Two distinct, though interrelated, issues arise in this case: (1) whether the accusatory hearsay statements inculpating the complaining defendants, contained within the co-defendant confessions at issue, fall within the "statement against interest” exception of MRE *631804(b)(3), and (2) whether the admission of those statements as substantive evidence against the complaining defendants violated their rights — under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions — to confront the witnesses against them. We discuss the first issue in part ii(a) and the second issue in part ii(b). We discuss in part ii(c) whether the admission of the codefendant confessions at the joint trial, whether that be deemed evidentiary or constitutional error or both, can be deemed harmless with regard to any of the complaining defendants.
I. PACTS
Although we generally adopt the statement of facts in the dissent, see post, pp 679-682, we find it necessary to revisit the crucial, disputed codefen-dant confessions by Kerry Jordan and Walter Miller. The complete text of those statements is set forth in appendices to the dissent. Even a casual reading of the confessions leads to the unavoidable conclusion that they contain precisely the kind of inherently suspect and unreliable accusatory hearsay which has historically concerned courts and commentators. Codefendant Jordan said it all when he responded to the interrogator’s question, "Why are you telling me [this statement],” by saying: "Because I’m not going to take the fall alone.” Post, p 706 (emphasis added).
We set forth in the appendix to this opinion the specific statements in the confessions that appear to inculpate, directly or indirectly, one or more of the complaining defendants, with the surnames of the participants substituted for the various nicknames used in the confessions. See post, pp 668-676.
*632II. ANALYSIS
A. THE HEARSAY ISSUE
MRE 802 provides that hearsay evidence is not admissible except where the rules provide otherwise. MRE 804(b)(3), worded almost identically to FRE 804(b)(3),1 provides for the admission as substantive evidence of hearsay "statements against interest,” defined as follows:
Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable person in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.[2]
Michigan, unlike the United States and many other states, has not adopted any "catch-all” exception to the rule against hearsay, cf. FRE 803(24); FRE 804(b)(5), and no other exception has been suggested or appears to apply to the disputed hearsay statements in this case. Thus, if those statements do not properly constitute statements against interest, their admission was erroneous.
It is undisputed that Jordan’s and Miller’s confessions each contain numerous specific statements *633admitting their own involvement in the crime, which were clearly against their penal interests when made and would therefore undoubtedly be admissible as substantive evidence against anyone under MRE 804(b)(3).3 Those statements, however, are not the ones that concern us here. The relevant issue is whether the various statements detailed in the appendix, inculpating the complaining defendants, are also admissible under MRE 804(b)(3) simply because they appear within the same confession as statements concededly against the confessor’s interest, or whether each discrete and specific statement must be shown to separately and intrinsically satisfy the requirements of MRE 804(b)(3).
The dissent would follow a "carry-over” rule.4 Under this rule, discrete assertions within a broader statement are viewed as against interest and therefore admissible — even though they, specifically, are not in fact against the interest of the *634declarant, and may even favor the interest of the declarant — on the theory that the trustworthiness of other assertions within the broader statement (which are concededly against the declarant’s interest) "carries over” and permeates the entire statement with a sort of aura of trustworthiness. Simply to state the rule suggests its inherent implausibility. As we discuss below, the rule is neither generally sound nor, more importantly, can it properly be applied in the special context of accusatory hearsay statements in codefendant confessions, with their unique and long-recognized dangers of self-serving unreliability.
The most distinguished authority which might arguably be read to support the carry-over rule is Dean Wigmore’s treatise, which states that
[sjince the principle is that the statement [against interest] is made under circumstances fairly indicating the declarant’s sincerity and accuracy (§ 1457 . . .), it is obvious that the situation indicates the correctness of whatever he may say while under that influence. In other words, the statement may be accepted, not merely as to the specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same statement. [5 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 1465, p 339. Emphasis in original.]
But this passage leaves undefined the scope of the "statement.” Does "statement” refer to the narrowest discrete or severable assertions uttered by a declarant? Or, as the dissent apparently assumes without analysis, does "statement” automatically encompass an entire confession which may run many pages and contain dozens if not hundreds of discrete and severable assertions? In other words, how does one determine whether a given statement is truly and properly "contained in” a state*635ment against interest? Wigmore, referring to "the living principle” underlying the exception, states that "a . . . useful test appears to be this: All parts of the speech or entry may be admitted which appear to have been made while the declar-ant was in the trustworthy condition of mind which permitted him to state what was against his interest.” Id. at 341.
Unfortunately, with all due respect to Dean Wigmore, the quoted passages suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of the "living principle” which in fact underlies the statement against interest exception. Wigmore’s references to the declarant’s "trustworthy condition of mind,” to the "circumstances” under which the statement is made, and to what the declarant says "while under that influence” depart from the true and proper rationale for trusting the reliability of statements against interest.5 That rationale, properly understood, has nothing to do with the situational or environmental "circumstances” or pressures surrounding the declarant as he makes the statement. The declarant is not necessarily in any generally "trustworthy condition of mind,” nor is he under any "influence” which would automatically render anything he said at that time and under those "circumstances” trustworthy.
Rather, as Wigmore himself states, "[t]he basis of the exception is the principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact distinctly against one’s interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect . . . Id., § 1457, p 329. In *636other words, the rule is based on the commonsense intuition that a reasonable person would be expected to lie, if at all, only in his own favor, and would not harm himself by his own words. " 'The principle is founded on a knowledge of human nature. Self-interest induces men to be cautious in saying anything against themselves, but free to speak in their own favor. We can safely trust a man when he speaks against his own interest.’ ” Id., quoting Gibblehouse v Stong, 3 Rawle 437, 438 (Pa, 1832).
It thus follows by the most elementary logic that our confidence in the trustworthiness of a purported statement against interest extends only insofar as the specific factual assertions contained within the statement are, in fact, against the declarant’s interest. "Such a statement . . . has a guaranty of trustworthiness only insofar as the truth-telling stimulus of the declarant is operative; that is only insofar as the statement or portions of the statement, is against the declarant’s interest.” Deike v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, 3 Ariz App 430, 433; 415 P2d 145 (1966) (emphasis added), cited and quoted in 5 Wigmore, § 1465, p 340, n 2.
The rationale for the statement against interest exception is thus fundamentally different from the rationale for many of the other traditional hearsay exceptions, such as those admitting dying declarations and excited utterances. As the United States Supreme Court has recently noted:
The basis for the "excited utterance” exception, for example, is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-*637examination would be superfluous. Likewise, the "dying declaration” . . . exception[] to the hearsay rule [is] based on the belief that persons making such statements are highly Unlikely to lie. See, e.g., Mattox [v United States, 156 US 237,] 244; 15 S Ct 337; 39 L Ed 409 [1895] ("[T]he sense of impending death is presumed to remove all temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict an adherence to the truth as woüld the obligation of oath”); Queen v Osman, 15 Cox Crim Cas 1, 3 (Eng N Wales Cir, 1881) (Lush, L.J.) ("[N]o person, who is immediately going into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon his lips”) .... [Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805, —; 110 S Ct 3139; 111 L Ed 2d 638, 655 (1990) (some citations omitted); see also MRE 803(2), 804(b)(2).]
Under the logic of these and similar hearsay exceptions, it might well be said that the presumed trustworthiness of the statement derives from the permeating influence of the situation in which the declarant finds himself as he utters the statement, and from his general mental condition thereby created, and that any associated statements made around the same time and under the same circumstances can be presumed to absorb and share that trustworthiness.
It would defy logic and common sense, however, to suppose that the motive for truthfulness presumed to underlie a discrete, specific assertion against interest possesses any such permeating influence, or could somehow cloak all collateral assertions with an equivalent aura of reliability. The presumed trustworthiness of a statement against interest derives not from the circumstances in which the statement is made, or from the general mental condition of the declarant, but only from the specific factual character of the statement itself. The statement is trustworthy *638precisely, and only, to the extent that it is, in fact, against the interest of the declarant.6
Wigmore himself, in several passages, actually seems to reject the logic of the carry-over rule. For example, Wigmore specifically cautions that "[i]t must be remembered that it is not merely the statement that must be against interest, but the fact stated. It is because the fact is against interest that the open and deliberate mention of it is likely to be true.” 5 Wigmore, § 1462, p 337 (emphasis in original).7 In another passage, Wigmore emphasizes the need to parse very carefully the specific factual content of discrete assertions, and to avoid any careless assumption that a declarant’s motivation either to lie or tell the truth with regard to one assertion necessarily carries over to any collateral assertion:
A common illustration of this question is the use of a merchant’s credit entry of payment received (thus against his interest) which at the same stroke has included (thus in favor of his interest) the debit entry of his claim leading to the payment; and, conversely, an agent’s debit and credit account in which the receipts creating liability are on the whole equalled or exceeded by the payments or credits in his favor. When (in the former case) the entry of payment received, or (in the latter case) of an item creating liability is sought to be used, the argument has been made that *639since, taking both sides of the account together, the entrant is not left with any liability and perhaps appears to have a claim for a balance, the matter cannot be said to be against his interest. This argument . . . has since been repudiated. The answer to it is that the entrant’s interest in making the favoring items does not really affect, as a countermotive, his interest against the individual charging items; the entries of the latter, taken by themselves, are to be trusted. [Id., § 1464, pp 338-339. Emphasis in original.]
