OPINION
SHORT, Judge.On appeal from a judgment of commitment as a sexually dangerous person, Dennis D. Linehan argues: (1) the proof fell short, as a matter of law, of the statutory elements; and (2) the sexually dangerous persons statute is unconstitutional.
FACTS
While on parole from a state training school on July 25, 1956, Linehan took indecent liberties with a four-year-old girl. In February 1960, at the age of 19, Linehan engaged in sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old girl. In July 1963, Linehan beat and repeatedly raped L.H. In June 1965, *311Linehan engaged in window peeping, spotted a young babysitter, and strangled her to death during an attempted sexual assault. Prior to his arrest, Linehan committed several more sexual assaults, including criminal sexual conduct with two 11- and 12-year-old sisters, and the rape of 22-year-old W.L.
In July 1965, Linehan was arrested. A grand jury indicted Linehan for murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, and kidnapping. On October 1, 1965, Linehan pleaded guilty to kidnapping, and received a 40-year sentence. In June 1975, he escaped from the minimum security unit at Stillwater. Eleven days later, he was arrested in Michigan for sexually assaulting a 12-year-old girl. He was tried and convicted in Michigan. When the verdict was read, Linehan pointed a finger to the victim and said, “When I get out I am going to kill you.” From July 1975 through September 1980, he served time in a Michigan prison and was returned then to complete his Minnesota sentence.
Linehan was due for parole in May 1992. In March, the Ramsey County Attorney’s Office filed a petition for Linehan’s commitment as a chemically dependent person and a psychopathic personality. After commitment hearings, the trial court denied the petition for commitment as a chemically dependent person, but committed Linehan for an indeterminate period as a psychopathic personality. We affirmed. The supreme court reversed the commitment, citing a lack of clear and convincing evidence that Linehan had an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses. In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn.1994) (Linehan I). In 1994, Linehan was paroled, subject to specified conditions imposed by the Department of Corrections. First, Linehan lived in a house on the grounds of the Stillwater Correctional Facility. Second, Linehan’s communications were subject to monitoring. And third, Linehan was under 24-hour-a-day surveillance by means of 4 cameras located at the house.
In September 1994, Ramsey County petitioned for Linehan’s commitment under the newly-enacted sexually dangerous persons statute, Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b. At his commitment hearing, the trial court heard testimony from mental health professionals and corrections personnel. The director of a sex offenders group, in which Linehan has participated during his probation, described his participation in the group as appropriate and noted Linehan has developed a plan to avoid relapse. One of Line-han’s parole agents testified he saw no indication that Linehan wanted to use chemicals or drugs, which conduct had played a role in his assaults. A court-appointed examiner testified Linehan does not presently exhibit a personality disorder, a sexual disorder, or a mental disorder, even though that expert had diagnosed Linehan with an antisocial personality disorder in 1992. By contrast, a licensed psychologist testified Linehan has an alcohol dependence (in remission), impulse control disorder, and an antisocial personality disorder and supported his commitment as a sexually dangerous person. Another licensed psychologist also diagnosed Linehan as a paraphilia with an antisocial personality disorder, and testified Linehan is highly likely to engage in harmful sexual conduct. Based on historical information, Linehan’s treating psychologist at the security hospital diagnosed Linehan as having an antisocial personality disorder.
After considering the testimony, the trial court granted the county’s petition, finding clear and convincing evidence that the combination of Linehan’s course of harmful sexual conduct and personality disorder results in a high probability he will engage in future harmful sexual conduct.
ISSUES
I. Is there clear and convincing evidence that Linehan meets the standards for commitment as a sexually dangerous person?
II. Is the sexually dangerous persons statute constitutional?
ANALYSIS
I.
To support the commitment of a sexually dangerous person, the state must establish the statutory elements by clear and *312convincing evidence. Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (1994); see Minn.Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (1994) (court shall hear petition for commitment as a sexually dangerous person as provided in Minn.Stat. § 253B.18). We will not reverse a trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In re Joelson, 385 N.W.2d 810, 811 (Minn.1986). However, we review de novo challenges that the state failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the elements required to commit an individual under the sexually dangerous persons statute. Cf. Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 613 (reviewing de novo whether the state proved the elements necessary for commitment as a psychopathic personality).
