circumstances or only very marginal ones.16
Thus, we start with the unarguable proposition that the trial judge may override the jury’s recommendation of life without parole only if the facts supporting the death sentence are so clear and convincing that no reasonable person could differ. The Delaware death penalty procedure requires a record of the exact vote of the jury and that the advice will be given “great weight”17 because it is the “conscience of the community.”18
If the jury verdict is to be cast aside simply because the trial judge disagrees with it, one wonders about the purpose and value of the jury’s advisory verdict. Nevertheless, the Delaware General Assembly, in its 2003 amendment to the death penalty statute, elected to vest discretion in the trial judge to give the jury’s recommendation “such consideration as deemed appropriate.” 19 The State does not contend on this appeal, however, that the 2008 statute applies to Garden.20
*316Here, we are required to apply not the 2003 statute, but the 1991 statute, which we have construed as incorporating the Tedder standard.21 If reasonable minds can differ in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, it necessarily follows that the trial judge may not override the jury’s verdict because, by definition, it cannot be said that no reasonable juror could have determined to recommend a sentence of life without parole, rather than death.
In its decision-after remand, the trial court reevaluated the reasonableness of its own decision and concluded, with justification, that there is record support for the imposition of a death sentence. But the Tedder standard is not directed at the trial court’s reasoning. Rather, it requires that the court evaluate the jury’s decision and determine whether there is any evidence to sustain the jury’s conclusion.22 When the facts are analyzed from this perspective, the jury’s recommendation to spare Garden’s life must be upheld.
c. The Tedder Standard Applied to Garden.
One cannot overlook the overwhelming vote of the jury. Ten of the twelve jurors recommended life without parole. Those ten jurors could have based their decision on the following facts: 1) the shooting was not planned; 2) Garden suffered a life-threatening childhood illness that negatively affected his development and resulted in a personality disorder; 3) Garden had a decent work history; 4) Garden had a positive relationship with his girlfriend and her children; and 5) Garden’s accomplice was given a plea bargain and received a life sentence. The issue is not whether the trial court or this Court would independently have been persuaded that these factors outweigh the aggravating factors. Rather, the trial court should have reviewed the record to determine whether there is support for these mitigating factors and, if so, whether they could reasonably form the basis for a recommendation of life.
1) Lack of Planning.
Both of Garden’s original co-defendants, who testified against Garden, testified that there was no prior plan to shoot or kill anyone. The absence of premeditated intent is a relevant mitigating factor.23
2) Garden’s Psychological Deficiencies.
Dr. Charles Bean, a neurologist, testified that Garden was diagnosed with a potentially fatal disease as a child and was treated for that disease from age 2-8. Because of the prolonged treatment and the seriousness of the illness, Bean opined that Garden was never taught appropriate boundaries and behavioral expectations. Bean concluded that the disease and the lack of parental control added significantly to Garden’s inability to accept responsibility for his acts.
Dr. Alvin L. Turner, a clinical psychologist, also testified about Garden’s personality. Turner explained that, although Garden exhibits anti-social behaviors, he is not a sociopath or predator. Turner testified that Garden functions out of fear; that he behaves much like a child, who acts impulsively without thinking; that he is capable of empathy and remorse; and that Garden would be able to acclimate himself to prison life.
*3173) Garden’s Employment.
Garden had been employed for Vk years prior to his arrest. He started working through a temporary agency. The manager of that agency described Garden as a “dependable worker” who showed up when scheduled. One of Garden’s jobs was at a warehouse company. The manager of that company thought Garden was a good employee — so good, in fact, that he hired Garden for a permanent job. The manager acknowledged that Garden had been insubordinate on one occasion, but testified that the incident was minor and that, after talking to Garden about it, there were no further problems.
4) Garden’s Relationship With His Girlfriend.
Garden’s girlfriend testified that he provided emotional and financial support to her and her children during their two-year relationship. She said that her three-year-old child was especially attached to Garden and that they continue to visit him regularly in prison. She explained that Garden used to take care of her children while she worked and took them to activities, in addition to providing financial support.
5) Disparate Treatment of Garden’s Accomplice.
Johnson, who admitted that he recklessly caused Rhudy’s death, was a “principal player” in the crime, which “probably would not have occurred without his participation.”24 Yet he received a life sentence under a plea agreement. The State argued that Garden is more culpable because he pulled the trigger, but our courts (and Florida’s) have long recognized a co-defendant’s life sentence as a mitigating factor.25
The aggravating circumstances in this case are, without question, significant. Garden killed Rhudy during an attempted robbery; he has a history of committing violent crimes; he expressed no remorse; and he took the life of an innocent mother of four children. The trial court also considered Garden’s prison record an aggravating factor, although the jury may not have agreed, given the fact that most of Garden’s infractions involved disobeying orders by, for example, asking for an extra piece of chicken.26
The trial court and the jury reached different conclusions in their evaluation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. When that happens, the trial judge must accept the jury’s recommendation if it has a reasonable basis in the evidence:
Where a jury and a trial judge reach contrary conclusions because the facts derive from conflicting evidence, or where they have struck a different balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances which both have been given an opportunity to evaluate, the jury recommendation should be followed because that body has been assigned by history and statute the responsibility to discern truth and mete out justice. Given that the imposition of a death penalty “is not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances, but rather a reasoned judgment
*318... ”, both our Anglo-American jurisprudence and Florida’s death penalty statute favor the judgment of jurors over that of jurists.27
Here, as in Keen v. State,28
the focus of the [trial judge’s] analysis was not upon finding support for the jury’s recommendation, ie., determining if a reasonable basis existed for the jury’s decision, but rather toward proving that the jury got it wrong and lacked any reasonable basis to recommend life. In other words, the trial judge disagreed with their recommendation based on his view of the mix of aggravators and miti-gators, rather than through the prism of a Tedder analysis.