Applying Wigmore’s logic in this passage, if the declarant’s motivation to make a discrete assertion in his interest "does not really affect” his incentive not to make a separate but closely associated assertion against his interest, then the reverse must also be true: The declarant’s incentive not to make the assertion against interest does not logically lend any credibility to separate, even though closely associated, assertions not sharing that disincentive. Statements not against interest, "taken by themselves,” are not "to be trusted.”
The case law rejecting the carry-over rule is both ample and persuasive. Deike v Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co, supra, although a civil case, is squarely on point. Deike involved an action for conversion against the estate of a man who had allegedly robbed one of the plaintiff’s a&p stores. The trial court admitted as evidence of the decedent’s guilt the custodial confession of a man who stated that he had robbed the store together with the decedent and another man. The court found this to be error requiring reversal because
there is no showing that that part of [the declar-ant’s] statement implicating [the decedent] in the Seattle robbery was in fact against the declarant’s interest — pecuniary, proprietary, penal or otherwise. There is no showing that [the declarant] felt *640any compelling obligation as to the truthfulness of his implication of [the decedent]. This Court can only speculate upon the inducements or reasons which prompted [the declarant] to make the declaration. [3 Ariz App 433. Emphasis added.]
The California Supreme Court rejected the carry-over rule in People v Leach, 15 Cal 3d 419; 124 Cal Rptr 752; 541 P2d 296 (1975), which involved the hearsay statements of two codefendants that each were introduced as evidence against both. The court stated:
[W]e construe the exception to the hearsay rule relating to evidence of declarations against interest ... to be inapplicable to evidence of any statement or portion of a statement not itself speciñcally disserving to the interests of the de-clarant. [Id. at 441. Emphasis added.]
New York’s highest court has also rejected the carry-over rule. See People v Brensic, 70 NY2d 9, 16; 517 NYS2d 120; 509 NE2d 1226 (1987):
If the court decides to allow such evidence [a statement against interest introduced to inculpate the accused], it should admit only the portion of that statement which is opposed to the declarant’s interest since the guarantee of reliability contained in declarations against penal interest exists only to the extent the statement is disserving to the declarant .... [Emphasis added.][8]
*641Federal courts have also rejected the carry-over rule. In United States v Lilley, 581 F2d 182, 188 (CA 8, 1978), the court addressed the applicability of FRE 804(b)(3) to a statement that "contained some material which was against [the declarant’s] interest and some allegations which were not against his interest and which were inculpatory of the accused.” The court stated:
The restriction advocated by McCormick excluding portions of statements which are not against the declarant’s interest is in keeping with the reasoning behind the 804(b)(3) exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 804(b)(3) is based on the guaranty of trustworthiness which accompanies a statement against interest. To the extent that a statement is not against the declarant’s interest, the guaranty of trustworthiness does not exist and that portion of the statement should be excluded. Those portions of [the declarant’s] statement inculpating appellant did not so far tend to subject him to criminal liability and were not so far contrary to his interests that a reasonable man would not have made them unless he believed them to be true. . . . Thus, all portions of [the declarant’s] *642statemént which were not against his interest should have been excluded from evidence because they lacked the indicia of truthfulness associated with Rule 804(b)(3). Also, the small portion of [the declarant’s] statement which was against his interest should have been excluded absent severability from those portions of the statement inculpating the accused. [Id.]
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held:
Given the advantages readily to be perceived in the incrimination of another for a crime in which the declarant himself is implicated, the circumstance that the inculpatory-against-the-accused statement would have probative value against the declarant does not necessarily indicate that, insofar as it implicates the accused, it is sufficiently against the declarant’s interest so as to be reliable. [United States v Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F2d 1092, 1101-1102 (CA 5, 1981). Emphasis in original.]
Other cases rejecting the carry-over rule, at least implicitly, include United States v Bailey, 581 F2d 341, 345, n 4 (CA 3, 1978), United States v Palumbo, 639 F2d 123, 127-128 (CA 3, 1981), United States v Riley, 657 F2d 1377, 1384-1385 (CA 8, 1981), and United States v Vernor, 902 F2d 1182, 1187 (CA 5, 1990).
There are some cases, of course, which support the carry-over rule followed by the dissent, but such cases typically lack significant or persuasive explanation or analysis, and often arise in contexts not fully apposite to the instant case, such as hearsay statements introduced by an accused to exculpate himself. See, e.g., State v Abrams, 140 NJ Super 232, 235-236; 356 A2d 26 (1976), aff’d without opinion 72 NJ 342; 370 A2d 852 (1977) (following the carry-over rule in unpersuasive ipse *643dixit in the context of a statement introduced by the accused to exculpate himself);9 State v Earnest (On Remand), 106 NM 411, 412; 744 P2d 539 (1987) (similarly unpersuasive ipse dixit applying the carry-over rule with no analysis or justification).
Even if some form of carry-over rule were conceded, arguendo, to be appropriate in some circumstances, the overwhelming weight of authority, in both case law and treatises, emphatically rejects any extension of such a rule to the special context of accomplice confessions, given their uniquely suspect and inherently unreliable character. In this regard, it is appropriate to note that Dean Wigmore’s treatise, even if it could be read to ambiguously support the carry-over rule to a limited extent, simply does not focus on the special and unique problems raised by accomplice confessions used to inculpate the accused in a criminal trial.
Judge Weinstein’s treatise does focus very informatively on those problems and takes an almost absolute position against the admission of inculpa-tory hearsay statements in accomplice confessions:10
*644Statements Inculpating Accused. Particularly troublesome is the problem of inculpating statements against penal interest inculpating the accused. Since they are offered against the accused, and by definition declarant is unavailable, confrontation questions arise. Since they are made by someone subject to criminal prosecution, the possibility exists, especially when the statement is made in police custody, that declarant is seeking immunity or hopes to be allowed to plead to a lesser crime, in return for his help to the prosecution in obtaining a conviction. Cross-examination in such instances is particularly important and is usually quite extensive. Generally, the defendant is entitled to a charge with respect to the particular care that needs to be taken in evaluating such accomplice testimony. [4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 804(b)(3)[03], p 804-150.]
After discussing the rigorous inquiry that a trial court should always undertake in assessing an alleged statement against interest in an accom*645plice confession offered to inculpate a criminal defendant, Judge Weinstein concludes that "[because of the dangers involved, exclusion should almost always result when a statement against penal interest is offered against an accused.” Id. at 804-156 (emphasis in original); see also McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 279, pp 825-826.
That the carry-over rule cannot properly be applied in the context of codefendant confessions is abundantly clear from the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Lee v Illinois, 476 US 530; 106 S Ct 2056; 90 L Ed 2d 514 (1986). The Court in Lee addressed the applicability of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation to a hearsay codefendant confession, and stated:
The true danger inherent in this type of hearsay is, in fact, its selective reliability. As we have consistently recognized, a codefendant’s confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant’s conduct or culpability because those passages may well be the product of the codefendant’s desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge himself, or divert attention to another. [Id. at 545. Emphasis added.]
Clearly, Lee envisioned a careful and searching analysis of each speciñc factual assertion contained within any broader statement or confession. While Lee applied constitutional confrontation analysis, the very same concerns of reliability inform the proper analysis under hearsay evidence law.11
Clearly, the assumption behind the carry-over *646rule — that discrete self-serving or neutral assertions within a broader statement somehow absorb an aura of trustworthiness from separate assertions which are against the declarant’s interest — is more than just inherently implausible as a general matter, though it is that. In the context of accomplice confessions, that assumption simply flies in the face of the obvious and long-recognized nature of such confessions as uniquely and especially suspect and unreliable with regard to accusations directed toward alleged accomplices.