A sexually dangerous person is an individual who (1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct, (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction, and, (3) as a result, is likely to engage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct. Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a) (1994). Linehan argues the state failed to prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence.
A. Course of Harmful Sexual Conduct
Harmful sexual conduct is sexual conduct that “creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a) (1994). A rebuttable presumption exists that conduct described in the definitions of criminal sexual conduct, in the first through fourth degrees, constitutes harmful sexual conduct. Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(b) (1994). This presumption also applies to conduct described in the definitions of certain other serious crimes if the individual’s sexual impulses motivated the behavior or if the conduct was part of a pattern of behavior having criminal sexual conduct as a goal. Id.
The trial court found Linehan engaged in numerous harmful acts, including taking indecent liberties with a four-year-old girl, raping two women, committing criminal sexual conduct with four different females, and killing a 14-year-old girl while attempting to sexually assault her. Most, if not all, of these acts create rebuttable presumptions of harmful sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(b). While they did not all result in criminal convictions, the statute does not require a conviction to establish a rebuttable presumption of harmful sexual conduct. See id. (creating a rebuttable presumption based on conduct described in various criminal statutes). This pattern of eight harmful sexual acts clearly and convincingly establishes a course of harmful sexual conduct. See Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 613 (finding this same conduct constituted a “habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters” for purposes of commitment as a psychopathic personality).
Linehan argues his acts of sexual misconduct are too remote in time to support commitment under the statute. However, Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b, contains no requirement of a recent overt act. Cf. In re Young, 122 Wash.2d 1, 857 P.2d 989, 1008-09 (1993) (concluding, under Washington’s sexually violent predators statute, that the constitution does not require evidence of a recent act to prove dangerousness when the individual is currently incarcerated); State v. Carpenter, 197 Wis.2d 252, 541 N.W.2d 105, 114 (1995) (holding, under Wisconsin’s sexually violent person statute, that the state need not produce evidence of a recent overt act to prove the probability of future acts of sexual violence if the committed person was incarcerated at the time the state filed the commitment petition, even though the defendant had been on parole for nine months before his reincarceration in July 1994). While Li-nehan has been on parole recently, he has been under 24-hour surveillance and living in a residence on the grounds of the correctional facility, thus simulating the protective conditions of prison. The psychopathic personality statute also allows the state to establish a “habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters” by evidence of remote acts of misconduct. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (1994) (requiring evidence of a “habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters”); Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 613 (finding Line-han’s criminal history (which remains unchanged in the current proceedings) demonstrates a habitual course of misconduct). The remoteness of any harmful sexual conduct affects the likelihood of future harm, *313and not whether the acts constitute a course of harmful sexual conduct in the first instance. Cf. Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614 (stating future dangerousness is predicated on the inability to control sexual impulses and requiring consideration of the recency of an individual's violent behavior when determining dangerousness).
B. Personality Disorder
The trial court independently concluded Linehan manifests an Axis II diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder as defined by the American Psychiatric Association after hearing all of the facts and expert testimony. See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 645, 649-50 (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV) (defining antisocial personality disorder and listing diagnostic criteria). The trial court relied on the DSM-IV, noting it “has a degree of acceptance in the forensic arena.” It cited testimony of doctors, many of whom relied on the DSM-IV, and also testimony of Line-han’s expert, who acknowledged the source is both widely used and accepted by mental health professionals and attorneys.
To support an antisocial personality disorder diagnosis, the DSM-IV requires the individual to meet at least three of the specified criteria to establish a “pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others.” DSM-IV, at 645, 649. Of these criteria, the trial court found Linehan has shown:
—a failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behavior as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest;
—deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of abuses, or conning others for personal profit or pleasure;
—irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or assaults;
—consistent reckless disregard for safety of self or others; and
—lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another.
