DISSENTING OPINION BY
DEL SOLE, P.J.:¶ 1 I must dissent because I believe that a pretrial order, which does not impinge on the Commonwealth’s ability to prosecute its case, is not appealable under relevant caselaw or Pa.R.A.P. 311(b), and accordingly such an appeal should be quashed. In criminal cases, the Majority’s ruling will permit the Commonwealth to appeal a pretrial order which does not limit the evidence the Commonwealth offers in support of the prosecution of its case, but impacts solely on the evidence the defense may introduce. I believe this result is contrary to both the Rule and the pronouncements of our Supreme Court which developed the Rule and applied it.
¶2 The question of the right of the Commonwealth to appeal from a pretrial order suppressing evidence was first considered in Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963). The Court cited to the rationale behind some Superi- or Court decisions which considered the Commonwealth’s right to appeal pretrial orders in criminal cases. It stated: “The rationale of these decisions is that the Commonwealth should possess the right of an appellate review of the validity of a pretrial order of suppression where the effect of such order is to terminate the prosecution.” Id. at 308 (emphasis in orig*918inal.) The Court spoke not only to the situation where finality is clear because all the Commonwealth’s evidence has been suppressed, but also to situations where the order suppresses a portion of the Commonwealth evidence which would substantially handicap its case. The Court recognized double jeopardy as an underlying concern, and focused on the element of finality in the order which “forces the Commonwealth to trial without all of its evidence.” Id. (emphasis in original.). It found that an order granting the suppression of some of the Commonwealth’s evidence had such an attribute of finality as to justify the grant of the right of appeal to the Commonwealth.
¶ 8 The Court applied its earlier ruling in reaching its decision in Commonwealth v. Dugger, 506 Pa. 537, 486 A.2d 382 (1985), wherein it ruled that the Commonwealth’s certification that the order substantially handicapped its case “in and of itself’ authorized an appeal. Id. at 386. In reference to Bosurgi the Court stated: “We granted the Commonwealth an appeal, and defined it a substantial handicap whenever the Commonwealth is denied the use of all their evidence.”13 Id. (emphasis in original.)
¶ 4 Rule 311(b) embodies the reasoning of Bosurgi for it requires the Commonwealth, in order to enjoy the right to appeal, to provide a certification that the order at issue “will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” The language of this rule applies not only to a suppression ruling but also to a pretrial order granting a motion in limine to exclude evidence that has the effect of terminating or substantially handicapping the prosecution. Commonwealth v. Matis, 551 Pa. 220, 710 A.2d 12 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. Gordon, 543 Pa. 513, 673 A.2d 866 (1996).
¶ 5 The Majority cites to language in Gordon which notes that there is no essential difference between suppression rulings and rulings on motions in limine to admit or exclude evidence. However, as the Majority recognizes, the court in Gordon was considering a denial of a motion in limine which prevented the prosecution from presenting certain evidence. The Commonwealth sought to admit transcripts of previous trials of assault cases involving the defendant, which the Commonwealth contended were similar to the crime it was prosecuting. I believe the posture of this case was critical to the Court’s decision as evidenced by the Court’s holding that, “fairness to the Commonwealth requires the right to appeal adverse pretrial rulings which exclude evidence the Commonwealth deems crucial to its case.” Id. at 869 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court was referring to a ruling made upon a motion in limine which limited the Commonwealth’s presentation of its case.
¶ 6 In no case before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has the Commonwealth been granted a right to appeal an adverse pretrial ruling that impacted on the defendant’s presentation of evidence.14 The de*919cisions of our Supreme Court and the Rule itself all speak to instances where the trial court’s decision negatively impacts the prosecution of the matter by the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Matis, 551 Pa. 220, 710 A.2d 12, (1998), Commonwealth v. Johnson, 542 Pa. 568, 669 A.2d 315 (1995). Only where the Commonwealth is limited from presenting its full case may it take an immediate appeal from a pretrial ruling by certifying that the order substantially handicaps its case.
¶ 7 The position adopted by the Majority, which would allow appeals from rulings which affect evidence relevant to the defense of the case, may necessary involve unintended consequences. Its ruling can be logically extended to permit the Commonwealth to appeal any evidentiary ruling made during trial which was made in favor of the defense, because under the rationale offered by the Majority the Commonwealth will not later have an opportunity to review this ruling. The Supreme Court and the Rule do not contemplate such action. It is for this reason that it is only in the limited circumstances where the Commonwealth is precluded by court order from presenting all the evidence it has to offer in the prosecution of the action that an appeal from such a pretrial ruling is allowed.
¶ 8 My interpretation of the Rule and the law concerning pretrial appeals by the Commonwealth will not prevent it from seeking review of an adverse pretrial ruling. Any party retains the ability to petition for permission to appeal following a certification by the trial court of a controlling legal issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 1311(b), and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b). Should the trial court refuse to enter such a certification the proper mode of determining “whether the case is so egregious as to justify prerogative appellate correction” is with a petition for review. Pa.R.A.P. 1311, Note, and see Pa.R.A.P. 1511.
¶ 9 In this case the Commonwealth sought a permissive appeal after the trial court certified that its evidentiary ruling implicates a controlling question of law as to which there exists substantial grounds for difference of opinion. In addition the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d) certifying that the trial court’s ruling substantially handicapped its prosecution. This Court dismissed the petition for permission to appeal due to the existence of a pending appeal under Rule 311(b). As I would quash the interlocutory appeal taken pursuant to Rule 311(b), and, due to the fact that the decision I would make would clarify an interpretation of the Rule for the first time, I would reinstate the motion for permission to appeal and direct that it be forwarded to the Court’s motions panel for a determination.
¶ 10 P.J.E. McEWEN and Judge TODD Join in this dissenting Opinion by DEL SOLE, P.J.. I recognize that the Supreme Court has directed that this Court is not to look behind the Commonwealth's certification to determine if its case has actually been handicapped. However I am not suggesting that such an examination of the evidence take place. This Court should not look to what evidence is being excluded, but whose evidence is being excluded, for Dugger recognizes that the ■ certification and the right to appeal applies to a denial of the Commonwealth’s evidence.
. I believe the decisions of this Court which are contrary to the Supreme Court’s pronouncement on this issue should be overruled by this en banc panel. See Commonwealth v. Allburn, 721 A.2d 363 (Pa.Super.1998), and Commonwealth v. McBurrows, 779 A.2d 509, 513 (Pa.Super.2001).