Given the inapplicability of any carry-over rule to the confessions in this case, it is necessary to separately analyze the specific accusatory statements contained within them under MRE 804(b)(3). At the outset, the general question arises of how narrowly to divide such statements for analytical purposes. The answer is dictated by the logic of the statement against interest exception, as discussed above. Each factual assertion sought to be admitted under that exception must be viewed as narrowly and specifically as reasonably possible, and the court must separately ask whether each speciñc assertion is so intrinsically against the declarant’s interest that a reasonable person would not have said it unless it were true. In other words, to the extent such statements can be logically and reasonably severed and dealt with independently, they should be. While this might, at first glance, seem an arduous task, it becomes quickly obvious that none of the accusatory statements in the confessions at issue here can reasonably be said to be statements against interest. Indeed, it appears likely, as a general matter, that accusatory statements in codefendant confessions *647will almost never properly qualify as statements against interest.12
While we have listed, in the appendix, sixty-five separate statements contained within the confessions at issue in this case, it is obvious that many of those numbered "statements” themselves contain several distinct and severable statements or assertions.13 With all such assertions, the inquiry is analytically quite simple: Given everything else that the confessor admitted regarding his own participation in the alleged crimes, was it against his interest also to name and accuse the alleged *648accomplices and describe their conduct? With regard to the accusatory statements in these confessions, the answer clearly is no. This conclusion is especially obvious with regard to statements such as no. 11 ("[Watkins] said come on, let’s go beep [Wilbert]”), no. 24 (Answering question, "Did [Hunter] know what was going down?” stating, "Yes”), no. 45 ("[Phillips] told me to drive over on Cloverlawn because we were going on a mission”), and no. 62 ("[Hunter] is the boss and he would have had to order the hit or approve of it”).
It might be argued that some of the statements refer collectively to both the confessor and one or more of the codefendants, and thus are simultaneously against the confessor’s interest and inculpa-tory of the codefendants. But such an argument would fail to appreciate the easily severable nature of such statements. For example, in statements nos. 14-16, 45, 51, and 54, Jordan and Miller describe driving about in search of the intended victim, with each of them present in the car along with Watkins and Phillips. These statements were certainly against Jordan’s and Miller’s interest insofar as they admitted that they themselves were present in the car and that they were part of a group searching for an intended murder victim. But having admitted those facts, was it against either’s interest to go further and specify either Watkins or Phillips as also being present in the car and participating in the scheme? Obviously not. The same logic applies to statements such as no. 22 ("Me and [Phillips] had Uzi’s, [Watkins] had a .357 mag”). It was obviously against Jordan’s interest to say that he had an Uzi, but it was clearly not against his interest to add that Phillips *649also had an Uzi and that Watkins had a .357 magnum.14
In sum, the specific accusatory hearsay statements at issue in this case are simply not statements against interest. Having chosen to confess their own involvement in the crime, Jordan and Miller had nothing to lose by also accusing and inculpating Watkins, Hunter, and Phillips. Indeed, they probably felt they had plenty to gain. See post, pp 657-664. In the end, however, it is unnecessary to speculate whether any particular additional circumstances rendered the hearsay statements at issue especially untrustworthy. It is *650enough to conclude, as the law and the facts clearly dictate, that they are simply not statements against interest under MRE 804(b)(3), that they therefore constitute inadmissible hearsay, and that their admission as evidence against Watkins, Hunter, and Phillips at trial was therefore erroneous.15
B. THE EIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... [US Const, Am VI.]
The Michigan Constitution similarly provides:
In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall *651have the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... [Const 1963, art 1, § 20.]
For more than a quarter century, the United States Supreme Court, relying on the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, has subjected hearsay statements in codefendant confessions introduced to inculpate the accused to the most searching and intensive scrutiny. In Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415; 85 S Ct 1074; 13 L Ed 2d 934 (1965), the Court held that the Sixth Amendment was violated even though the hearsay accomplice confession was not formally admitted as evidence, but was read to the codefendant as he remained mute on the stand, claiming his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, purportedly to "refresh” his memory. The Court rejected that subterfuge and held that the defendant was denied the right to confront and cross-examine his codefendant accuser. See id. at 419-420.
In Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968), the Court held that the danger posed by hearsay codefendant confessions to the defendant’s right of confrontation is so extreme that cautionary instructions to the jury regarding consideration of such evidence in joint trials must be deemed ineffective and constitutionally insufficient. The Court stated:
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the *652jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incrimina-tions devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination. It was against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed. [Id. at 135-136. Citations omitted.]
The Court strongly reaffirmed Bruton in Cruz v New York, 481 US 186; 107 S Ct 1714; 95 L Ed 2d 162 (1987), which held that Bruton’s rejection of the efficacy of cautionary instructions applies even in cases where the complaining defendant himself has confessed, where his confession "interlocks” to a substantial extent with the accusatory hearsay confession of his codefendant, and where the co-defendant’s confession is no more inculpatory of the defendant than the defendant’s own confession. See id. at 191-193.16
In the instant case, of course, there was no cautionary instruction or redaction with regard to the disputed accusatory statements in the codefen-dant confessions, because those statements were admitted as substantive evidence against the complaining defendants under MRE 804(b)(3). The issue here is simply whether such admission was proper.17 The substantive inadmissibility of hear*653say codefendant confessions, while presumed in such cases as Douglas and Bruton, was squarely addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Lee v Illinois, supra.18 The dissent concedes, as it must, that Lee is "[cjentral to our analysis” in this case, see post, p 693, but we must take issue with its understanding of Lee and its application of Lee to this case.
The Court in Lee squarely "rejected] [the state’s] categorization of the hearsay [codefendant confession] involved ... as a simple 'declaration against penal interest.’ That concept defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant.” 476 US 544, n 5.19 Lee, of course, did not thereby categorically bar the admission of *654hearsay statements in codefendant confessions to inculpate the accused. But Lee did thereby reject the possibility that an accusatory hearsay statement in a codefendant confession, purportedly constituting a statement against interest, might on that ground be deemed presumptively admissible without any inquiry into its particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
It is true that Lee avoided deciding whether, as a general matter, statements against penal interest fall within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception,” but that is because the Court clearly found it unnecessary to decide that issue, because it would not have affected or altered the Court’s analysis. (If the issue had been relevant or dispositive, the Court surely would have addressed it.) Lee focused specifically on the problems related to hearsay codefendant confessions introduced against the accused, and found that the "concept” of the statement against interest is simply too broad to be analytically useful (let alone dispositive) in that context. In part, footnote five in Lee appears to recognize that accusatory statements in codefen-dant confessions will not usually, in fact, truly constitute statements against interest. As discussed in part ii(a), the Court’s reasoning in Lee strongly suggests that it fully understood the carry-over issue and properly rejected any carryover rule, at least in this context. Thus, the Court *655may have thought the statement against interest exception "defines too large a class” because particular assertions within a statement generally against interest might not be specifically against interest themselves. See generally part ii(a).
Footnote five in Lee clearly indicates much more, however, than that the Court might simply have found the particular statements at issue to be not truly against the confessor’s interest. Rather, as a general theoretical matter, the Court stated that "[the] concept [of the statement against interest] defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis,” and concluded that it had to analyze the case more narrowly within the context of "a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal defendant.” 476 US 544, n 5. Indeed, the dissent in Lee argued strenuously that the hearsay statements inculpating the accused in that case truly were against the confessor’s interest, even viewed narrowly and insever-ably. See id. at 553, n 6 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting); cf. part ii(a), n 14. It appears that the Court, while not necessarily rejecting that view of the statements, nevertheless believed that they had to be subjected to rigorous scrutiny regarding their "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Thus, the Court in Lee apparently believed that the statement against interest exception "defines too large a class” because, while that exception might confer presumptive reliability on most types of hearsay in most cases, it does not, without more, suffice to cure the especially suspect and uniquely unreliable nature of accusatory hearsay statements in codefendant confessions.
Indeed, central to any proper understanding of Lee is the recognition — as the Court painstakingly emphasized — that Lee, like the instant case, in*656volved hearsay that did not merely fall outside any traditional exception that would have conferred presumptive reliability on it. The hearsay in Lee did not merely lack, at face value, any affirmative indicia of reliability. Rather, because it constituted accusatory hearsay contained in a co-defendant confession, it was properly presumed at the outset to be uniquely and especially suspect and unreliable, much more so than typical, run-of-the-mill hearsay.
Our cases recognize that th[e] truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely threatened when an accomplice’s confession is sought to be introduced against a criminal defendant without the benefit of cross-examination. As has been noted, such a confession "is hearsay, subject to all the dangers of inaccuracy which characterize hearsay generally. . . . More than this, however, the arrest statements of a codefen-dant have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant’s statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.” [Lee, 476 US 541, quoting Bruton, 391 US 141 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted by Lee; emphasis added here).]
Thus, while Lee held that this "presumption [of unreliability] may be rebutted” in accordance with the general analysis of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” set forth in Ohio v Roberts, 448 US 56, 66; 100 S Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980), see Lee, 476 US 543, it is clear that the Roberts analysis should be conducted with much greater rigor in a Lee-type case. It is therefore not surprising that the Court’s analysis of the disputed confession in Lee was constantly and explicitly sensitive to the special dangers of unreliability in that context. See id. at 544-546.