See id. at 649-50 (setting forth the diagnostic criteria for an antisocial personality disorder). The trial court cited specific facts pertinent to each factor. The evidence supports each of these criteria, including expert testimony that Linehan had this diagnosis.
Linehan does not argue there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence to support a diagnosis that he has an antisocial personality disorder. Rather, Linehan argues this disorder cannot be a personality disorder within the meaning of the sexually dangerous persons statute because the antisocial personality disorder (1) does not bear a reasonable relationship to the purpose of his commitment, (2) can be applied to an individual no longer exhibiting serious antisocial behaviors, (3) would be extremely difficult to diagnose based on current behavior, and (4) is not necessarily an indicator of his current behavior. Linehan’s arguments are misplaced because the statute requires only a finding of a “sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction.” Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(2) (emphasis added). Section 253B.02, subdivision 18b(a)(2) does not require this determination to be made solely on the basis of current behavior. Also, whether the disorder bears a reasonable relationship to the petitioned-for commitment is determined under section 253B.02, subdivision 18b(a)(3), requiring the disorder and course of harmful sexual conduct to likely result in future harm.
C. Resulting Likelihood of Future Harmful Sexual Conduct
Based on expert testimony and its own experience, the trial court found the state established by clear and convincing evidence that, as a result of Linehan’s past course of harmful sexual conduct and his personality disorder, it is “highly likely” he will engage in future acts of harmful sexual conduct. The trial court correctly concluded the statute’s term “likely” requires future misconduct to be “highly likely.” This is consistent with the requirement that the matter be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See also Colorado v. New Mexico, *314467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 2437-38, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (noting the clear-and-convincing-evidenee standard requires a determination that the factual contentions are “highly probable”); John William Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 340, at 442 (4th ed. 1992) (describing clear and convincing evidence as “highly probable”). Compare Minn.Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 1 (requiring proof for civil commitments by clear and convincing evidence), and In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn.) (describing the psychopathic personality statute as a civil commitment law), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 146, 130 L.Ed.2d 86 (1994) with State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 629 (Minn.1995) (reviewing a criminal conviction for proof beyond a reasonable doubt).
Linehan argues that conflicting expert testimony precludes a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of likely future dangerousness. However, while expert testimony may play a role in the determination of future dangerousness, it is not a conclusive factor. See Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 613-15 (concentrating on expert testimony regarding evidence on deficiencies in behavioral control, but directing lower courts to examine a list of factors in making predictions on dangerousness). The trial court should address the Linehan I factors as well as the committed person’s relevant personal attributes and behavior. See In re Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d 902, 909-10 (Minn.App.1995) (conducting this type of analysis), review denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995). If this analysis tips the scale in favor of clear and convincing evidence, the future dangerousness element is met. See id. (affirming a commitment under the psychopathic personality statute on this basis).
Because of the conflicting expert testimony, the trial court found it necessary to consider other factors in addition to this testimony before reaching the determination that Linehan is likely to engage in future harmful sexual acts. Minnesota courts have previously considered the element of future dangerousness under the psychopathic personality commitment statute. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (requiring a resulting dangerousness to others in order to commit an individual as a psychopathic personality); Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614 (establishing guidelines for determining dangerousness). In Linehan I, the supreme court held trial courts must consider the following factors, if such evidence is presented, when evaluating whether a person is dangerous to the public:
(a) the person’s relevant demographic characteristics (e.g., age, education, etc.);
(b) the person’s history of violent behavior (paying particular attention to recency, severity, and frequency of violent acts);
(e) the base rate statistics for violent behavior among individuals of this person’s background (e.g., data showing the rate at which rapists recidivate, the correlation between age and criminal sexual activity, etc.);
(d) the sources of stress in the environment (cognitive and affective factors which indicate that the person may be predisposed to cope with stress in a violent or nonviolent manner);
(e) the similarity of the present or future context to those contexts in which the person has used violence in the past; and
(f) the person’s record with respect to sex therapy programs.
Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614. These factors apply equally to determining the probability that an individual will engage in harmful sexual conduct for purposes of the sexually dangerous persons statute. The trial court specifically considered and weighed all of the Linehan I factors. See Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d at 910 (holding it is for the trial court to weigh the Linehan I factors as a whole); see also Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614 (requiring trial courts to consider these factors if relevant evidence is presented, but not indicating that a trial court must find any of them dispositive on the issue of dangerousness); In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525, 530-31 (Minn.App.1994) (upholding a commitment, the proceedings for which ended before the release of Linehan I, despite the trial court’s failure to consider demographic data and base rate statistics because the trial court weighed many of the other Linehan I factors), review denied (Minn. Oct. 27, 1994).
*315Linehan specifically objects to consideration by the trial court of his prior offenses. While his last sexual offense occurred in 1975, Linehan has been either in a correctional facility or on probation, and under 24-hour surveillance, since that time. Linehan argues the 20-year gap between his last offense and the current commitment proceedings reduces any prediction of future dangerousness to speculation and conjecture. However, the remoteness of his sexual offenses, due to his supervised environment, does not necessarily negate a finding of future dangerousness. See Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 614 (requiring consideration of certain factors, particularly token a large time gap separates the petition for commitment and the last act of sexual misconduct); Pirkl, 531 N.W.2d at 909 (noting the trial court rejected, in affirming a psychopathic personality commitment, arguments regarding the remoteness of an individual’s action because he had been in prison during the relevant time); In re Welfare of Hofmaster, 434 N.W.2d 279, 281 (Minn.App.1989) (noting, in the context of a mentally ill and dangerous commitment, that good behavior in a hospital does not conclusively determine the issue of dangerousness to others). Significantly, the only time Linehan has been unsupervised in the past 30 years, when he escaped from prison in 1975, he committed another violent, sexually-motivated assault against a 12-year-old girl.
Linehan also argues the trial court inappropriately dismissed the factors of base rate statistics and Linehan’s age. However, the trial court thoroughly analyzed the evidence presented on base rate statistics and determined no clear conclusion followed. It noted the recidivism rate appeared too low because the statistics (1) covered only a three-year period following the release of convicted rapists, (2) considered rearrests for rape only and not other sexual offenses, and (3) likely excluded rapes that went unreported. The trial court also found Linehan has not followed the general pattern of those between the ages of 30 and 40 with antisocial behavior, because he reoffended in his mid-30s. Additionally, one expert testified the criminal behavior of child molesters does not slow with age to the same degree as for other offenders. Because the trial court considered factors appropriate to Linehan’s situation and the study’s reliability, we cannot find error in the trial court’s weighing of the base rate study.
In addition to the Linehan I factors, the trial court concluded Linehan’s recent conduct and personality disorder demonstrates he is likely to commit future acts of harmful sexual conduct. First, at Linehan’s commitment hearing, a security guard testified that, on three separate occasions, Linehan masturbated in his bathroom after engaging in physical play with his seven-year-old stepdaughter. Second, in an interview with a mental health professional, Linehan stated he does not masturbate, in direct contradiction to the security guard’s testimony and his own testimony at the hearing. Third, Linehan displayed aggressiveness toward staff of the St. Peter hospital and on occasion has acted abusively toward correctional officers assigned to his parole residence. And fourth, Linehan has shown neither true remorse for his actions nor empathy for his victims. While Linehan vigorously disputes these factual findings, the record demonstrates (1) the trial court carefully evaluated all the evidence, and (2) there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s findings. See Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01 (requiring due regard to be given to a trial court’s determination of witnesses’ credibility); Joelson, 385 N.W.2d at 811 (attaching particular significance to the trial court’s evaluation of credibility when the findings rest largely on expert testimony and reversing factual findings only when they are clearly erroneous).
The antisocial personality disorder involves a “pervasive pattern” of disregard for and violation of others’ rights. DSM-IV, at 645, 649. The trial court found Linehan’s actions demonstrate the continuing nature of this pattern, which began when he was a teenager and took indecent liberties with a four-year-old girl. Linehan argues these findings fail to establish that his personality disorder caused or will cause harmful sexual conduct. However, the sexually dangerous persons statute does not require a finding of actual causation, but only that an individual’s personality disorder and a course of harmful *316sexual conduct result in a likelihood of future harmful conduct. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a)(3) (employing the language “as a result ”) (emphasis added); Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-16 (finding the psychopathic personality statute, which is not predicated on a lack of criminal responsibility, is constitutional). Under the circumstances, the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that Linehan’s course of harmful sexual conduct and personality disorder results in a high probability that he will engage in further harmful sexual conduct.
