dissenting-. While the opinion discusses the application and construction of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act in New Hampshire (RSA ch. 546 (supp)), Massachusetts, Maine and Florida, that act is not in issue in this proceeding and cases construing it and relied upon in the majority opinion are not in point, i.e., Clarke v. Blackburn (Fla.), 151 So. 2d 325; Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Me. 161. What is in issue is section 6 of the Uniform Extradition Law which has been adopted in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and most states. It provides for the interstate rendition of a person committing an act in one state “intentionally resulting in a crime in the state whose executive authority is making the demand.” RSA 612:6. This section specifically provides that it shall apply “even though the accused was not in that state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not fled therefrom.”
The majority opinion in effect holds that section 6 of the Uniform Extradition Law is unconstitutional and cannot be applied in support cases where it is most needed. If there was authority for this view in the rigid dogma of Beale (2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws, s. 428.4) or in the worry of Lord Ellen-borough a century and a half ago (“Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?”, Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East. 192 [K. B. 1808]), it is not impressive today. In re Harris, 170 Ohio St. 151. The continuing crime of neglecting to support an illegitimate child in Massachusetts “whether begotten within or without the commonwealth” (Mass. G. L., c. 273, s. 15) is an extraditable offense under section 6 of the Uniform Extradition Law. RSA 612:6. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, s. 82 (1962).
Lampron, J., concurs in this dissent.