*657The dissent argues that the disputed hearsay statements in the instant case satisfy the test of reliability set forth in Lee. See post, pp 695-701. We discern eight separate grounds on which the dissent rests its finding that these statements bear sufficient particularized indicia of reliability: (1) the statements were voluntarily given, id. at 700, (2) none of the confessing codefendants was offered any " 'leniency in exchange’ for their statements,” id., (3) the statements "were so far contrary to [the confessors’] penal interest that they had to be true,” id. at 700, (4) the statements indicated "personal knowledge” of the underlying events, id. at 701, (5) the confessors confessed soon after their arrests, id., (6) "there is nothing in the record to support an inference that either Jordan or Miller made the statements implicating the others in an attempt to avenge himself, or to demonstrate that he was motivated by a desire to curry favor with his interrogators, or that the state gave either any reason to believe that it would help if he inculpated others,” id., (7) there is "no affirmative evidence of blameshifting” in either Jordan’s or Miller’s confession, and both took a substantial helping of blame themselves, id. at 695, and (8) Jordan’s and Miller’s statements are "consistent” with, and therefore corroborate, each other, id. at 697, 701. Each of these grounds is addressed below, though not in order.
Ground 3 has already been refuted. The accusatory statements contained in these confessions are simply not, by any stretch of the imagination, statements against interest. See part ii(a). Ground 1 was specifically rejected as inadequate by Lee. "[A] finding [of voluntariness] does not bear on the question of whether the confession was also free from any desire, motive, or impulse . . . either to mitigate [the confessor’s] own culpability by *658spreading the blame or to overstate [the accused’s] involvement . . . 476 US 544. Hearsay accusations against codefendants are suspect precisely because the declarant is likely to make them not only voluntarily but eagerly, and because it will usually be in his own interest to do so.
Grounds 4 and 5 find no support in Lee, and plainly do not materially assist in overriding the presumption of unreliability. These factors would appear likely to exist with virtually every codefen-dant confession, and are thus unhelpful in singling out particularly reliable confessions. Virtually every codefendant confession is likely to suggest that the confessor has "personal knowledge” of the relevant events (if not, such statements would hardly be useful evidence for the prosecution), and most confessions, by definition, are taken in police custody soon after arrest. That a statement appears or purports to be based on "personal knowledge” says little or nothing about its potential inaccuracies or biases. The very danger and infirmity of all hearsay is precisely that the defendant has no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant regarding his alleged "personal knowledge,” and regarding "the many possible deficiencies, suppres-sions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a [declarant] . . . .” 5 Wigmore, § 1362, p 3 (describing the underlying theory of the rule against hearsay). Furthermore, the fact that the confessions were taken in police custody soon after arrest has been universally viewed by all persuasive authorities as weighing heavily against the reliability of such statements. See, e.g., Lee, 476 US 541-542; 4 Weinstein & Berger, ¶ 804(b)(3)[03], p 804-154; McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 279, p 826; Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F2d 1102-1104; Brensic, *65970 NY2d 15-16, 20. It is precisely in the context of custodial confessions made to police — in contrast, for example, to "a spontaneous declaration made to friends and confederates,” Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F2d 110220 — that the concerns regarding unreliable codefendant accusations are at their zenith.
Grounds 2, 6, and 7 indicate an even more basic flaw in the analysis of the dissent. By arguing that this record reveals no explicit promises or offers of deals by the police to these confessors, no affirmative proof that these particular confessors were actually motivated by a desire to avenge themselves, spread blame, or curry favor with the police, and "no affirmative evidence of blameshift-ing,” post, p 695, the dissent erroneously suggests that accusatory codefendant confessions should generally be admitted unless, on a case-by-case basis, such specific evidence of unreliability is produced. This turns Lee on its head. The very premise of Lee is that accusatory statements in codefendant confessions are, by their very nature, presumptively unreliable, and that the mere absence of additional, specific indicia of unreliability cannot suffice to overcome that heavy presumption.21 Even if the record in this or any case reveals no explicit promises or inducements by the police, it would depart from common sense to suppose that these or any accomplice confessors could be naively unaware of the fact, surely common knowledge "on the street,” that benefits may often be reaped by cooperating with the police and *660"naming names.”22 The controlling and persuasive authorities are in agreement that the motivation to spread the blame and curry favor with the police need not be affirmatively proven on a case-by-case basis, but rather must be presumed to inhere in the context of custodial confessions.
Thus, the ever-present likelihood that the police will try to induce statements inculpating suspected accomplices, and that, in any event, accomplice confessors will almost always desire to accuse and inculpate their alleged cohorts and will almost always believe (even without police encouragement) that they can help themselves by so doing,23 provides a basis for categorically doubting the reliability of all custodial codefendant confes*661sions.24 This approach is consistent with the reasoning of the Court in Cruz, supra, which rejected the notion that the "devastating” effect of codefen-dant confessions noted by Bruton "should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Rather, that factor was one of the justifications for excepting from the general rule the entire category of codefendant confessions that implicate the defendant in the crime.” 481 US 191 (emphasis added).
With regard to ground 7, it is not entirely clear what the dissent means by "affirmative evidence of blameshifting.” Post, p 695. A confession is intrinsically suspect whenever, on its face, it imputes criminal liability to one or more accomplices by reporting or describing their alleged criminal conduct. To speak of "blameshifting,” of course, implies that the confessor’s accusations may be inaccurate or biased. But there is no way to tell, from the confession itself, whether the accusations are, in fact, true or false. It is entirely possible, in this as in any codefendant confession case, that the confessors’ accusations are true and accurate. But the point of Lee and the general principles governing this area is that the hearsay character of such accusations precludes the vital probing and testing of confrontation and cross-examination, and that the context in which this kind of hearsay arises requires the presumption that such accusations are too unreliable to be properly admissible evi*662dence. That presumption cannot logically be overcome simply because it seems, from the contents or wording of the confession itself, that the confessor is not shifting or spreading blame in an especially obvious or suspicious manner. A canny confessor seeking to protect himself and shift blame to others will obviously strive to make his confession seem as honest and free of "blameshifting” as possible.
Ground 7 also erroneously suggests that the mere fact that the confessor takes some helping of blame himself renders his accusations of others more reliable. At bottom, this amounts to no more than a resurrection in disguised form of the invalid carry-over theory regarding statements against interest. See generally part ii(a). Lee plainly rejected any notion that accusatory statements in a codefendant confession are rendered more reliable simply because the confessor also inculpates himself (which is virtually always going to be the case). The dissent in Lee noted that the codefendant confessor in that case severely inculpated himself, indeed, that his "confession was less favorable in all respects to his own interests than [the complaining defendant’s own] confession . . . .” 476 US 553. Yet the Court in Lee still found the accusatory statements intolerably unreliable, noting that "[t]he true danger inherent in this type of hearsay is . . . its selective reliability. . . . [A] codefendant’s confession is presumptively unreliable as to the passages detailing the defendant’s conduct or culpability . . . .” Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
Even if the analysis of the dissent with regard to grounds 6 and 7 were theoretically proper, the dissent misapplies that analysis by simply ignoring the numerous statements in Jordan’s and Miller’s confessions which, in fact, do pointedly shift and *663spread blame onto the complaining defendants, minimize the confessors’ own involvement, and suggest that the confessors were indeed motivated to inculpate the others in the hope of helping themselves. We have already noted the most dramatic of these statements: Jordan’s declaration, at the very outset of his confession, that he was talking to the police ”[b]ecause I’m not going to take the fall alone” (emphasis added). See, also, in the appendix, statements no. 23 (Jordan answering question, "Why did you guys want to kill [Wilbert]?” stating, "It was really [Watkins] who wanted him”), no. 42 (Miller, after many of the preparations for the crime had allegedly been completed by the others, claiming, "That’s when I found out what was going down”), no. 62 (Miller answering question, "Who ordered [the hit]?” stating, "[Hunter] is the boss and he would have had to order the hit or approve of it”), no. 63 (Miller, in response to an open-ended question, volunteering statements that "[Hunter] was in the narcotics business,” that Hunter "was an underboss enforcer for and body guard for” another drug boss, and that after the other drug boss got killed, "[Hunter] kind of took over [his] action”), and no. 65 (Miller answering question, "If a hit would be planned ahead of time, would you be informed of it?” stating, "No, that would be between [Hunter], [Phillips], and [Jordan], all I would do is drive, and I wouldn’t find out until it was about to happen”).
Indeed, the confessors in this case frequently attempted to shift responsibility even for their own actions onto the complaining defendants, by claiming, at various points, that they acted only in response to orders given by one or the other of the complaining defendants. See statements nos. 11, 27, 43-45, 51, 52, 54, and 62. Miller also denied participating in any of the actual shooting, and *664denied knowing why the hit was ordered. In sum, we can only express puzzlement at the dissent’s assertion that there is "no affirmative evidence of blameshifting” in these confessions. Post, p 695.