II.
Until recently, the psychopathic personality statute provided the only mechanism by which the state could civilly commit dangerous and mentally unstable, but sane, sex offenders. Minn.Stat. § 526.09 (1992) (later amended and recodified at Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18a); see also State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 205 Minn. 545, 550, 287 N.W. 297, 300 (1939) (construing the law to apply to unbalanced, but sane, people), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270, 60 S.Ct. 523, 84 L.Ed. 744 (1940). While potentially broad in its literal application, the supreme court construed the statute’s language to impose clear boundaries on its scope:
[T]he act is intended to include those persons who by a habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who as a result are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.
Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302 (emphasis added).
In 1994, when the legislature amended the psychopathic personality statute to incorporate the Pearson holding, it also enacted a new law, which authorizes the commitment of sexually dangerous persons who clear and convincing evidence shows
(1) ha[vej engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a;
(2) ha[ve] manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction; and
(3)as a result, [are] likely to engage in acts of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a.
Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a). Under this provision, the state need not demonstrate that the person wholly lacks the ability to control his or her sexual impulses. Id., subd. 18b(b) (1994).
Linehan argues the new statute violates his state and federal constitutional rights to substantive due process and equal protection, as well as the prohibitions against ex post facto laws and double jeopardy. The statute’s constitutionality presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Estate of Jones v. Kvamme, 529 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn.1995).
A. Burden of Proof
Individuals who challenge a statute’s constitutionality usually bear the heavy burden of proving their claim beyond a reasonable doubt. Rio Vista Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. County of Ramsey, 335 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Minn.1983), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033, 104 S.Ct. 690, 79 L.Ed.2d 158 (1984). However, if the statute infringes on a fundamental right, the burden shifts to the state to prove the law is necessary to a compelling interest. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn.1993). Linehan argues the trial court erroneously required him to prove the statute violates due process and equal protection. See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914, 916-17 (applying strict scrutiny because commitment burdens a fundamental right).
In both the introduction to and conclusion of its constitutional analysis, the trial court charged Linehan with proving the statute’s unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. While the trial court invoked some of the language of strict constitutional scrutiny (i.e., “compelling interest” and “carefully limited”), a thorough reading of its analysis suggests the trial court placed the burden of proof on Linehan.
This error does not require us to reverse and remand for further consideration, provided a proper application of the law would have produced an identical result. *317See Brecht v. Schramm, 266 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn.1978) (“If the trial court arrives at a correct decision, that decision should not be overturned regardless of the theory upon which it is based.”); cf. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 2118, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (suggesting the court of appeals could have independently tested a statute’s constitutionality under strict scrutiny despite the trial court’s application of a lower standard of review). Accordingly, we must independently evaluate whether the state has proven the law’s constitutionality by demonstrating its narrow tailoring to a compelling interest.
B. Substantive Due Process
At the core of substantive due process lies the right to be free of governmentally-imposed physical restraint. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80, 112 S.Ct. 1780, 1785, 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). The fundamental principles of our democratic society prohibit state incursions into this zone of personal liberty unless the government demonstrates such infringements are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914, 922 (the majority and Wahl, J., dissenting, agreeing strict scrutiny is the applicable constitutional burden of proof); see also Young v. Weston, 898 F.Supp. 744, 748 (W.D.Wash.1995) (same); Young, 857 P.2d at 1000 (same). Linehan argues strict scrutiny cannot tolerate the commitment of sexual predators who retain a measure of self-control.
