dissenting.
Because I disagree with the majority’s disposition of the first issue, I respectfully dissent. In Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), the Court of Appeals held that Maryland recognizes a cause of action, either in tort or in contract, for abusive discharge by an employer of an at will employee when such discharge is in contravention of some clear mandate of public policy. The majority here appears to be of the opinion that a “clear mandate of public policy” translates to require a codified expression of such policy. The majority opinion relies on cases where the public policies at issue were formulated. Adler, however, explicitly holds that such is not the case:
As indicated, the Court has not confined itself to legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions or administrative regulations when determining the public policy of this State. We have always been aware, however, that recognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a basis for a judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a given case, and that declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch____ As Mr. Justice Sutherland stated for the Supreme Court in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306, 50 S.Ct. 253, 261, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930):
“The truth is that the theory of public policy embodies a doctrine of vague and variable quality, and, unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or statutory provisions, should be accepted as the *433basis of a judicial determination, if at all, only with the utmost circumspection. The public policy of one generation may not, under changed conditions, be the public policy of another.” (Emphasis added.)
(Citations omitted.) Adler, supra at 45-46, 432 A.2d 464. Additionally, this court held that:
It is society’s interest upon which primary focus is required. The source of the “clear mandate of public policy” may be found in legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions and administrative regulations, or it may be undeclared, in which case, extreme care must be taken to insure that it is, in fact, the policy of the State. In any case, the public policy found must be “sufficiently clear to provide the basis for a tort or contract action for wrongful discharge.”
(Citations omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) Townsend v. L.W.M. Management, Inc., 64 Md.App. 55, 61, 494 A.2d 239 (1985).
The holding in the majority opinion limits the public policy asserted by appellant to that expressed in Article 19 of the Declaration of Rights. Article 19 provides that every person should have a remedy at law for injury done to him or her. Although it is widely held that the right to seek redress of grievances in court is not such a clear mandate of public policy on which to predicate an abusive discharge claim, Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers, Inc., 208 N.J.Super. 503, 506 A.2d 379 (1986), cert. denied, 104 N.J. 466, 517 A.2d 449 (1986); Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F.Supp. 242 (N.D., Ill., E.D.1983), under circumstances like those sub judice, this Court must inquire as to what the grounds were for such lawsuit. While the institution of a suit against an employer alone may not be enough to contravene public policy, this Court should not ignore the nature of the suit and the employer’s conduct which may provoke it. The grounds for the suit itself may be in contravention of public policy. Only after an examination of the suit’s basis is it possible to determine the nature of the public policy which may be violated.
*434At trial appellee stated that she was discharged for filing suit against her employer. Implicitly included in this assertion is the nature of the complaint and the facts which gave rise to it. I am aware that the trial court dismissed Counts I, II and III and, as a result one could conclude that the issue of the sexual harassment as to appellant is not before us. Count IV, the abusive discharge count, includes by reference all of the allegations included in the previous three counts. These counts clearly contain the sexual harassment claims and the facts contained in them, to the extent that they are the basis for Count IV, are included in that count. The dismissal of Counts I, II and II eliminates from the case the causes of action raised in those counts but did not eliminate the facts upon which they were based. The basis of the abusive discharge count was not simply the discharge taken in isolation from the facts upon which it was based but also includes those facts.
The cases cited by the majority are distinguishable because they do not concern such an intensely personal affront to the employee as in the case sub judice, where the employee was sexually harassed to the point of an assault and battery. A review of the cases cited by the majority makes this point clear: in Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers, Inc., supra, the employee was discharged for filing suit against his employer in connection with a salary dispute; in Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, supra, an employee was discharged because he retained an attorney and threatened to sue his employer over a salary dispute; and in Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.1988), an at will employee was discharged for revealing confidential information to an attorney retained in connection with a dispute about job performance. In this case, appellee was discharged in retaliation for filing a law suit against appellant alleging sexual harassment that rose to the level of an assault and battery. It cannot seriously be doubted that this State has an undeclared yet clearly mandated public policy proscribing such conduct.
*435In Adler, the Court balanced various interests in determining that the at will rule must be excepted:
When terminated without notice, an employee is suddenly faced with an uncertain job future and the difficult prospect of meeting continuing economic obligations. But this circumstance, in itself, hardly warrants adoption of a rule that would forbid termination of at will employees whenever the termination appeared “wrongful” to a court or a jury. On the other hand, an at will employee’s interest in job security, particularly when continued employment is threatened not by genuine dissatisfaction with job performance but because the employee has refused to act in an unlawful manner or attempted to perform a statutorily prescribed duty, is deserving of recognition. Equally to be considered is that the employer has an important interest in being able to discharge an at will employee whenever it would be beneficial to his business. Finally, society as a whole has an interest in ensuring that its laws and important public policies are not contravened. Any modification of the at will rule must take into account all of these interests.