Finally, with regard to ground 8, the dissent errs in its reliance on the fact that Jordan’s and Miller’s confessions are "consistent” with each other. Post, pp 697, 701. In the first place, this observation misunderstands the "interlock” theory discussed in Lee, 476 US 545-546, and in Cruz, 481 US 193-194. The allegedly relevant consistencies in Lee and Cruz were between the codefendant’s hearsay confession and the complaining defendant's own confession. In this case, Hunter and Phillips did not make any incriminating statements to the police, and Watkins’ two statements were not introduced at trial. The interlock between Jordan’s and Miller’s confessions is far less significant in view of the fact that they had precisely the same presumptive motive to inculpate Watkins, Hunter, and Phillips.
In any event, the United States Supreme Court, just last year, squarely prohibited reliance on corroborative evidence of any kind in assessing whether presumptively unreliable hearsay bears sufficient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” for Confrontation Clause purposes. See Idaho v Wright, 497 US 805; 110 S Ct 3139; 111 L Ed 2d 638 (1990). Wright held that " 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ must be shown from the totality of the circumstances, but we think the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of belief.” 111 L Ed 2d 655. "To be admissible under the Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inher*665ent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence at trial.” Ill L Ed 2d 657. The Court reasoned that
the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement’s "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility. [Id.][25]
Wright specifically rejected reliance on either corroborative physical evidence, hearsay statements, or trial testimony, see 111 L Ed 2d 659, 664-665, and thus clearly overruled the dicta in both Lee and Cruz regarding reliance on the "interlocking” consistency or corroboration of confessions.26
*666In sum, the admission of the accusatory hearsay statements in these confessions as evidence against Watkins, Hunter, and Phillips plainly violated their right of confrontation under both the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Not only were the statements not in any sense against interest, but, just as in Lee, they were "given in response to the questions of police, who ... no doubt knew what they were looking for, and [they] w[ere] not tested in any manner by contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel, or its equivalent.” Lee, 476 US 544. These statements suffer from the classic indicia of unreliability affecting virtually all custodial codefendant confessions. The heavy presumption of unreliability is not overcome by any particularized indicia of inherent trustworthiness, applying the proper analysis. To the extent that we may properly draw any particularized inferences about the motivations which may actually have prompted Jordan and Miller to make these statements, such inferences tend to support excluding rather than admitting them. Jordan explicitly, and Miller implicitly, made clear that their primary concern was "not to take the fall alone.”
It may be that only a hearsay confessional statement strongly, specifically, and inseverably against the confessor’s interest could ever conceivably qualify for admission under the test enunciated in Lee, and even then, the most rigorous and exacting scrutiny would be required to determine whether the prosecution has overcome the heavy presumption of unreliability. We agree with Judge *667Weinstein’s wise counsel that "[b]ecause of the dangers involved, exclusion should almost always result when a statement against penal interest is offered against an accused.” 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 804(b)(3)[03], p 804-156 (emphasis in original).
In this case both Michigan’s rule against hearsay and the constitutional right of confrontation were plainly violated.
C. HARMLESS ERROR
With regard to both evidentiary and constitutional errors, Michigan’s harmless error rule requires that the appellate court be able to confidently conclude, beyond any reasonable doubt, that the error did not affect the jury’s verdict. See People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 563; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). It is clear that the erroneous admission of Jordan’s and Miller’s confessions as evidence against the complaining defendants in this case— whether that error be deemed constitutional or merely evidentiary — cannot be deemed harmless with regard to either Watkins, Hunter, or Phillips. While the properly admitted evidence against these defendants was substantial, the hearsay confessions provided a uniquely devastating and detailed account of the alleged crime. Any doubt on this score is dispelled by the fact that the jury specially asked and was permitted to reexamine copies of the two confessions during deliberation. It would be virtually impossible to find the error harmless in light of such a direct indication that the jury was specifically concerned with the erroneously admitted evidence.
For these reasons, these defendants’ convictions must be reversed and remanded for retrial without the erroneously admitted codefendant confessions.
*668III. CONCLUSION
The right of confrontation is not a hairsplitting technicality designed to needlessly hamper or impede the operation of our criminal justice system. It is a vital component of the Bill of Rights and the American tradition of justice, which serves not only the goal of protecting the liberty of presumptively innocent defendants — and thereby us ail— but also, and inseparably so, the ultimate truth-seeking goal of the trial process itself. These goals are equally served by the exclusion of hearsay — an intrinsically suspect and presumptively unreliable form of evidence — unless it is properly found to fall within one of the established exceptions set forth in the Rules of Evidence.
We would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for retrial without the inadmissible hearsay.
Levin, J., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.APPENDIX
A. THE JORDAN CONFESSION
1. "[Watkins], another guy who worked for me came over to 9555 Pinehurst and said that Cliff was at home.”
2. "Then me, [Miller], [Phillips] went in a black [C]ougar and drove over to Cliff’s house. [Watkins] and another guy followed us in their car.”
3. "We got the gun from Cliff and [Watkins] got in the car with us.”
4. "[Watkins] said, T just saw [Payne] go to the store, we should get him.’ ”
5. "[Miller] and [Phillips] got out of the car with [Watkins]. They waited by the alley for [Payne] and brought him back to the car.”
*6696. [Answering question, "Were they armed?”] "Yes, [Phillips] had an Uzi, [Watkins] had the gun we got from Cliff, [Miller] didn’t have anything.”
7. "When we got [Payne] to the car [Watkins] and [Phillips], no [Watkins] and [Miller] got in the back seat with him. They made him bend over and we went back to 9555 Pinehurst.”
8. "We all went into the basement and they [apparently Watkins, Phillips, and Miller] questioned [Payne]. They were questioning him about a guy name[d] [Wilbert].”
9. "I went outside. Then [Hunter] came to the house. I told [Hunter] we got [Payne] in the basement and we went downstairs.”
10. "[Payne] said I’ll beep [apparently, contact by beeper] [Wilbert] because he didn’t want us to kill him.”
11. "[Watkins] said come on, let’s go beep [Wilbert].”
12. "Me, [Phillips], [Miller], [Watkins] and [Payne] drove over to the Mendota and [Payne] beeped [Wilbert].”
13. "[Phillips] gave [Payne] an address off the top of his head on Cloverlawn and [Payne] gave it to [Wilbert]. [Hunter] was there with us.”
14. "After we made the call, me, [Phillips], [Watkins], [Miller] and [Payne] went on Cloverlawn. At first we just drove down the street. We [saw] [Wilbert] parked near Tireman. He was pulling off and we were behind him.”
15. "We [Jordan, Phillips, Watkins, Miller, and Payne] went back to Mendota and [Payne] beeped [Wilbert] again. I don’t remember if [Hunter] was there or not.”
16. "After [Payne] called, we went back on Clo-verlawn, me, [Phillips], [Miller], [Watkins] and [Payne] and parked. We gave [Wilbert] another *670address this time. Me, [Phillips], [Watkins], and [Payne] got out of the car. We told [Payne] to go and stand in front of the address we gave [Wilbert].”
17. "We waited about twenty or thirty minutes and decided to leave because it was raining a little bit and [Wilbert] had not showed up. We all got back into the car and started to leave and that’s when we saw [Wilbert].”
18. "We came around the block and parked on the side street, I think it was Belton; but I’m not sure. Me, [Phillips] and [Watkins] got out.”
19. "Me and [Phillips] went to one side of the street. [Watkins] was on the other. We were walking towards [Wilbert]. He was on [Watkins’] side of the street coming off the porch.”
20. "[Wilbert] went to get in his car. That’s when the shooting started.”
21. "[Wilbert] took off in his car. We went back to our car and went back on Pinehurst. [Watkins] and [Payne] got out and we got out for a while. Then me, [Miller] and [Phillips] left.”
22. [Answering question, "What kind of gun did you, (Watkins) and (Phillips) have?”] "Me and [Phillips] had Uzi’s, [Watkins] had a .357 mag, the gun we got from Cliff.”
23. [Answering question, "Why did you guys want to kill (Wilbert)?”] "Because [Payne] was working with us, then he quit us and was working for [Wilbert]. It was really [Watkins] who wanted him.”
24. [Answering question, "Did (Hunter) know what was going down?”] "Yes.”
25. [Answering question, "Are there any corrections (to the statement)?”] "Yes, when we picked up [Payne] [apparently referring to statement no. 5], [Watkins] stayed in the car, [Phillips] and *671[Miller] got out. [Phillips] had the Uzi, [Miller] had the .357.”
B. THE MILLER CONFESSION
26. "On the day the shooting happened, [Watkins] came over to 9555 Pinehurst and said that Cliff wanted to give the gun [a .357 revolver] back to us.”
27. "[Hunter] instructed us to get the gun.”
28. "Me, [Phillips], [Jordan] went in a black [C]ougar, I think it’s a 1979, over to Cliff’s house.”
