Warren County Human Services v. State Civil Service Commission

DISSENTING OPINION BY

Judge COHN.

Respectfully, I dissent from the majority opinion.

I believe that this case is distinguishable from Nixon, and find significant differences between the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL) as compared to the Older Adults Protective Services Act (OAPSA), such that the criminal records provision of the CPSL is not, in my view, constitutionally infirm.

In Nixon v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 576 Pa. 385, 839 A.2d 277 (2003), our Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated the appropriate inquiry for examining the constitutionality of a criminal records provision that has the impact of limiting employment opportunities. Statutory provisions are “presumed to be constitutional and may only be found to be unconstitutional if the party challenging the law can prove that it ‘clearly, palpably, and plainly’ violates the Constitution.” Nixon, 576 Pa. at 398, 839 A.2d at 286. In evaluating a statutory provision, the reviewing court:

may not question the propriety of the public policies adopted by the General Assembly for the law, but rather is limited to examining the connection between those policies and the law. See Finucane v. Pennsylvania Milk Marketing Bd., 136 Pa.Cmwlth. 272, 582 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1990); see also Parker v. Children’s Hosp. of Phila., 483 Pa. 106, 394 A.2d 932, 937 (1978) (“the power of judicial review must not be used as a means by which the courts might substitute [their] judgment as to the public policy for that of the legislature”).

Id. In reviewing laws which do not impede a fundamental right, Pennsylvania courts are to apply “a rational basis test.” Id. at 400, 839 A.2d at 287. This test has been defined to mean that “a law ‘must not be unreasonable, unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the means which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to be attained.’ ” Id. at 400-01, 839 A.2d at 287-88 (quoting Gambone v. Commonwealth, 375 Pa. 547, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (1954)).

In conducting this inquiry into the criminal records provision of the OAPSA, the Supreme Court noted that:

There is no question that protecting the elderly, disabled, and infirm from being victimized is an important interest in this Commonwealth and that the General Assembly may enact laws that restrict who may work with these individuals.

*76Nixon, 576 Pa. at 402, 839 A.2d at 288. However, the Court found the OAPSA criminal records provision to be constitutionally infirm because it distinguished persons already employed at elder care facilities from those seeking employment, precluding the hiring of the latter and doing nothing to the former. The Court noted that there was no “real and substantial relationship” differentiating between these two groups, if the object to be attained was the protection of the elderly. Id. at 403, 839 A.2d at 289. Accordingly, the Court struck the criminal records provision of the OAPSA as unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, as noted above, although the specific statutory language of the OAPSA did not pass the rational basis test, the Court left open the possibility that the legislature’s “barring certain convicted criminals from working with [elderly] citizens may be an effective means of protecting such citizens from abuse and exploitation” provided that the basis for doing so passed the rational basis test. Id. at 402, 839 A.2d at 288; accord Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 277 Pa.Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631, 638 (1980) (noting that “Public employers are not always precluded from considering a job applicant’s prior convictions in making hiring decisions,” and suggesting that convicted arsonists could be precluded from employment as firemen and convicted felons could be precluded from employment as police officers because of the significant governmental interest protected and the relationship of the crimes to the furtherance of that interest).

The CPSL was enacted to protect and assist children, particularly those “most at risk.” The General Assembly stated:

[t]he purpose of this chapter [is] ... to ensure that each county children and youth agency establish a program of protective services with procedures to assess risk of harm to a child and with the capabilities to respond adequately to meet the needs of the family and child who may be at risk and to prioritize the response and services to children most at risk.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6302(b) (emphasis added). There is no doubt that the governmental interest in ensuring this goal is significant. Further, the CPSL’s provisions are narrowly tailored. They apply to child-care workers who have direct control and supervision of children, including employees of child-care services, foster parents, adoptive parents, self-employed family day-care providers and others who provide childcare services under a contract with a childcare facility or program. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6344(a). The law’s careful drafting evidences the legislature’s recognition that children are vulnerable, particularly where unfortunate circumstances have required the intervention, assistance, and care of the children by the government. Further, unlike in the OAPSA amendments in Nixon, in the CPSL, the General Assembly has carefully chosen, as impediments to employment, those crimes that society has become increasingly cognizant of being perpetrated against children. These are crimes that often elude detection for some time, specifically, violent crimes,1 sexually related crimes,2 kidnapping and related crimes,3 and general crimes against child *77welfare.4 Permanently precluding individuals convicted of these specific crimes from having direct control and supervision over children is, therefore, rational and advances the policy of protecting all children, particularly “at risk” children, from the abusive and criminal conduct of adults.5