As we have indicated, few courts have flatly rejected the notion that the wrongful discharge of an at will employee may give rise to a cause of action for damages. Where courts differ is in determining where the line is to be drawn that separates a wrongful from a legally permissible discharge. This determination depends in large part on whether the public policy allegedly violated is sufficiently clear to provide the basis for a tort or contract action for wrongful discharge.
Adler, supra [291 Md.] at 42, 432 A.2d 464. This same test is applied in other jurisdictions as well. See Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers, Inc., 208 N.J.Super. 503, 506 A.2d 379, 381 (1986), cert. denied, 104 N.J. 466, 517 A.2d 449 (1986); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
This balancing of interests test must be applied to the case sub judice to meet the policy demands of the public. *436The decision to make this exception to the at will employment rule can only be made after taking into account the employee’s interest in job security, “particularly when continued employment is threatened not by genuine dissatisfaction with job performance,” Adler, supra [291 Md.] at 42, 432 A.2d 464, the employer’s interest in “being able to discharge an employee when it is beneficial to his business,” id., and society’s interest in “ensuring that its laws and important public policies are not contravened.” id. Appellant discharged appellee not for reasons of genuine dissatisfaction of job performance but because she performed an act which public policy would encourage—she filed suit to prevent continued sexual harassment in the work place. This must be weighed against appellant’s interest in running the business as it sees fit. In addition, it is clear that a discharge of an employee at will, that is motivated by retaliation, is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good. Therefore, it is this jurist’s opinion that there is indeed a clear, although not explicitly declared, mandate of public policy on which to predicate appellee’s cause of action. Such is not a novel idea. In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., supra, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held the discharge of an employee, who alleged sexual harassment on the job, was “motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation” and violated public policy. Despite the fact that Monge was based on an abusive discharge claim under the breach of contract theory, the Court of Appeals relied on it in Adler, supra at 36-37, 432 A.2d 464, in holding that the cause of action exists in Maryland. The test applied in New Hampshire is the same as that applied in Adler and the case sub judice.
To fail to implement that public policy in the case sub judice would give the message to employers that if harassment such as that present in this case occurs, the employer may let it persist until the employee can tolerate the harassment no longer and files suit in an attempt to terminate it. At that point the employer may discharge the employee with impunity. The message to the employee would be that *437in order to protect herself or himself from such harassment, she or he may be required to lose her or his job with no legal redress against the employer. Cf. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill.2d 124, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Harless v. First Nat’l Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978); and Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
I am not unaware that in Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316 Md. 603, 561 A.2d 179 (1989), affirming Makovi v. Sherman-Williams Co., 75 Md.App. 58, 540 A.2d 494 (1988) the cause of action for wrongful discharge was limited by the Court of Appeals. I believe that the case sub judice falls under the “narrow ground” exception explained by the Court in Makovi [316 Md.] at p. 620, 561 A.2d 179:
Sometimes the facts underlying a discharge constitute both a violation of an anti-discrimination statute and of another, more narrowly focused, statute reflecting clear public policy but providing no civil remedy. Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir.1984) illustrates an analysis which utilizes the narrower ground. There the plaintiff alleged that she had been fired because she refused to sleep with her foreman. The court reasoned that “[a] woman invited to trade herself for a job is in effect being asked to become a prostitute.” Id. at 1205. Prostitution was a crime denounced by Arkansas statute. The Eighth Circuit predicted the Supreme Court of Arkansas would find an abusive discharge because the plaintiff “should not be penalized for refusing to do what the law forbids.”
In my opinion the general holding in Makovi does not apply to the case sub judice, regardless of whether the above exception is applicable or whether Judge Adkins was correct when he observed in his dissent:
The majority attempts to explain Lucas on the ground that the plaintiffs ability to sue for wrongful discharge was based on the fact that she was being forced into prostitution in violation of a criminal statute, 316 Md. at 620, 561 A.2d at 187. This is unpersuasive. The plaintiff *438alleged she was a victim of quid pro quo sexual harassment, a violation of Title VII. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Thus, she was allowed to bring a wrongful discharge action despite the existence of a civil remedy under Title VII.
316 Md. at 635, fn. 5, 561 A.2d 179.
For the above reasons I would affirm on the first issue.