dissenting in part.
I agree that the trial court erred in determining paternity and in ordering Pedro to pay support for Joshua, but I do not think further proceedings are permissible or desirable. I would simply reverse with directions to determine that Joshua was not Pedro’s child and to cancel the child support obligation. The record, as discussed in the opinion, establishes that the doctrine of estoppel does not apply. However, even assuming that facts could exist which would justify a finding that Pedro is estopped from denying he is Joshua’s father, I would still object to either the trial court or this court framing that issue.
I realize that “ ‘[a] court of equity, if cognizant of the facts, should, on its own motion, protect the rights of minors, when involved in litigation to which they are not parties.’ ” Workman v. Workman, 167 Neb. 857, 869, 95 N.W.2d 186, 194 (1959) (quoting Jones v. Hudson, 93 Neb. 561, 141 N.W. 141 (1913)). The trial judge did so by appointing a guardian ad litem. After a guardian ad litem is appointed:
*412In order to protect fully the infant’s interest the court should exercise a general supervision over the conduct of the next friend or guardian ad litem, and determine whether such representative has in fact acted to protect his ward. The court should advise such representative as to what steps to take or what pleadings to file, and see that the infant’s rights are in no way sacrificed, impaired, infringed on, or destroyed. As otherwise stated, the court must see that the infant’s rights are not prejudiced or abandoned, that all proper defenses are made for him, and that he is given a fair and impartial hearing, before judgment is rendered against him.
43 C.J.S. Infants § 220 at 565-66 (1978).
The pleadings filed by the parties raised only the issue of whether Pedro was Joshua’s biological father. Obviously, the trial judge thought Pedro should be held responsible as the child’s father. In such a situation, I can see a trial judge continuing the hearing, calling the guardian ad litem before the court to see if the guardian had properly investigated and considered the matter, and in the proper case appointing a different guardian ad litem. However, with no pleadings that addressed this issue, the trial judge simply found that Pedro acknowledged paternity and “therefore . . . that both parties are estopped from denying paternity.” I realize that the judge has some heavy burdens when it comes to looking after children’s rights in litigation, but he or she can never lose sight of the fact that even with children’s rights the judge should act as a disinterested arbiter in an adversarial system, and not an advocate. Beyond directing the guardian ad litem to perform his or her duty, I do not think either the trial court or this court should frame the issues to be tried. I think the record shows that a competent guardian ad litem would not have sought to impose parental responsibility upon Pedro.