Linehan agrees society has a compelling interest in protecting its members against the actions of known sexual predators who are mentally unstable and, as a result, almost certain to violate the physical and emotional integrity of their fellow citizens through harmful sexual conduct. Young, 857 P.2d at 1000; State v. Post, 197 Wis.2d 279, 541 N.W.2d 115, 122 (1995); cf. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 (concluding the state has a compelling interest in protecting the public from individuals who suffer from an uncontrollable impulse to commit sexual assaults). However, Linehan argues the state has not proven the sexually dangerous persons statute enjoys a sufficiently close nexus to the government’s compelling interest. See Young, 857 P.2d at 1000-01 (recognizing the state’s compelling interest and holding the constitutional challenge to a similar statute had to rest on the nexus requirement); Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122-24 (recognizing the state’s compelling interest and devoting the bulk of its analysis to the nexus requirement).
Due process unquestionably forbids the government from restraining the eccentric, the socially maladjusted, or even those whose mental disorders do not render them dangerous. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77, 112 S.Ct. at 1784 (requiring the release of mentally ill persons who pose no danger); Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 (implying that commitment of the socially maladjusted would not be constitutional); Pearson, 205 Minn. at 555, 287 N.W. at 302-03 (suggesting it would be unconstitutional to authorize commitment of individuals simply because their sexual appetites lie outside the mainstream). However, due process tolerates mandatory confinement and treatment of those whose “volitional dysfunction[s] * * * grossly impair[ ] judgment and behavior with respect to the sex drive,” making them highly likely to commit sexual assaults. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 (explaining why an antisocial personality disorder can meet the constitutional requirement of “mental illness”); see Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122-24 (upholding as constitutional a nearly identical definition of “mental disorder,” which was used for the statutory commitment of two sexual predators); see also Young, 857 P.2d at 1001-04 (arriving at a similar formulation of the constitutional measure of mental illness and upholding the commitment of two sexual predators under a statute that requires evidence of a mental “abnormality” or “disorder”).
As the supreme court has noted, neither the United States nor the Minnesota Constitution requires obvious lunacy as the predicate for physical confinement. See Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312, 318 n. 4, 319 (Minn.1995) (recognizing that mental illness is a constitutional requirement for civil commitment, but rejecting “an utter lack of control” as the dividing line between acceptable confinement and mandatory release); see also Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15 (reject*318ing the argument that the United States Constitution requires mental illness, as defined by the medical profession, for involuntary commitment); Pearson, 205 Minn. at 550, 287 N.W. at 300 (rejecting a state constitutional challenge of a law providing for the commitment of individuals who are not so insane as to avoid criminal responsibility); see also Young, 857 P.2d at 1006-07 n. 12 (agreeing with Foucha that an “antisocial personality” does not constitute mental illness for purposes of constitutional law, explaining the substantive differences between an “antisocial personality” and an “antisocial personality disorder,” and concluding the latter falls within the constitutional standard for mental illness); cf. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88, 112 S.Ct. at 1789-90 (O’Connor, J., concurring and stating that involuntary commitment should not occur absent some medical justification). Persons whose mental afflictions leave them with a measure of self-control present an especially insidious risk, for they retain the ability to plan, wait, and delay the indulgence of their maladies until presented with a higher probability of success.
Because the sexually dangerous persons statute requires clear and convincing evidence that a committed person suffers from a mental disorder or dysfunction, which affects that person’s volition and judgment so significantly as to render him or her highly likely to continue a pattern of sexual assaults, the state has demonstrated the sexually dangerous persons statute is narrowly tailored to a compelling interest. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-77, 112 S.Ct. at 1783-84 (holding that clear and convincing evidence of mental illness and dangerousness will justify the deprivation of liberty inherent in civil commitment); Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15 (declaring that a “volitional dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex drive” qualifies as “mental illness” within the meaning of Fou-cha ); see Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122-24 (reaching the same conclusion as Blodgett); see also Young, 857 P.2d at 1001-03 (arriving at a conclusion similar to Blodgett).