Furthermore, consideration of these statutory provisions and constitutional concerns is not complete without also considering the constitutionally mandated procedure afforded individuals to remove a conviction from in futuro consideration. Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Board of Pardons affords individuals convicted of any crime the opportunity to have that conviction removed, thereby allowing them the chance to pursue employment that the conviction might otherwise have precluded. See Pa. Constitution, Article IV, § 9 (discussing the powers of the Board of Pardons). Thus, persons, such as Roberts, have a constitutionally provided mechanism through which to seek relief from the limitations on their Constitutional right to pursue meaningful employment.6

In summary, although it cannot be gainsaid that the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees individuals the right to engage in any of the “common occupations of life,” the legislature may reasonably regulate certain positions in the interest of protecting the health, safety, welfare and morals of the citizens of the Commonwealth. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Medical Society v. Foster, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 528, 608 A.2d 633, 637 (1992) (the right to engage in the common occupations of life is “subject to the lawful exercise of the state’s police power to protect the public health, safety, welfare and morals by promulgating statutes which reasonably regulate occupations.”). The limitations imposed by the CPSL are well crafted, rational and serve to protect the health, safety, welfare and morals of the citizens of the Commonwealth in accordance with Foster.7

For these reasons, I would reverse.

. These crimes include homicide, aggravated assault, and rape. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6344(c)(2).

. These crimes include rape, sexual assault, incest, indecent exposure, and prostitution. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6344(c)(2).

.These crimes include kidnapping and unlawful restraint. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6344(c)(2).

. These crimes include dealing in infant children, corruption of minors, and endangering the welfare of children. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6344(c)(2).

. Additionally, the CPSL differentiates between types of offenses, providing, as noted above, a permanent ban on persons convicted of crimes related to the mental and physical well being of children, and imposing a proportionate preclusion period of only five years for crimes not directly bearing on the physical or mental well being of children, specifically, for felony convictions arising under the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6344.

. Cf. Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 277 Pa.Super. 4, 419 A.2d 631 (1980). In Hunter, the Superior Court concluded that an applicant for a bus driving position could not be denied employment on the basis of an aggravated assault conviction for which he had been subsequently pardoned. Unlike Hunter, who was pardoned from his aggravated assault conviction, here, Roberts has not pursued this constitutionally established remedy.

.Application of the majority’s analysis in Nixon to the facts of this case suggests that the CPSL is constitutionally infirm because, like the OAPSA discussed in Nixon, the CPSL differentiates between persons already employed and those seeking employment. However, in my view, Justice Eakin, in his dissenting opinion in Nixon, presents a compelling analysis that I find more persuasive.

He stated:

Just because the General Assembly has not subjected some tenured workers to summary termination does not mean the restrictive hiring mechanism now in place has no relation to fulfilling the General Assembly's objective. In actuality, and as ref*78erenced by the majority, this legislation will certainly detect and reduce the number of potentially dangerous staff members working with [the protected group]. Erecting a hiring roadblock to the inflow of proven criminal offenders is not unconstitutional simply because others already beyond the roadblock were not forced out. Eventually this legislation will eliminate those with convictions for the enumerated offenses from working in any covered institution. Wisdom often comes late, to court and legislature alike, and the' failure to enact it when petitioners were hired does not make it less wise. This legislation is a rational means to a rational end.

Nixon, 576 Pa. at 411, 839 A.2d at 294 (Eakin, J.) (dissenting).