29. "[Watkins] and a guy who I don’t know got into a blue car and led the way to Cliff’s.”
30. "When we got to Cliff’s he was on the porch, [Jordan] got the gun from him .... Before we left [Watkins] got out [of] the car he was in and got into our car. After we got the gun we left.”
31. [Answering question, "Was anyone in the car armed before Cliff gave you the revolver?”] "Yes, [Jordan] had a Mack-10, [Phillips] had a[n] Uzi 9 mm, I was unarmed, and [Watkins] got the .357 from Cliff; but it wasn’t loaded. The rest of the guns were loaded.”
32. "We were just going around the block when [Watkins] spotted a gun [sic] who was walking out of a store. [Watkins] said, that’s, then he said the guy’s name; but I don’t remember the name.” [This was apparently Payne.]
33. "We turned the corner and pulled over. [Phillips] and me got out of the car and walked to an alley. [Phillips] got behind a garbage dumpster and I was in front of it.”
34. "The guy who was walking [Payne] came across the street and started turning into the alley when I stopped him. I said don’t move. The guy stopped and said don’t kill me. [Phillips] jumped out and was standing behind me. I grabbed the *672guy and walked him to the car and put him in the back seat with [Watkins], then I got in the back seat with him.”
35. [Answering question, "Were either you or (Phillips) armed?”] "Yes, I had the .357, it was unloaded, [Phillips] had the Uzi.”
36. "When we got [back to 9555 Pinehurst] [Phillips], [Jordan] and [Watkins] took [Payne] into the basement.”
37. "[Hunter] was not at the house when we first arrived, either [Phillips] or [Jordan] went down the street, found [Hunter] and told him what had happened.”
38. "[Hunter] then came back to the house with either [Phillips] or [Jordan] and went into the basement.”
39. "Me, [Phillips] and [Hunter] were in one part of the basement talking about what happened. We [apparently Miller and Phillips] told him [apparently Hunter] about us going over theré and getting the gun, and bringing [Payne] back with us.”
40. [After Phillips, Jordan, Hunter, Watkins, and Payne had left 9555 Pinehurst] "I left 9555 Pinehurst and went over to Mendota where they were. When I got to Mendota I went up on the porch and [Phillips], [Jordan], [Hunter], [Watkins] and the other guy [Payne] sat on the porch talking about the guy who had beeped, all I remember is that the guy said he was waiting for someone to call him back.”
41. "The guy finally called, when he called I was back on Pinehurst checking the house. I went back on Mendota and got the car and went and bought some gas and returned to Pinehurst. Everyone was there, [Phillips], [Hunter], [Jordan], [Watkins] and the other guy [Payne].”
*67342. "I parked the car and me, [Phillips], [Jordan] and [Hunter] just started walking down the street and talking. That’s when I found out what was going down.”
43. "[Hunter] told me to get into the car and drive to Mendota and Westfield with the guy [apparently Payne], and wait.”
44. "I went back to Pinehurst, got the guy [Payne], put him in the car and went to where [Hunter] told me to go.”
45. "[Phillips], [Jordan], and [Watkins] came and got into the car, [Phillips] told me to drive over on Cloverlawn because we were going on a mission and that we were going to meet the guy on Clover-lawn. I drove to Cloverlawn between Belton and Tireman, when we got there the guy who I took out of the Pinehurst house [Payne] pointed out a little red car and said that’s them. They [sic] guy [apparently Wilbert] was coming off of the porch and was getting into his car, I speeded up to try to catch up with him, but he pulled off. He made a right on Tireman and circled the block. I tried to follow him but lost him. I caught back up with him on the sidestreet off of Tireman. I followed him and stopped on Brighton and Majestic.”
46. "[Phillips], [Jordan] and [Watkins] got out of the car and started to walk up Majestic towards the red car.”
47. "[Watkins] went into the alley. [Phillips] and [Jordan] stayed on the sidestreet. By the time they got there the guy was gone. They came back into the car and I tried to follow the guy; but I lost him.”
48. "We went back on Mendota, [Phillips], [Jordan], [Watkins] and the other guy [Payne] went inside, I drove off and went and made a phone call.”
*67449. "I went back to the house on Mendota, and stood on the porch. All of them came out, [Phillips], [Jordan], [Watkins], [Hunter] and the guy [Payne].”
50. "[Hunter] was mad. He didn’t say anything but by knowing him I could tell he was mad.”
51. "[Phillips] or [Jordan] said let’s go and I got back in the car with [Phillips], [Jordan], [Watkins] and the other guy [apparently Payne].”
52. "[Phillips] told me to go back on Cloverlawn and that they called the guy [apparently Wilbert] again and had given him another address.”
53. "While driving down Cloverlawn I saw the red car on Mackenzie, I made a left on Joy [R]oad, [Phillips], [Jordan] and [Watkins] were out of the car by this time. I dropped them off on Cloverlawn by the alley, I went into a lot on Northlawn and Joy Road, turned around then made a left on Joy [R]oad and picked all three of them up at Clover-lawn and Joy [R]oad.”
54. "Once they [Phillips, Jordan, and Watkins] got into the car I drove to Roselawn and made a right, going back to Tireman, then another right on Belton. I cruised up to the alley with the lights off and stopped. [Phillips], [Jordan] and [Watkins] got out of the car and walked up to Cloverlawn. Before they got out either [Phillips] or [Jordan] told me to wait and that I was to crash into the red car if they tried to get away.”
55. "As they [Phillips, Jordan, and Watkins] were walking away from our car I heard someone say, he turned around.”
56. "I proceeded up Belton to Northlawn then to Mackenzie, turned and parked on the corner of Cloverlawn and Mackenzie. I saw the red car, it was like in the middle of the block. By the time I parked the shooting started.”
*67557. "The red car pulled off, I realized that I wasn’t where I was supposed to be and pulled off behind him. The red car made a left on Tireman, I stopped on Cloverlawn and Belton and picked up [Phillips], [Jordan] and [Watkins]. We tried to chase the car but he got away.”
58. "We went back to the house, Wykes, that’s where we followed him to earlier, but he wasn’t there. Then we went back to Mendota, [Phillips], [Jordan], [Watkins] and the other guy [Payne] got out. I went and made another phone call and then went back to Mendota. Everyone was on the porch, [Phillips], [Jordan], [Watkins], [Hunter] and the other guy [Payne]. They took the car and told me to meet them back on Pinehurst. I walked back to Pinehurst, 9555, we all went inside and talked about what happened.”
59. "Everyone was mad at me and blamed me for missing the guy. [Hunter] told me you better start learning how to think. The guy who I didn’t know [apparently Payne] said you just signed my death warrant. We also discussed what to do with the guy who I didn’t know [apparently Payne]. [Hunter] said to let him go. I left and went to my mother’s house. Everyone was still on Pinehurst when I left.”
60. [Answering question, "What type of weapons did the three guys have who did the shooting?”] "[Phillips] and [Jordan] had Uzi’s, [Watkins] had the .357.”
61. [Answering question, "Who loaded the .357?”] "I don’t know but before [Watkins] left the car he checked it and said it was loaded.”
62. [Answering question, "Who ordered (the hit)?”] "[Hunter] is the boss and he would have had to order the hit or approve of it.”
63. [Answering question, "What relationship be*676tween you, (Phillips), (Jordan), (Watkins) and (Hunter)?”] "Me, [Phillips] and [Hunter] grew up knowing each other. I met [Jordan] after I got with the crew and that’s also when I met [Watkins]. [Hunter] was in the narcotics business. He was an underboss enforcer for and body guard for Farmer, he’s the guy who got killed on the expressway, Wendell Henry. After he got killed, [Hunter] kind of took over Farmer’s action, he was still working for someone, but I don’t know who. Me, [Phillips], [Jordan], were the enforcers for [Hunter]. An enforcer is a person who makes sure everything is going all right, and who straightens things out if there [sic] not.”
64. [Answering question, "Do you know what happened to the guns that were used?”] "They were kept by the guys who had them.”
65. [Answering question, "Are there any additions or corrections you want made?”] "The only other thing is that it was not a planned hit for that day, we were only supposed to get the gun, the rest just happened afterwards.” [Answering question, "If a hit would be planned ahead of time, would you be informed of it?”] "No, that would be between [Hunter], [Phillips], and [Jordan], all I would do is drive, and I wouldn’t find out until it was about to happen.”
The only difference is that the Michigan rule refers to a "reasonable person” rather than a "reasonable man.”
A condition for the admissibility of a statement against interest under MRE 804(b)(3) is that the declarant be shown to be unavailable under MRE 804(a). It is undisputed that declarants Jordan and Miller were unavailable in this case because they asserted their Fifth Amendment privilege not to testify. See MRE 804(a)(1).
