(dissenting). I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
The Supreme Court remanded this case to us “to consider the existence of nuisance per se and public nuisance exceptions to immunity, and their applicability to [this case] if, and to the extent that, they were properly raised before the Court of Appeals.” Li v Feldt (After Remand) and Garcia v City of Jackson (After Remand), 434 Mich 584, 596; 456 NW2d 55 (1990).
*203Throughout the six years of appellate proceedings in this case, the only issue ever raised before this Court is whether plaintiffs pleaded a cause of action for intentional nuisance. Whether or not plaintiffs’ pleadings alleged a nuisance per se or public nuisance has never been "properly raised before the Court of Appeals.” Id., p 596.1 therefore consider it beyond the scope of the Supreme Court’s remand order to engage, as the majority does, in any further consideration of plaintiffs’ pleadings. It is also beyond the scope of the remand order to burden the trial court with the task of deciding whether plaintiffs have pleaded a claim constituting a nuisance per se or public nuisance.
Ultimately, the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for intentional nuisance was consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Li, supra. Because plaintiffs have raised no issue other than the correctness of that determination, I would affirm.