dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Although I agree that the State should have done more to ensure an adequate record for appeal, I would nevertheless vacate the order of suppression.
At closing time on New Year’s morning, January 1, 1988, defendant Richard Knee-land left the Bounty Taveme at the Holiday Inn in Bath. In response to a radio message, Officer Merry, the arresting officer, picked up another officer at the Holiday Inn and was informed that Kneeland’s car, had just backed across the Holiday Inn parking lot and struck a snowbank. The second officer also reported that the car made a wide turn as it left the parking lot and that a second car followed it. Officer Merry pursued the cars in his cruiser and quickly caught up with them. He saw Kneeland cross over into the left lane. Both cars travelled at a “noticeably slow” speed. Officer Merry eventually stopped the Kneeland vehicle because he believed the operator was under the influence. At the suppression hearing, after detailing his observations, he stated that he based his belief on the information related by the second officer and on the fact that Knee-land left a drinking establishment at closing time, approximately 2:00 a.m. The District Court judge granted Kneeland’s motion to suppress although she characterized the case as “a very close call.” In granting the motion, the court referred only to *7the fact that Kneeland had backed across the parking lot into a snow bank.
This Court has stated that “[i]n order to initiate an investigation involving brief detention short of a formal arrest, a law enforcement officer must act on the basis of ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’ ” State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me.1983) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Such facts must give rise to “a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. A mere “inarticulate hunch” will not suffice. State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d 314, 317 (Me.1985). In assessing whether a reasonable suspicion existed, “a court must take into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop.” State v. Jarrett, 536 A.2d 1111, 1112 (Me.1988).
Whether or not the police had the requisite articulable suspicion to justify a vehicular stop “is always a question of fact to be decided by the trial judge who hears the witnesses at the suppression hearing.” State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d 960, 963 (Me.1984). The reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion has been characterized as a question of law. State v. Fillion, 474 A.2d 187, 190 (Me.1984). The ultimate question of justification combines both legal and factual issues. Id. The Law Court will therefore reverse a motion justice’s decision regarding the suppression of evidence only if clearly erroneous. E.g., State v. Thurlow, 485 A.2d at 963.
Relying on State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978 (Me.1987), the defendant argues in the present case that the motion judge could have properly concluded that Officer Merry had no more than an unsubstantiated hunch that the driver was operating under the influence. I disagree. In Caron, we held that the District Court clearly erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during an investigatory stop after a Maine State Trooper had observed the defendant straddle the center line of an undivided highway for 25 to 50 yards. We stated that “[t]he observation, even when taken with all rational inferences that can be drawn from it, did not give rise to an objectively reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was involved.” Id. at 979. Our holding in Caron, however, is limited to the particular facts of that case. That decision stands only for the proposition that “[a] vehicle’s brief, one time straddling of the center line of an undivided highway is a common occurrence and, in the absence of oncoming or passing traffic, without erratic operation or other unusual circumstances, does not justify an intrusive stop by a police officer.” Id.
The facts of the present case do not fall within the narrow rule of Caron. The arresting officer in Caron stopped the defendant solely on the basis of a single straddling of the center line of an undivided highway. Officer Merry, on the other hand, testified to other significant factors which, when taken together, clearly give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. On New Year’s morning, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Kneeland left a tavern, got into his automobile, backed across the parking lot, and struck an icy snow bank. He made a wide turn as he left the parking lot, and a second vehicle escorted him as he left the lot and as he continued home. Both vehicles drove at an unusually slow rate of speed. At one point Kneeland crossed so far into the left lane that Officer Merry was able to see the entire rear of his automobile from behind the second car. Although we have stated that a trial court is not required to believe uncontradicted testimony, State v. Harriman, 467 A.2d 745, 747 (Me.1983), here there is no reason to presume that the motion justice rejected any portion of Officer Merry’s testimony. Rather, it appears as though the judge’s decision reflects uncertainty engendered by our opinion in State v. Caron. See Sheldon, Vehicle Stops And The Maine Constitution, 3 Me.B.Jour. 182 (1988); Schwartz, The State of Fourth Amendment Vehicle Stops in Maine After Caron: A Response to Judge Sheldon, 3 Me.B.Jour. 310 (1988); Moss. OUI Stops: Proving That Your Suspicion Is Reasonable, 1 All Points Bulletin, No. 3 at 3 (1988). Taking into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop, State v. Jarrett, 536 *8A.2d 1111, 1112 (Me.1986), Officer Merry acted on at least a reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, when he stopped Knee-land’s automobile. I conclude that the motion justice committed clear error in granting Kneeland’s motion to suppress. I would vacate.