We thus do not hold, as the dissent erroneously suggests, see post, pp 689-690, that statements against penal interest are categorically inadmissible to inculpate an accused. We agree that the framers of FEE 804(b)(3), on which our own MRE 804(b)(3) is modeled, forswore such a simplistic approach, which would have rendered all our present discussion superfluous. As we discuss in n 14, it is indeed possible to envision hypothetical statements in accomplice confessions which would be admissible against an accused under MRE 804(b)(3). In any event, we reject the seemingly result-oriented criticism that we render MRE 804(b)(3) "meaningless,” post, p 690, simply because our analysis will make it more difficult for the prosecution to introduce statements in accomplice confessions to inculpate the accused. The only proper inquiry is whether any given statement is indeed— truly, properly, and speciñcally analyzed — a "statement against interest.” Whatever results flow from our analysis simply reflect the true and proper scope of MRE 804(b)(3).
The dissent devotes substantial discussion to the historical issue regarding whether statements against penal interest should generally enjoy the same presumption of reliability as statements against economic interest. See post, pp 685-689. We are puzzled by this discussion because we have absolutely no disagreement on this point with the dissent, nor is this issue even disputed in this case. Our primary disagreement with the dissent regarding MRE 804(b)(3) concerns the carry-over rule.
There is nothing novel or unprecedented in questioning Dean Wigmore’s reasoning, sound though it generally is. The United States Supreme Court recently rejected his reasoning on another important point relating to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. See Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012, 1018, n 2; 108 S Ct 2798; 101 L Ed 2d 857 (1988) (criticizing and rejecting Wigmore’s view of the relationship between visual confrontation at trial and cross-examination).
This analysis is consistent with that offered nearly half a century ago by Professor Bernard Jefferson. See Jefferson, Declarations against interest: An exception to the hearsay rule, 58 Harv L R 1, 59-63 (1944).
It is really quite curious that Wigmore overlooks the obvious and basic conflict between the logic of this passage and the carry-over rule suggested in § 1465. The notion that "the statement may be accepted, not merely as to the specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same statement,” § 1465, p 339 (emphasis in original), is utterly at war with the eminently logical reminder that "[i]t is because the fact is against interest that the open and deliberate mention of it is likely to be true,” § 1462, p 337 (emphasis added).
To the same effect is State v Allen, 139 NJ Super 285, 288; 353 A2d 546 (1976), which involved a hearsay statement sought to be introduced as exculpatory evidence by the defendant in a robbery case. In the disputed statement, the declarant admitted his own involvement in the robbery and named three accomplices, conspicuously leaving out the defendant. The court upheld the exclusion of the statement as follows:
The robbery delineated by the evidence was not committed by one felon; it involved three persons. As a consequence, the *641statement by [the declarant] that he committed the offense does not in itself exculpate defendant Allen. Although that portion of the statement would come within the [statement against interest] hearsay exception , it would not be material on the issue of Allen’s guilt. The presence of [the declarant], even if true, would not necessarily exclude the hypothesis of guilt of Allen.
The remainder of the alleged statement referring to three other participants would not be admissible under [the statement against interest exception] because [the declarant’s] reference to the involvement of others is clearly not against his own interest. Similarly, his discussion relating to [one of the named confederates], his physical description and his involvement in the offense would be pure hearsay beyond the scope of any recognized exception. [Id. Emphasis added.]
Given the greater liberality in admitting exculpatory evidence, see n 9, Allen’s rejection of the carry-over rule even in that context provides especially strong support for rejecting it where, as here, the disputed statement is introduced to inculpate the defendant.
Although both MRE 804(b)(3) and its federal counterpart indicate skepticism regarding the trustworthiness of statements against penal interest "offered to exculpate the accused,” by requiring in that context that "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement,” pressures exist to exercise relatively greater liberality in admitting exculpatory evidence, because of the defendant’s fundamental due process right (a right of somewhat uncertain contours) to present any reliable exculpatory evidence. See, e.g., Green v Georgia, 442 US 95; 99 S Ct 2150; 60 L Ed 2d 738 (1979); Chambers v Mississippi, 410 US 284; 93 S Ct 1038; 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973). As we note in n 14, most persuasive authorities favor applying the "corroborating circumstances” requirement to any hearsay statements offered to inculpate the.accused as well.
Judge Weinstein is less critical of the carry-over rule in his general discussion of the statement against interest exception, as applied to the full range of cases including civil litigation. See 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 804(b)(3)[02], p 804-138 (expressing mild criticism of Professor Jefferson’s stringent rejection of the carryover rule, see n 6, on the ground that "[ejxperience with our intelli*644gent juries suggests that this view is too pessimistic”); see also post, p 689, n 17 (the dissent, citing this passage in Weinstein, while ignoring both its context and Weinstein’s rigorous stance against admitting alleged statements against penal interest in the context of hearsay accusations in codefendant confessions introduced to inculpate the accused). We would disagree with the suggestion that "[tjhere is no reason why, when admitting [a hearsay statement], the court should not explain to the jury the theory upon which this hearsay is being introduced so that it can evaluate more accurately the probative force of the disserving, neutral, and self-serving elements of the statement.” 4 Weinstein & Berger, supra. This appears to suggest that the court might permit the jury itself to assess whether or not an alleged statement against interest (or portion thereof) is or is not, in fact, "disserving,” "neutral,” or "self-serving,” and then to assess its "probative force” in that light. But the fundamental premise of evidence law is that the court alone, not the jury, decides threshold questions of admissibility. See, e.g., MRE 104(a). The jury cannot properly be permitted to "evaluate . . . the probative force” of a hearsay statement (or portion thereof) which is, in fact, “neutral” or “self-serving,” because such a statement does not properly fall within the statement against interest exception in the first place. The jury should not be permitted to "evaluate” any hearsay statement under the statement against interest exception until and unless the court has determined that that speciñc statement is indeed intrinsically against the declarant’s interest and therefore admissible.
Other cases emphasizing the special duty of courts to carefully scrutinize purported statements against interest contained in accomplice confessions, where offered to inculpate the accused, include Brensic, 70 NY2d 14-16, Standifur v State, 64 Md App 570, 586-587; 497 A2d 1164 (1985), State v Hoak, 107 Idaho 742, 747-748; 692 P2d 1174 (1984), and Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F2d 1101-1104.
The dissent’s argument that our analysis of the specific alleged statements against interest in this case is "unconstitutional” under Chambers v Mississippi, n 9 supra, is without merit. See post, pp 702-703. In the first place, Chambers involved a criminal defendant’s constitutional claim to introduce exculpatory hearsay evidence. Thus, the constitutional concern raised in Chambers could not possibly apply to a case, like this one, where the prosecution seeks to introduce inculpatory hearsay evidence. As we have already noted, see ns 8-9, it may well be, because of the very constitutional right enunciated in Chambers, that the relevant analysis would be more liberal with regard to admissibility where exculpatory rather than inculpa-tory evidence is involved. This would merely reflect our legal system’s historic principle that it is better for ten guilty people to go free than for one innocent person to go to jail. We do not prejudge in any way the proper analysis in any hypothetical future case involving a hearsay statement against interest introduced to exculpate the accused.
Furthermore, even if our analysis had been applied to Chambers in its full rigor, the result in Chambers would not have been affected. The specific disputed hearsay statements in Chambers, unlike in this case, were not accusatory statements implicating accomplices, but rather were confessional statements directly and inseverably incriminating the declarant. They were also not made while in police custody, but rather were confided to "close acquaintance^] shortly after the murder had occurred.” See Chambers, 410 US 300. Finally, the dissent ignores the fact that the Court in Chambers placed significant reliance on the fact that the hearsay declarant was actually available for cross-examination at the trial. Id. at 301 and n 20.
A "statement” for MRE 804(b)(3) purposes obviously cannot be defined in any superficial grammatical sense: for example, as a complete sentence. A single sentence might easily string together many separate (and perhaps completely unrelated) assertions or statements, some of which may be against interest, some neutral, and some blatantly self-serving. Only the first category can properly qualify under MRE 804(b)(3).