C. Equal Protection
Linehan also challenges the statute on equal protection grounds, arguing the state has failed to demonstrate that the legislative distinction between (1) the sexually dangerous and (2) the mentally ill and sexually dangerous is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. See Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 312 (defining strict scrutiny as shifting the burden of proof to the state, which must then demonstrate that a statute is necessary to a compelling state interest). However, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Foucha established this difference in situation is of fundamental constitutional significance. In its defense of the basic right to physical liberty, the Constitution will not tolerate the open-ended confinement of the “merely” dangerous. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75-81, 112 S.Ct. at 1783-86. Rather, the community’s interest in security becomes overwhelming when a dangerous person also suffers from a mental illness. See id. (allowing confinement under these circumstances). Because under Foucha, the state must discriminate between (1) the sexually dangerous, and (2) the mentally ill and sexually dangerous in matters of civil commitment, we find Linehan’s equal protection challenge unavailing.
D. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions limit the extent to which the state may penalize unpopular conduct. While protection against double jeopardy immunizes a defendant against multiple punishments for the same offense, the prohibition against ex post facto laws prevents the government from creating or increasing criminal penalties for past conduct. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) (defining the protection against double jeopardy); Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798) (explaining the prohibition against ex post facto laws). These constitutional guarantees apply only to penal laws. Moreover, the strong presumption in favor of a statute’s constitutionality applies until the challenging party has dem*319onstrated the law’s penal nature and, thus, the infringement of a fundamental right. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 369, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2992, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2641, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980), for the proposition that only “the clearest proof’ of overriding punitive purpose or effect will overcome the civil label attached to a statute); Young, 857 P.2d at 997 (quoting id. in analyzing, for purposes of double jeopardy and ex post facto doctrine, the status of Washington’s equivalent to the sexually dangerous persons statute); see also Weston, 898 F.Supp. at 751, 753-54 (applying the same presumption and stating the analysis of a law’s civil or criminal status is identical for double jeopardy and ex post facto purposes); Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d at 109, 113 (requiring defendants to overcome a heavy presumption of constitutionality in challenging Wisconsin’s analog to the sexually dangerous persons statute on double jeopardy grounds and analyzing the law’s status for double jeopardy and ex post facto purposes in the same manner).
Linehan argues the sexually dangerous persons statute’s purpose and effect, the open-ended detention of likely recidivist sexual offenders who have completed them criminal sentences, overcomes its formally civil designation. See Weston, 898 F.Supp. at 753-54 (concluding a similar statute manifested a preoccupation with punishment, rendering it a penal law for double jeopardy and ex post facto purposes). However, if a law’s unpleasant consequences flow from the legislature’s intent to regulate a present condition, and not to punish past behavior, the law is not penal. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (plurality opinion).
The sexually dangerous persons statute serves as a vehicle for treatment of a committed person’s present condition and is qualified by his or her rights to petition for relaxed conditions, immediate release upon successful treatment, and independent judicial review. See Minn.Stat. § 253B.185, subd. 1 (1994) (affording both sexually dangerous persons and people with psychopathic personalities the same rights and procedural safeguards enjoyed by the mentally ill and dangerous); Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 916 (listing the rights to treatment, review, and release enjoyed by a person committed under the psychopathic personality statute). As such, the statute does not endorse punishment, which would subject it to the limitations imposed by the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses, but is a civil and remedial framework from which a committed person may exit as soon as he or she overcomes either his or her mental affliction or dangerousness. See Call, 535 N.W.2d at 319-20 (citing Blodgett as authority for the proposition that the psychopathic personality statute’s treatment component renders the law nonpunitive); see also Young, 857 P.2d at 997 (citing the therapeutic component and right to release when no longer dangerous as factors strongly supporting the court’s ultimate conclusion that the local equivalent of the sexually dangerous persons statute is nonpunitive); Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d at 111 (same). Therefore, the sexually dangerous persons statute is constitutional.
DECISION
There is clear and convincing evidence Li-nehan’s course of harmful sexual conduct and his personality disorder results in a high probability that he will engage in future harmful sexual conduct. The sexually dangerous persons statute, Minn.Stat. § 253B.02, subd. 18b, is valid under both state and federal constitutions. Thus, the trial court properly committed Linehan to the Minnesota Security Hospital for an indeterminate period as a sexually dangerous person.
Affirmed.