To be sure, one can parse the issues where each of the aggravating and mitigating factors is weighed and make a cogent assessment that the former outweigh the latter. That is precisely the argument that is artfully made in the very thoughtful dissent. But in the end, it is just that — an excellent argument, skillfully maximizing the horrific nature of this murder and denigrating the defendant’s character, while trivializing the mitigating factors in the record that would support the jury’s verdict.
Indeed, the dissent demonstrates that the jury should have found that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. Whether in our view they should have or not, the dissent fails to persuade us that the conclusion of this death-qualified29 jury, which heard all the evidence, including live witnesses at the trial and the penalty hearing, was so irrational that its verdict cannot be given great weight, but instead is entitled to no respect whatsoever. That may be the effect of the 2008 statute on new cases to which it may be constitutionally applied after its effective date. But that is not the law under the 1991 statute, which applies to this case.
In sum, the trial court need not, and we need not, agree with the jury’s conclusion in order to uphold it. We may strongly disagree. Under the governing law, however, the jury’s recommendation must be respected if it is supported by the record and is not irrational. Proper application of the Tedder standard requires that the trial court’s override be reversed and that Garden be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of probation or parole.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Superior Court imposing a death sentence is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED for imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation and parole. Jurisdiction is not retained.
. Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327 (Del.2003).
. Indeed, the trial court had instructed the jury in the penalty phase that its recommendation would be given "great weight." State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1030 (Del.Super.2001).
. 815 A.2d at 343.
. 815 A.2d 327.
. 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975).
. 73 Del. Laws Ch. 423 (2001).
. State v. Garden, 831 A.2d 352, 356-357 (Del.Super.2003).
. House Bill No. 287, 74 Del. Laws Ch. 174.
. 68 Del. Laws Ch. 181.
. 604 A.2d 846 (Del.1992).
.604 A.2d at 851.
. 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).
. The United States Supreme Court relied on the "cnicial protection” afforded by the Ted-der standard again in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), in deciding whether the Florida death penalty statute was an ex post facto law.
. Lawrie v. State, 643 A.2d 1336, 1346 (Del.1994).
. Ferry v. State, 507 So.2d 1373, 1376 (Fla.1987).
. In one such case, for example, defendant and his accomplice spotted a teen-aged couple parked in a car near the beach. After being forced at gunpoint to a secluded area, the accomplice guarded the boy while the defendant raped the girl. The boy attempted to help his girlfriend, but was shot four times in the head. The accomplice then took his turn raping the girl vaginally and anally. When the accomplice was done, he shot her twice in the head. Then defendant raped her anally, rolled her over, and shot her in the forehead. The only mitigating factors were that defendant was 22 years old and had no significant criminal history. Hoy v. State, 353 So.2d 826 (Fla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 293, 58 L.Ed.2d 265 (1978); See, also: Douglas v. State, 328 So.2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 871, 97 S.Ct. 185, 50 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976).
. See, e.g., Capono v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 656 n. 417 (Del.2001).
. See, e.g., State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 856 (Del.1992).
. The 2003 statute (House Bill No. 287) provides:
The jury’s recommendation concerning whether the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by the Court. The jury’s recommendation shall not be binding upon the Court.
.Interestingly, however, the statute purports to apply not only prospectively but also to "all defendants tried, re-tried, sentenced or resentenced after its effective date.” In the Opinion of the Justices, furnished to Governor Minner on July 11, 2003, in response to her inquiry as to the constitutionality of House Bill No. 287, we said:
First, in our opinion, none of the provisions of House Bill No. 287 is unconstitutional on its face, at least to the extent that they operate prospectively to defendants whose crimes are committed after the statute is enacted. Second, whether or not any of the provisions set forth in Sections 1, 2 or 4 may be deemed to have been unconstitutionally applied retrospectively or sought to be applied to a particular defendant in a particular case may be determined only on a case-by-case basis.
(Footnote omitted).
. See Pennell v. State, 604 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del.1992).
. See: Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d 772, 787 (Del.1994).
. Ferry v. State, 507 So.2d at 1377.
. State v. Garden, 792 A.2d 1025, 1035 (Del.Super.2001).
. See, e.g. State v. Ferguson, 642 A.2d 1267, 1269 (Del.Super.1992); State v. Cabrera, 1999 WL 41630 (Del.Super.Jan.21, 1999); Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 144 (Fla.1986).
.It appears that his most serious infraction was that a razor was found in his cell. But nothing in his prison records indicated that he was considered a risk to institutional safety-
. Chambers v. State, 339 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla.1976).
. 775 So.2d 263, 284-285 (Fla.2000).
. Under the 1991 statute, a jury empaneled to hear a capital case must be death qualified. State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846, 855-56 (Del.1992). That requirement means "no juror was selected who was so conscientiously opposed to the death penalty as to preclude joining in a recommendation of death.” Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 344 (Del.2003).