It is conceivable, of course, that a hypothetical codefendant confession might contain an accusatory statement which is also intrinsically and inseverably against the confessor’s interest, even analyzing the statement narrowly and separately. Cf. Lee v Illinois, 476 US 553, n 6 (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that certain inculpatory statements in the codefendant confession in that case, in contrast to "the typical confession implicating an accomplice,” were "inseverablfy]” against the confessor’s interest, while conceding that "fi]n most cases, the inculpation of the accomplice is 'collateral’ to the confession, in that the allegations implicating the accomplice are not found in portions of the statement directly adverse to the declarant’s penal interest”). No such statements appear in the confessions at issue in this case, however. Moreover, even where a specific accusatory statement is properly found to be intrinsically and inseverably against the confessor’s interest, most persuasive authorities hold that the proponent of the statement must still surmount the additional hurdles of demonstrating that the statement is sufficiently strongly and predominantly against the confessor’s interest to dispel the inherently suspect nature of such accusations, demonstrating the absence of custodial circumstances typically rendering such accusations unreliable, and producing corroboration at least as strong as (and perhaps stronger than) that required by FRE 804(b)(3) and MRE 804(b)(3) with regard to statements offered to exculpate the accused. See, e.g., 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, ¶ 804(b)(3)[03], pp 804-150 to 804-156; McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 279, p 826; Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F2d 1098-1104; Brensic, 70 NY2d 14-16. Again, however, because no statements of this sort are implicated in this case, we need not exhaustively address the standards which should govern their admissibility. A hearsay statement in a codefendant confession which is not, on its face, specifically and intrinsically against the confessor’s interest, is inadmissible under MRE 804(b)(3) without more, and no need exists in that event to inquire further into any possible circumstantial indicia of reliability.
Because Jordan’s and Miller’s confessions, to the extent they do not inculpate or accuse Watkins, Hunter, or Phillips, are simply irrelevant to the guilt of the latter three, the confessions obviously should have been excluded altogether from their trial. It is well established, of course, that a jury cannot reasonably be expected to disregard an inculpatory codefendant confession simply on the basis of a cautionary instruction. See Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968); Cruz v New York, 481 US 186; 107 S Ct 1714; 95 L Ed 2d 162 (1987). While the Bruton rule was enunciated in the context of constitutional confrontation concerns, it clearly applies with equal force to codefendant confessions that are inadmissible as a matter of hearsay evidence law. The introduction of inculpatory hearsay statements in codefendant confessions that do not properly fall within the statement against interest exception will always raise grave constitutional concerns. Thus, Watkins, Hunter, and Phillips should either have been tried separately from Jordan and Miller or the disputed confessions should have been redacted, if feasible, in a manner sufficient to satisfy evidentiary and constitutional concerns. This Court addressed the redaction issue in People v Banks, 438 Mich 408; 475 NW2d 769 (1991). The joint trial problem will not arise on remand in this case, of course, because this Court has denied Jordan’s and Miller’s applications for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals affirmance of their convictions, and they, therefore, need not be retried.
On the same day that Cruz was decided, the Court addressed the efficacy of redacting codefendant confessions in joint trials to eliminate references to the name or existence of the complaining defendant. See Richardson v Marsh, 481 US 200; 107 S Ct 1702; 95 L Ed 2d 176 (1987). This Court addressed the redaction issue in People v Banks, n Í5 supra.
It is conceded in this case that the codefendant confessors were not available for confrontation because they chose to exercise their Fifth Amendment rights not to testify at trial. See Douglas v Alabama, supra at 419-420.
The dissent notes that Bruton, which predated the general modern acceptance of statements against penal interest as falling within the statement against interest hearsay exception, observed that "[t]here is not before us . . . any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause.” Bruton, 391 US 128, n 3, quoted post, p 683. Far from suggesting that Bruton’s result might now be different in light of the statement-against-penal-interest exception, it is quite evident that this footnote dicta was meant merely to reassure the bench and bar that Bruton’s analysis did not necessarily extend to all hearsay introduced in criminal trials outside the narrow and specific context of codefendant confessions. In any event, the dissent’s assertion that "[t]oday we have a hearsay exception that addresses the caveat left open in Bruton,” post, p 683, incorrectly suggests that the issue arguably left open by the cited footnote in Bruton has remained open to this day. It has not. As discussed in the text, Lee, postdating by a decade the general acceptance of statements against penal interest, squarely addressed the issue and provides clear guidance on it, guidance directly contradicting the reasoning and conclusion of the dissent.
The dissent asserts that "[t]he Lee Court did not hold . . . that an inculpatory statement admitted under the penal interest exception violates the Confrontation Clause,” post, p 695, n 26. But the Court in Lee, just as in this case, was presented with the argument that the codefendant confession there at issue was properly admissible in its entirety, as a statement against penal interest. Just as in this case, the codefendant confession in Lee contained separate and discrete statements, some of which were clearly against interest and some of *654which were clearly self-serving accusations directed at the codefen-dant. It would be a gross distortion of Lee’s holding to suggest that Lee ruled the confession inadmissible simply because it concluded that the confession was not, overall, a statement against interest. Rather, as we discuss and explain in the text, Lee rejected, as a theoretical matter, the analytical usefulness of categorizing such accomplice confessions as "statements against penal interest,” even though that categorization might be partially accurate.
Lee did not "le[ave] open the situation that we are addressing today.” Post, p 695, n 26. The situation presented here is fundamentally similar, for relevant analytical purposes, to that presented in Lee, and is closely and directly governed by Lee’s analysis.
See also, e.g., United States v Layton, 855 F2d 1388, 1406 (CA 9, 1988) (involving a statement "uttered voluntarily to a trusted advi-sor”).
As the dissent elsewhere acknowledges, see post, p 696, it is, of course, the burden of the prosecution, as the proponent of the disputed evidence, to disprove and overcome the heavy presumption of unreliability cloaking such hearsay statements.
The dissent, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight and advanced legal training, finds this argument "remarkable.” Post, p 700, n 31. We can only say that we find it perfectly predictable and unremarkable that a relatively uneducated layperson, under the stress and anxiety of custodial police interrogation, might (albeit mistakenly) think that he might possibly benefit from telling the police what they so clearly want to hear. We doubt that the police in such situations risk losing valuable voluntary confessions by pointing out to such confessors that, in fact, they may have nothing to gain.
Lee referred to the "desire, motive, or impulse [the confessor] may have had either to mitigate the appearance of his own culpability by spreading the blame or to overstate [the accused’s] involvement . . . .” 476 US 544 (emphasis added). The Court went on to observe that "[fli is worth noting that the record indicates that [the confessor] not only had a theoretical motive to distort the facts to [the accused’s] detriment, but that he also was actively considering the possibility of becoming her adversary . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). This language clearly indicates that the Court was simply "noting” the existence of further evidence that happened to support excluding the hearsay in Lee, not suggesting an evidentiary requirement for exclusion that must be satisfied in every case. It certainly does not suggest that the mere absence of such additional affirmative evidence of unreliability —in the instant case, the absence of evidence that the police explicitly sought to induce the confessors to inculpate their suspected accomplices — could overcome the heavy presumption of untrustwor-thiness. The Court noted that the record in Lee simply "documented]” what it viewed as a general and ever-present "reality of the criminal process, namely, that once partners in a crime recognize that the 'jig is up,’ they tend to lose any identity of interest and immediately become antagonists, rather than accomplices.” Id. at 544-545.
See, e.g., McCormick, Evidence (3d ed), § 279, p 826 ("It has been held that the fact of custody alone, with its attendant likelihood of motivation by a desire to curry favor with the authorities, bars a finding that the statement was against interest and requires exclusion”) (emphasis added); Sarmiento-Perez, 633 F2d 1102 (referring to motivation to curry favor, among others, as being among "circumstances that inhere in the making of virtually every custodial confession”) (emphasis added); Brensic, 70 NY2d 15 (in custodial questioning, "the declarant is likely to have a 'strong motive to falsify’ in order to curry favor, shift blame, receive immunity from prosecution or obtain a favorable plea bargain”) (emphasis added).
Wright does not conflict with the requirement in FRE 804(b)(3) and MRE 804(b)(3) of corroboration as a necessary condition of admitting a hearsay statement against penal interest where offered to exculpate a criminal defendant, a requirement that most persuasive authorities also apply to such statements where offered to inculpate a defendant. See part 11(A), ns 9, 14. Wright simply holds, for Confrontation Clause purposes, that corroborative evidence can never be sufficient, even in part, to support the admission of presumptively unreliable hearsay — that is, that such evidence cannot weigh disposi-tively in favor of admission when the other indicia do not already support admission. The corroboration requirement of FRE 804(b)(3) and MRE 804(b)(3) simply imposes, as a matter of evidence law, an additional and necessary condition of admissibility in one narrow context. That is, even where a hearsay statement is shown to be truly against interest and to otherwise bear sufficient inherent indicia of reliability to be admissible, the added requirement of corroboration is imposed in that one narrow context. Thus, even if a given hearsay statement against interest were properly found constitutionally admissible under Lee and Wright, without consideration of corroborative evidence, it might still be found inadmissible under the governing hearsay analysis (whether state or federal) for lack of the necessary corroboration.
Both the Court and the dissenting opinion in Wright were fully aware of the conflict with the Lee and Cruz dicta on this point. See *666Wright, 111 L Ed 2d 657-658 and n * (opinion of the Court), 662-663 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). It should be recalled that even in Lee the Court expressed considerable skepticism about the validity of the interlock theory, and, of course, found that it did not support the reliability of the disputed hearsay in that case. See Lee, 476 US 545-546.